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Singapore prides itself in being a model and world-class multiracial nation in which 
over 80% of its residents live in good public housing. Through a very particular system 
of ‘ownership,’ 90% of public housing residents own their flat (Housing Development 
Board 2020). The state’s unusual degree of control over urban space across the five 
decades since its founding has determined the social location of housing. Singapore 
first began as a developmental state, later becoming a property state where public 
housing residents were regarded as clients of the state, and where, given the current 
extent of public housing, (re)housing has increasingly acted as an important socio-
spatial praxis of state-led capitalism (Shatkin 2014). Singapore’s housing achievement 
is viewed more impressive because there is no stigma attached to public housing. Yet 
a sustained housing hierarchy remains, and crucially overlaps with Singapore’s socio-
ethnic stratification. There has therefore been a core tension at the heart of the state’s 
multiracial nation-building: whilst the government recognises and makes a virtue of 
the multiraciality of the nation-state, majoritarian priorities have nevertheless 
characterised Singapore’s evolving nation-building project for more than half a 
century. One consequence has been the continued marginalisation of its socio-
economically more disadvantaged Malay community.  
This study thus asks: can we understand the state’s housing policies over the past 50 
years as instruments of both multiracial nation-building and state-led capitalist 
development – and with what consequences for those most socio-economically 
disadvantaged, the Malays? In exploring housing policies directly through the 
experiences of Malay residents, I chart the spectrum of experiences of those who lived 
the sharp end of Singapore’s nation-building housing policies. I do this 
methodologically through the innovative use of ‘housing biographies.’ As I deploy it 
here, this is a form of narrated history of a person’s housing life with the aim of seeing 
how structural realities, at the site of constrained agency, are embodied in individual 
housing lives. Additionally, I contextualise these housing biographies with a variety 
of historical data sources: newspapers, census data, policy documents, land lot history, 
maps and photographs. On the basis of in-depth housing biographies exploring the 
history of five Malays aged 50 to 81, I tell the story not only of their housing lives, but 
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through them that of Singapore’s state-driven capitalist nation-building from its 
founding in 1965 to the present. Following an empirical contextualisation chapter, the 
thesis comprises three substantive chapters. 
Chapter 4, Lives in Housing, explores Malays’ understanding of redevelopment and 
their own relocation. It shows that Malays are displaced socioeconomically and 
emotionally through social, political and legal impositions. Chapter 5, Developing the 
Multiracial State, considers the early relocation policies on the Southern Islands 
beginning in 1959, which turned the Malays into a political minority and cultural 
diaspora in the Malay-majority region. In transforming the Southern Islands into a 
leading oil refinery centre, the fragmentation of the predominantly Malay population 
in the area spatially consolidated the multiracial nation-state. Finally, Chapter 6, 
Revitalising the World-class Nation, looks at the present relocation policy known as 
Selective En Bloc Redevelopment (SERS) and at its operations in Tanglin Halt. I show 
how this new step in ongoing ‘universalist’ relocation policy, this time associated with 
clearer state fostering of property-mindedness (Haila 2017), has impacted and has been 
experienced by the Malays. Here, I find that the culture of property-mindedness as it 
exists within the larger discourse of housing as an infrastructure for social mobility, 
functions to support relocation.  
The main substantive finding is that although each period correlated with a different 
subjectivating logic – seen in how relocation policies were experienced and justified 
over time – majoritarian nation-building remained the overriding logic guiding 
housing policies. I have retrieved neglected voices that attest to the mismatch between 
the equalising discourse of housing policies and the inequalities suggested by their 
relocation experiences. The equality mandate espoused by the state’s housing policies 
misrecognises the very diversity that is acknowledged by the People’s Action Party 
(PAP) government. And in doing so, it reproduces social hierarchies and inequalities. 
Yet, there is a relative silence around inequalities especially in housing because the 
majoritarian nation-building project is shrouded in a powerful ethos of social mobility. 
On this basis, I argue that Singapore’s commitments to multiracialism and social 
mobility act as cloaking devices because they allow the misrecognition of underlying 
differences, hierarchies and inequalities. Universalist housing policies misrecognise 
 
racial inequalities and therefore perpetuate a form of majoritarian nation-building. 
Multiracial-meritocratic housing policies, which are synonymous for social mobility 






This study asks: can we understand Singapore’s housing policies over the past 
55 years, which have been touted internationally, through the biographies of its 
minority Malay residents? What can their housing stories tell us about 
Singapore as a multiracial modern city that takes pride in being a housing 
nation. Singapore’s system of public housing is seen as a model of good public 
housing for all. This widely shared belief in Singapore’s housing 
exceptionalism is also held by residents in Singapore – including the Malay 
community, which is located at the lowest rungs of the multiracial nation’s 
socioeconomic ladder. Indeed, one of the causes of Malay socioeconomic 
disparity has been linked to their resettlement into public housing under various 
policies and schemes of homeownership. Through careful listening of five 
Malays and their ‘housing biographies’ as they undergo resettlement and 
relocation over the course of 55 years, this study explores how Singapore’s 
house-moving culture – based on homeownership and what is referred to as 
“property-mindedness” – becomes subtext for the multiracial meritocracy that 
has shaped everyday life and what ‘home’ means since the state’s founding in 
1965. These five Malay biographies are seen not only as individual stories, but 
they also allow me to trace the story of housing the multiracial nation in 
Singapore over five decades. Although their housing movements cause 
discomfort and, at times, a sense of dislocation, some actually look forward to 
being state relocated. I develop three concepts: the housing nation, the notion of 
racialised property-mindedness and the construction of the indigenous migrant-
citizen. On this basis, this thesis argues that housing policies that represent 
social mobility in Singapore are in themselves sources of racialised inequality. 
As such, the thesis offers stories that go beyond the singular story of housing 
success. It hopes to offer a more nuanced and complex historical narrative of 
how Singapore became a nation-state with enviable and exceedingly high 
 viii 
homeownership rates, whilst paying careful attention to the costs that this 
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Chapter 1 | Home but not ours 
 
The name is home but not our home. Home, but not ours. It is not true 
ownership. If we were living on the islands, we could call it our home, our 
place, our birthplace, that it belongs to us. Previously, I could say I’m 
proud to be born on Bukom Kechil, my home, my great grandfather’s land. 
But [my home] now, what can I say about it – where it is located and how 
big? I cannot be proud about this. If previously, I feel proud staying on the 
island, where the land belongs to my great grandfather. 
This was 64-year-old Hans’ way of expressing how home in Singapore had changed for 
him. He was clear as to how he defined home. Later, he would profess a desire to balik 
pulau or return to the islands, but we both knew it was impossible. His first island home, 
Bukom Kechil, from which he was resettled had been converted into an oil hub, while 
his second island home, Semakau, from which he was also resettled was now a landfill. 
Both times, he was moved as part of Singapore’s wider development in becoming a 
housing nation. Because his first island home Bukom Kechil was considered appropriate 
for oil development and thereby unsafe for living, he was resettled to Semakau which 
five years later was earmarked for development as well and he was eventually resettled 
into public housing on the mainland.  
Like Hans, the majority of slum-dwellers in Singapore were resettled into public housing 
over a period of 25 years, between 1960 and 1985. In 1960, 9.1% of the populace lived 
in public housing and by 1976, half of Singapore’s resident population was housed in 
Housing Development Board (HDB) flats (Fernandez 2011: 242). Then, 25 years after 
that, by 1985, three quarters of the population in Singapore were resettled in HDB flats 
(Loh 2013: 384). In Singapore, HDB functions as the state organization responsible for 
the management of public and other housing. I use the term ‘resettlement’ rather than 
‘relocation’ because resettlement describes both a change in location and in dwelling 
type. In other words, it is a double kind of rehousing. From the government’s point of 
view, the success of their resettlement efforts was tied to HDB’s philosophy, wherein 
they believed that resettlement would be strongly opposed unless each settlement case 
is given alternative accommodation (Teh 1969). HDB further allowed residents to own 




response was overwhelming as seen by the rate of homeownership that doubled in a 
decade, from 29% in 1970 to 59% in 1980 (Phang and Helble 2016). This model of 
housing development and governance has arguably been one of the most important 
elements of the nation’s wider branding (Tan 2018: 49–56). And more specifically, 
Singapore’s urban and public housing policies are perhaps the most impressive aspect 
of its development model. Thus, the state prides itself in having a resident population 
that own their homes.   
Yet, Hans’ testimony suggests the imaginary of home in Singapore’s housing nation 
is one experienced as change, loss and impermanence. The housing nation’s 
achievement has come at a price, and this is the story that this dissertation seeks to 
retrieve. I refer to Singapore as ‘the housing nation’ since it managed to house the 
entire nation within one generation. It is also inspired by one of the earliest books 
published by the Housing Development Board documenting its early years, Housing a 
nation: 25 years of public housing in Singapore (1985). Despite its emphasis on 
housing and homeownership, however, the housing nation is ultimately about 
continual rehousing. From the beginning, then, it has been effectively an urban 
regeneration project. And it has been one that has encompassed and mobilized the 
whole nation. Indeed, we might see something of the pervasiveness of this in a recent 
high-profile dispute involving the home of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime 
minister and founder of the housing nation. Lee Kuan Yew’s grandson, Li Shengwu, 
offered a eulogy for his grandfather in which he noted the permanence and stability of 
the grandfather’s home:  
In a city of continual renewal, my grandparents’ house never changed. 
Always the same white walls, the same wooden furniture, the same high 
windows letting in sunlight. The food stayed the same too; Singapore 
cooking of a kind that would not be out of place at a good stall in a hawker1  
center2. 
 
1 Open-air hawker centres are intrinsic to Singaporean culture, being nodes for community bonding. 
Located all over Singapore, they consist of stalls selling a huge range of affordable food to people of 
different backgrounds. “Hawker management,” National Environment Agency, accessed March 23, 
2020, https://www.nea.gov.sg/our-services/hawker-management/overview.  
2 Li Shengwu, “Grandpa was our man of tomorrow: Li Shengwu,” The Straits Times, March 30, 





Yet, three years later, this sense of the stable family home deeply contrasted with a 
much-discussed legal dispute that emerged among Lee Kuan Yew’s children over the 
fate of this family home. Lee Hsien Yang and Lee Wee Ling, the second and third 
children of Lee Kuan Yew, alleged that their eldest brother – now Singapore’s current 
prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong – had wanted the family home preserved. But Lee 
Kuan Yew had wanted the house to be demolished after his death, or at least closed as 
a residence for his family and their descendants. Lee Hsien Loong was accused by his 
younger siblings of ‘manipulat[ing] their father’s name and memory’ for political 
gain (Barr 2019: 144) . This was because the family home had much heritage value; 
it was the meeting place for People’s Action Party (PAP) founding members in the 
early years when the party was being established,3 and indeed the PAP had won every 
election since 1959. We see even through the dispute of Singapore’s first family, then, 
how far and how deep the state’s control over discourse around home and housing can 
reach. As Tan (2018: 53) aptly puts it, ‘at the heart of the Singapore model is a city 
that is strictly regulated and controlled’. This means that no space or home is exempted 
from the state’s control, not even the home of Singapore’s ‘founding father’. 
This family dispute highlights another key aspect of Singapore’s nation-branding, 
which is that of preserving the Singapore Story (Tan 2018: 48). The story has been 
described as ‘the standard shorthand for the official history of Singapore as projected 
by the ruling elite’s top down nation-building project’ (Barr and Skrbiš 2008: 18). The 
Singapore Story can be summarised in five moments: the 1819 establishment of a 
British trading post by Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen, Stamford Raffles; the 
Japanese occupation of Singapore between 1942 and 1945; the beginning of self-
governance by the PAP in 1959; the merger with Malaysia in 1963 and its subsequent 
Separation from Federation of Malaysia in 1965; and, finally, PAP’s present leadership 
of Singapore from the developing world to developed (ibid.: 21–3). Whilst shaped by 
popular histories of Singapore (Turnbull 1989; Chew et al. 1991), Lee Kuan Yew 
 
3 Kelly Ng, “Lee Kuan Yew’s Oxley Road home has ‘architectural, heritage and historical 






remains its chief protagonist, and in fact, his autobiography is The Singapore Story: 
Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (1998). This characterises the relationship between Lee 
Kuan Yew’s biography and the national narrative as ‘simultaneously one of 
synecdoche and metonym’ (Hong and Huang 2008: 31). Preserving his family or 
ancestral home is thus made all the more compelling because Lee Kuan Yew had 
authored ‘the Singapore Story’. What would otherwise be a typical domestic conflict 
over the family home among the Lees is one that becomes embroiled and entangled in 
Singapore’s unique form of urban and heritage redevelopment – that is, it is in constant 
service of propagating the Singapore Story. In short, the Lee family conflict not only 
highlights the way in which Singapore’s nation-branding or ‘brand Singapore’ is 
inextricably linked to the ‘Lee brand’ (see Purdey and Barr 2016), but also the way in 
which it defines all Singaporeans and their housing lives. 
Yet invisibilities and racialised silences in this entwined historical narrative and its 
valorisations persist. The year of Lee Kuan Yew’s death coincided with Singapore’s 
50th anniversary celebrations since its 1965 independence. The ‘state sponsorship of 
widespread national nostalgia’ (Tan 2018: 48) through different heritage projects and 
events was branded as SG50 (Singapore 50) in 2015 and later, as the ‘Singapore 
Bicentennial’ in 2019. The latter was to commemorate the 200th anniversary of Raffles 
landing in Singapore. Yet, both did not extend the Singapore Story beyond its ‘colonial 
founding’ in 1819. Despite the revisions in national memory, the same selective 
remembering - and forgetting - applied (for exceptions, see Borschberg 2010; Miksic 
2010; Kwa et al. 2019). While the state was interested in ‘officially’ remembering 
Lee’s family home, it was only during SG50 that the presence of the Southern Islands 
– Hans’ family home – was acknowledged. Funded by the Singapore Memory Project 
as part of the SG50 celebrations, a documentary project called Island Nation is 
described as ‘tell[ing] the stories of people who once lived on the islands of southern 
Singapore [with the aims of] weav[ing] it into the broader narrative of Singapore’s 
nationhood’4. Yet, the most basic detail about the islands was absent from the 
 





narrative: it had been home to a predominantly Malay population. In the paragraphs 
that follow, I outline what ‘home’ might have been and meant for Malays, from the 
ancestral home in the cultural community, through colonial Singapore and finally in 
today’s postcolonial Singapore.  
 
Malay homes in historical contexts 
My account of what may be referred to as the housing biography of Malays on the 
Singaporean archipelago fills the gaps of Malay history within the Singapore Story. 
As I was writing this biography, I realised that home had always been on the move for 
Malays in Singapore.  Relocation, which began as a choice, was later increasingly 
enforced on the Malays when they started to live by and inside the nation-state 
category. It is thus important to understand the changing character of the homes in 
which Malays in Singapore had been housed.  
Home before colonial Singapore 
The Malays’ first - and arguably wider cultural “home” – was the Nusantara, which 
‘corresponds historically to the Indonesian and Malay sphere of influence… [that] 
includes the territories of the pre-colonial Sri-Vijaya, Majapahit, Johor-Riau and 
Malacca Kingdoms’ (Rahim 2009: 184). In 1965, Lee Kuan Yew noted that: 
Malays began to migrate to Malaysia in noticeable numbers only 700 years 
ago… Therefore, it is wrong and illogical for a particular racial group to 
think that they are more justified to be called Malaysians and that the other 
can become Malaysians through their favour (Cited in Fletcher 1969: 58).   
This however ignores the historical realities of ‘atavistic internal migration within the 
Malay world’ (Rahim 2009: 33). Such regional migration is known as merantau, 
defined as ‘leav[ing] one’s home, one’s relatives, one’s home village or country either 
temporarily, for a very long time or even forever’ (Wang 1985: 44). Part of word 
rantau, which means region, validates merantau as a form of migration restricted to 
the Malay region. Not only is the culture of merantau ‘deeply rooted in the culture of 




to Lee Kuan Yew’s assertions, Malays were indigenous to the lands of the Malay 
Archipelago, in which regional migrations and mobilities were an integral part of their 
lives and livelihood.  
The earliest reference to Malay settlements in what is now Singapore was in the 13th 
century. Seven settlements were recorded in the Sejarah Melayu (The Malay Annals), 
an important Malay historical work that was written or revised between 1614 and 1615. 
These settlements were located in Telok Blangah, Tanjung Ru, Tanah Merah, Padang 
Temasik Kallang, Seletar and Bukit Singapura. The last settlement, which is now 
renamed Fort Canning, was most important because it was home to the Malay rulers 
of the Temasik Kingdom (1275–1400) (Rahmat 2008). Temasik was however more 
than the centre of ceremonial activity (Miksic 2000: 60).  
Different parts of the settlement were used for quite different and specific 
activities […] Singapore was not simply an outpost dependent on tapping 
long distance maritime trade passing by its shores. It was also an importer 
of raw materials and exporter or at least producer and consumer of finished 
artifacts. In this respect, Singapore resembles the growing commercial 
cities of Europe of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance. 
Such archaeological material subverts the notion of a pre-1819 sleepy Malay fishing 
village in the Singapore Story. This depiction had stemmed from Singapore’s second 
British Resident, John Crawfurd, who claims that ‘for a period of about five centuries 
and a half, there is no record of Singapore having been occupied, and it was only the 
occasional resort of pirates’ (1856: 402). The presence of ‘piracy’ in the Malay 
kingdom will be discussed below but what is important to note here was that Malay 
rule continued across several settlements before the arrival of the British in 1819.  
These Malay settlements were governed by Temenggong Abdul Rahman, who was the 
third highest official after the ruler in the Johor empire. The maritime Malay empire 
was founded in the 16th century by Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah. The main settlement, 
known as Kampung Temenggong, was situated at the mouth of the Singapore River. 
The indigenous communities of Orang Laut or sea nomads also lived in the area. They 
however lived in boats and in huts built on stilts over the Singapore River (Rahmat 
2008). They were employed by the Temenggong as boatmen and as suppliers of fish 




communities included the Orang Seletar and Orang Biduanda Kallang, who were 
located in the mangroves near Seletar River and swampy areas near Kallang River 
respectively5. The Orang Laut in particular had been identified with piracy, even in 
Singapore’s history textbooks (Miharja 2014). This however contrasted with 
Portuguese sources who depict the Orang Laut’s political dominance in the kingdoms 
of Malay archipelago. This was due to ‘their maritime skills and prowess [that] made 
them a formidable force and a desirable ally for any lord aspiring to political hegemony 
in the area’ (Abdullah 2006: 83). Importantly, what is now Singapore had served as 
their home base (Kwa et al. 2009: 57). The fluid use of ‘piracy’ in the early days 
therefore needs to be embedded in the various historical and cultural contexts (Tarling 
1963; Trocki 1979). In this case, the colonial territorial conquests would be deterred 
by these Orang Laut - seen as pirates - who essentially were protecting their home 
ground.  The issue of piracy nevertheless shows how in addition to the indigenous 
Malays, what would become colonial Singapore was also ‘home’ to other smaller 
indigenous communities.  
Home in colonial Singapore 
From 1819, colonial Singapore became a new kind of home for Malays. Rahmat 
(2008) notes the disagreement regarding population figures in Singapore that ranged 
from 500 to 1000, when Stamford Raffles arrived in 1819. Common among the 
accounts was that the majority of the population was made up of Malays and other 
indigenous communities of Orang Laut, Orang Kallang and Orang Seletar (see 
Houghton 1882; Turnbull 1989; Murfett 1999). Singapore could not be regarded as a 
British possession until the 1824 Anglo-Dutch treaty that gave the colonials legal 
control over Singapore (see Wake 1975; Manogaran 2006). John Crawfurd, 
Singapore’s second British Resident, himself described the 1819 treaty as:  
[a]mount[ing] to little more than a permission for the formation of a British 
factory and establishment […] There was in reality no territorial cession 
 






giving a legal right of legislation. The only law which could have existed 
was the Malay code. The native chief was considered to be the proprietor 
of the land (cited in Buckley 1984: 40).   
In other words, the British East India Company was only allowed to set a trading post 
on the island in 1819. This was important because it meant that the 1822 Raffles Town 
Plan was ‘illegal’. Due to the influx of migrants, the town plan was implemented by 
Raffles to prevent the haphazard growth of settlements and facilitate the rapid 
economic development of Singapore. The population was racially segregated into four 
residential areas (Rahmat 2008: 362):  
[T]he European town for European traders, Eurasians and rich Asians; the 
Chinese Kampung for the ethnic Chinese, located in present-day 
Chinatown and south-east of the Singapore River; Chulia Kampung, where 
ethnic Indians originally resided, located to the north of the Chinese 
Kampung; and Kampung Glam, consisting of Muslims, mainly Malays 
and Arabs who had migrated to Singapore. 
This ‘progressive’ plan however also resulted in the first forced relocation of the 
Malays in Singapore, including the Temenggong and Sultan who were put on land 
reserves. Not only was the Temenggong not given the title to his new 200-acre land 
reserve at Telok Blangah (Suppiah 2006), the area he was relocated to was composed 
of mangrove swamps and cut off from the centre of native trade in Singapore (Gibson-
Hill 1954). The Sultan, on the other hand, was placed on a mere 56-acre land reserve 
in Kampong Glam. And by 1836, due to immigration inflows and British 
encouragement of trade, the Chinese overtook the Malays as majority residents in 
Singapore (Rahmat 2008).  
Nevertheless, beginning in 1928, the British gazetted special settlements for the 
Malays ‘to protect them from development projects’ (ibid.: 364). Four settlements - 
Kampung Melayu Jalan Eunos (1928), Kampung Ayer Gemuroh (1959), Kampung 
Melayu West Coast (1957) and Kampung Tengah, Sembawang (1962) – were 
restricted to Malay residents. These initiatives indirectly acknowledged the Malays as 
the indigenous community in Singapore. Malay kampungs (villages) continued to 
proliferate on the main island as well as the offshore islands in colonial Singapore. 
Rahmat (2008: 367) provides a comprehensive listing of the Malay kampungs on the 




[Among them were] Kampung Ayer Limau on Pulau Merlimau, Kampung 
Seraya on Pulau Seraya, Kampung Pesek on Pulau Pesek, Kampung Wak 
Sekak on Pulau Ayer Chawan, and Kampung Tanah Merah on Pulau 
Sakra. On Pulau Brani, there were Kampung Kopit and Kampung Telok 
Saga. The Malays also lived at Pulau Sudong, Pulau Semakau, Pulau 
Blakang Mati (now Sentosa) and Pulau Seking.  
Therefore, we see that historically, the Malay presence on the offshore islands was 
significant, indeed dominant and long-standing. These islands had been their ancestral 
homes. It is only recently that the history of the offshore islands and the Malay 
presence there has been acknowledged, and it pushes back the history of Singapore 
before 1819.   
Home in multiracial postcolonial Singapore  
The Malays ‘third historical home’ was in multiracial postcolonial Singapore. 
Singapore gained independence from Britain in 1963 by merging with other former 
British territories -Malaya, Sarawak and North Borneo (later renamed Sabah)- to form 
the Federation of Malaysia. The merger however lasted only two years and Separation 
from Malaysia occurred in 1965 due to ideological differences. We might see 
Separation as remaking a postcolonial home that reshaped the lives of Malays in 
Singapore once again. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Malay language was a social 
bridge and major medium of communication for the community, and in preparation 
for merger with Malaya in 1963, the PAP government made every effort to accentuate 
Singapore’s Malay identity. Yusof Ishak who was the chief editor of Utusan, the first 
Malay-owned nationalist newspaper, was installed as the island’s Yang di Pertuan 
Negara (Head of State). A national anthem Majulah Singapura was composed in the 
Malay language by another Malay, Jubir Said. All students were required to study 
Malay as a second language while teachers had to pass at least standard 1 Malay  
(Rahim 2009: 102). Today, however, we have a female, hijab-wearing Malay 
President, more than 50 years after the first and only Malay president Yusof Ishak. 
Despite these advances, the multiracial home in Singapore today is a completely 
different home than that of pre-Separation. What did it mean for the Malays to be 




For decades, Malays had been ‘living in a region where people of their own race, 
religion, culture and language, predominate and decisively hold sway in their political 
lives’(Ahmat 1971: 10). With the sudden Separation, they experienced the dilemma of 
being a minority that is ‘poor and backward’ (ibid.). Malays therefore became a socio-
economically backward minority, whilst in the wider Malay dominated region 
including Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, they were a numerical majority. Yet, the 
300,000 Malays in Singapore only formed 14.5% of its total population in 1969 (Karni 
and Dzafir 1971: 14). The odds were against them. The comparatively large family 
size among the Malays and the Malay population in Singapore which was younger on 
average than the Singaporean general population contributed to the high dependency 
burden. Only a third of Malays aged 10 and above were ‘economically active’. The 
Malays’ unemployment rate was also higher compared to other races (ibid.). Those 
Malays who were employed, a majority of them, were in the lower ranks of their 
occupations. For instance, despite constituting 17% of all government employees, 
more than 95% were in division III and IV and only 3% of all those in Divisions I and 
II were Malays (ibid.: 16).  As they try to draw on whatever formal and informal 
resources and networks they had, it was hard to enter the commerce industry because 
the commercial establishments in Singapore were ‘owned mainly by the non-Malays, 
especially the Chinese and Indians’ (ibid.: 17). All this was in spite of codified, legal 
protection. 
The constitutional provision in article 89(2) states that: 
the government shall exercise its functions in such manner as to recognize 
the special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous people of the 
state and accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the government to 
protect, safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, educational, 
religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language.  
Malay medium education and provision of scholarships and bursaries thus aimed to 
increase the opportunities open to Malays for secondary and tertiary education. PAP 
chose to continue the Malay medium education, which was started in the colonial era. 
Malay-language secondary classes and pre-university classes were thus introduced in 
1960 and in 1964 respectively. It was argued however that ‘unless the quality of Malay 




graduates command little or no economic value’ (Karni and Dzafir 1971: 12). Malay 
school leavers were then ‘forced to go into jobs which most of their English medium 
counterparts are spared of’ (Ahmat 1971: 9). 
Apart from the dearth of employment opportunities for Malays, a lack of academic 
qualifications and technical skills needed by employers contributed to their dismal 
state of employment. The Malays had a low level of education compared to other 
communities. This can be seen based on the assumption that secondary education was 
essential for employment then. In 1966, Malays comprised only 4.5% of the total 
population that had completed this stage, compared to 72.5% of Chinese and 8% of 
Indians and Pakistanis (Ahmat 1971: 8). And given the newly introduced 
multiracialism and meritocracy, their fears were steadily confirmed by the continued, 
acute lack of participation in the socio-economic development. A form of multiracial 
meritocracy had been adopted by the PAP (Moore 2000). This meant that no racial 
groups would be able to argue for racial discrimination since the meritocracy policy 
supposedly sees to ‘equal opportunities’. This also meant that gazetted Malay 
settlements were no longer safe from urban redevelopment in postcolonial Singapore, 
as seen from Hans’ and Lee’s family home discussed earlier. Rahmat (2008: 369) notes 
that:  
 [T]ension between [Malay kampung] residents and the state only ended 
in the late 1980s, when most of the demolitions of Malay kampungs and 
resettlement of Malays to new public housing estates were completed.  
Nevertheless, Hans’ account seems to suggest that the sense of disappointment and 
effect of resettlement still linger on. In order to understand the historical housing 
biography of the Malays, it is important to introduce a few conceptual tools I will be 
using to make sense of these biographies.  
  
Un-homing and its practices 
To understand these housing lives of Malays, I draw upon theories of land and urban 
redevelopment, housing, and multiracial nation-building. These housing biographies 




multiracial nation-building and state-led capitalist development. First, I draw on Haila 
(2016) and Chua (2017) to conceive of the property state-housing nation framework, 
in the bid to understand the state’s housing policies in Singapore. They allow me to 
see how (i) land and real estate, and (ii) the state ideology of anti-liberalism and social 
democracy contribute to Singapore’s resolution to the housing question. Haila’s (2016) 
concept of property state specifically highlights Singapore’s unique state ownership 
and control of land. From this framework then, I conceive of four traits that capture 
the essence of the property state-housing nation. Firstly, substantial public land 
ownership is key. The present government controls about 87% of the urban land and 
is managed by two key statutory boards under the Ministry of National Development 
– the Singapore Land Authority (SLA) and the Urban Redevelopment Authority 
(URA) – that deal with state landholdings. Singapore’s small land area enables 
comprehensive planning without the need for provincial authorities or sectoral 
interests. The SLA is responsible for state land management, which includes 
auctioning land leases to private and public sector developers; whereas the URA takes 
up the multiple roles of a land sales agency, and land use planning and conservation 
authorities. It oversees development and implementation of concept plans, master 
plans and urban design plans.  
Although the Singaporean government’s tight control over the physical environment 
is led by the rationale that ‘local environments could be modelled and controlled in 
accordance with an assumed public good’ (Yeoh 1992: 4), there is still a mix of market 
and state mechanisms - which constitutes the second trait. For instance, Wang (2012) 
observes that creation of a more heterogeneous housing landscape among the new 
public housing was facilitated by the institutional deregulation and financial liberation 
of the resale market. This in turn allowed for speculative capital through the 
consumption of space. The third and fourth aspects of the property state-housing nation 
revolve around the disposition needed to sustain it. I thus look at the fostering of 
homeownership and property-mindedness in Singapore. Many have discussed how 
public housing system in Singapore functions to secure consent for neoliberalism and 
thereby, sustain the state’s political legitimacy (Tremewan 1994). Further research is 




and habits of its residents. The Singapore government’s unusual degree of control over 
urban space determines not only the physical housing supply and so the social 
(re)positioning of different housing types, but also the housing culture that is formed 
and sustained. 
Related to the property state-housing nation is the state-led urban redevelopment in 
Singapore which started in the 1970s with a ‘demolish and rebuild’ philosophy. The 
process was aided by legal mechanisms such as the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 
1966. LAA provides the government with broad powers to acquire land – with as little 
as seven days’ notice to landowners that the land has been gazetted (Han 2005). With 
the advent of LAA, state ownership of land increased from 31% in 1949 to 80% in 
1992 (ibid.). Christudason (2004) identifies LAA as the main driving force for the 
increased redevelopment activities in Singapore in the last few years, which Teo and 
Lin (2011) add has allowed for the enhancement of plot ratio and the increase of storey 
height. I ask whether urban redevelopment in Singapore can be considered as 
‘gentrification’? First coined by Ruth Glass in 1964, gentrification refers to the 
residential movement of middle-class people into working-class neighbourhoods. 
Despite the different forms of gentrification in various cities over the years, scholars 
generally agree that gentrification refers to a physical, economic, social and cultural 
phenomenon, which ‘involves the invasion of working-class neighbourhoods by 
middle-class or higher-income groups within inner-city locations that resulted in 
replacement or displacement of the original occupants’  (Hamnett cited in Soytemel 
and Besime 2014: 67). Has ‘residential’ gentrification in Singapore moved away from 
Ruth Glass’ strict conception of working/middle gentrifying class transitions with a 
more diverse social class mix of those involved in contemporary residential 
gentrification? 
My third group of conceptual tools allows me to understand the sense of displacement 
suggested by Hans. I am particularly interested in displacement that revolves around 
home.  Thus, I have chosen the concept of un-homing (Elliott-Cooper et al. 2020) as a 
lens with which to explain the Malay acquiescence towards redevelopment, 
resettlement, and relocation. I understand un-homing as the process which cuts links 




place, and such displacement manifests ‘through a range of modalities, including 
experiential, financial, social, familial and ecological’ (ibid.: 494). 
Could un-homing be linked to the loss of majority status and economic uncertainty 
due to Separation? The emphasis on connections will allow me to look at different un-
homing processes. If resettlement or relocation means displacement that occurs on 
many different levels at the same time, I seek to identify these different levels through 
the housing biographies. This would thus expand the current conceptualisation of un-
homing (Elliott-Cooper et al. 2020). Since un-homing requires a more dynamic 
understanding of displacement, I also draw on ‘longitudinal displacement’ that is 
inspired by Shin (2019) and identify Atkinson’s (2015) symbolic displacement and 
Elliott-Cooper et al.’s phenomenological displacement (2020) that enable such a long 
term view of displacement. Atkinson’s (2015: 382) concept of symbolic displacement 
is defined as ‘the sense of a loss of place’. Phenomenological displacement, on the 
other hand, is more specific, referring to the forced disconnection from a familiar 
place. Since the dissertation explores biographical accounts of displacement, these 
three concepts will allow me to examine the forms of displacement even when the 
respondents are not being relocated or resettled. Clearly, displacement is not just 
physical but more affective. In the following, I explain how I approached my 
respondents, data collection and the issues that emerged.  
 
Home but not ours?  
All of the five Malay protagonists lived in flats and owned their homes. They, along 
with 80% of the Singapore’s population, live in public housing6. While they came from 
various socioeconomic backgrounds, they all resided in the central region of Singapore 
and had experienced state relocation at one point in their lives. Yet, they are also 
singular in one respect - with the exception of the youngest protagonist aged 50, they 
 
6 “About us,” Housing and Development Board, accessed October 2, 





have lived longer than the nation-state of Singapore. Only 30% of the Malay 
population are aged 50 and over, with less than 10% aged 65 and over7. Three of my 
protagonists belong in the latter group. I spent over a year speaking to those who lived 
in Tanglin Halt and previously on the Southern Islands, hoping to learn as much of 
their housing lives as possible. Given the different relationships I had with each 
protagonist, however, some of them allowed me ‘in’ to see more than the others and 
opened up parts of their lives that had been silent until then. Being Malay myself, born 
and bred in Singapore, I did not require an interpreter, and this helped create a greater 
sense of intimacy and sharing. And with all the protagonists whom I called Cik 
(informal term for aunty and uncle), it was likened to sharing secrets with me – ones 
that they felt I could somehow understand and perhaps relate to. This sensitized me to 
pay careful attention to their housing experiences as embedded within the wider 
context of being a Malay in Singapore. My protagonists were selected from twenty 
respondents that I interviewed in the course of this research.  
I had conducted interviews with twenty people involved in the early resettlement 
policy in Bukom Kechil and the current state relocation policy in Tanglin Halt. I met 
most of the former Bukom Kechil residents in their houses and I was introduced to 
them through snowball sampling. My conversations with them were more lengthy and 
‘open’. In comparison, I interviewed residents of Tanglin Halt in public places and had 
shorter ‘chats’. Three of them however did invite me to their homes for a more in-
depth conversation. Whilst the data chapters in this dissertation do not draw directly 
on these interviews and conversations, they were critical in helping to shape and focus 
the direction of the research, and in particular helped me to sharpen the in-depth 
interviews with the five Malay protagonists that in the end formed the core of this 
study. Additionally, I interviewed real estate agents, four of whom specialised in areas 
that were involved in state relocation. Because I was working with the contentious 
topic of state relocations, both ongoing and historical, I was unable to obtain much 
information either at the National Archives or Housing Development Board. 
 
7 “Singapore residents by age group, ethnic group and sex (2019),” Department of Statistics 





Therefore, I collected government reports such as land lot history of ownership and 
made use of publicly available statistics.  
My first foray into Tanglin Halt explored the elderly Malay experience with relocation 
in Singapore. I began by conducting group interviews, chatting with residents in 
different hawker centres, void decks8, and even corridors. Less focus group discussion, 
they were very casual ‘collective conversations’ (see Kamberelis and Dimitriadis 
2013). I was open to people joining these discussions at any time. I approached the 
discussions in very open and general terms by asking their housing chronology, ‘was 
this your first flat and what was it like first moving into the flat?’ They were excited 
about telling their stories, which revolved around their homes in the past, but were 
visibly hesitant to talk more about the upcoming Selective En bloc Redevelopment 
Scheme (SERS), which will be explained in greater detail later. I however take it to be 
an indication of how difficult and sensitive the topic of (re)housing could be, and that 
their experiences with housing might be somewhat different from their quick positive 
responses. This prompted me to give more careful consideration to their general 
housing experience. I then decided to ask them to compare their housing experiences 
over the years. While group interviews helped create trust in terms of understanding 
my research and a safe environment for the respondents to talk, these respondents seem 
to gatekeep other respondents who held themselves back. Absent their own in-depth 
narrations, I could say little that was meaningful about how these resettlement and 
relocations might have affected them in terms of fractured relationships and other un-
homing processes. 
I then used the in-depth interviews to find out more about their housing biographies. 
Through these interviews, I found a disconnect between the sense of displacement that 
emerged from their stories and the success narrative of the housing nation. Two 
protagonists were resettled from the Southern Islands, two others are involved with the 
present SERS at Tanglin Halt, whereas the last is involved in both. Each housing 
 
8 Void deck refers to the open space on the ground floor of a block of HDB flats, designed for communal 





biography makes up the nation’s housing history, if only versions of it. Together, these 
five housing biographies show how two housing moments - the resettlement from the 
Southern Islands and SERS - shaped lives in different ways, and each articulated what 
they felt was most consequential for them. I therefore followed their narratives thus. 
For this reason, I refer to them as protagonists, in recognition of their own narrative 
agency. Alexievich (2016) similarly uses the term protagonists rather than 
‘respondents’ or ‘participants’ or even ‘interlocutors’. Ultimately, when people tell 
their stories, they remain protagonists. Their willingness to share their stories – even 
against a wider silenced context – demonstrates a distinctive form of narrative agency, 
not least in recovering their lost homes, even if only in the form of memories and 
stories. The use of the term of housing biography is designed to capture how Malays 
lived through the nation-state’s own housing history – and with it, how they endure its 
inequalities. Singapore’s biography is seen through their biography, and the other way 
around. These lifelong biographical housing narratives seem better able to show how 
Malays witness, experience, and narrate the successful housing nation in terms of its 
practices. Did their housing stories fit into Singapore’s grand narrative of success and 
why? What has been silenced and why? This underscores the importance of listening 
sociologically to ‘the fragments, the voices and stories that are otherwise passed over 
or ignored’ (Back 2007: 1).  
I deepen some of the findings that the housing interviews had generated, through the 
use of housing biographies and the range of subjectivities that emerged in connection 
with these. The essence of each housing biography is summarised with a descriptor to 
highlight the specific subject position that each protagonist embraces. For my five 
protagonists, the uneven changing housing landscape they had to manoeuvre through 
the years can be seen through the different subjectivities produced and embodied. Yet, 
they too stand in for common experiences, for instance ‘the property-minded Malay’ 
shows the kind of property-mindedness and problems fostering this specific culture 
that a Malay in Singapore might encounter. Thus, while they do not offer clarity, what 
they do offer is a glimpse into the structural restrictions that other Malays too face in 
their lives. The ultimate emphasis on subjectivity nevertheless is ‘to theorise not an 




that in retrieving some of these silenced stories, this thesis may contribute to a fuller 
understanding of some of the costs exacted in the building of Singapore as a world-
class housing nation.  
It is through stories that my Malay protagonists made sense of their lives; how could I 
then make sense of their stories? There were few sources that could help contextualise 
these housing biographies. The silent history of Southern Islands became increasingly 
apparent when access to what few sources I had were restricted, including the National 
Archives. I then turned to newspaper reports with the aim of constructing the timeline 
of Bukom's resettlement within the broader Southern Islands resettlement, and to 
examine the newspaper coverage surrounding these resettlements. I sought to 
understand how narratives of resettlement in different time periods and contexts were 
constructed and represented, especially the explanation given for the resettlement and 
its implications on the resident population. For instance, Hans highlighted the political 
reasons for the Southern Islands’ resettlement, which was non-existent in newspapers, 
that only noted the economic necessity for the resettlement. I thus paid attention to the 
kind of notions that were evoked such as conflict or vulnerability. In particular, I 
wanted to see if land ownership had become a central frame for reporting on the issue. 
While resettlement had been an ongoing concern for these residents, the issue had 
never been about losing control over territory, but rather that this was their home. I 
then looked at the positioning of the affected residents and families, Shell and the 
government and their respective representations. Although there was more newspaper 
coverage for Tanglin Halt, I found it to be couched in the jargon of development. There 
was little written on the history of the area in terms of its first-generation residents that 
were from the Southern Islands, nor was much ink spilled over the impact of SERS on 
its residents. While feelings about relocation were individual and differed from 
household to household, the image of SERS in the newspapers was largely 
homogenous and positive. Race was largely absent in these narratives. How did SERS 
impact the Malay community? 
One of the issues that was regarded important in the housing biographies was 
ownership and as explored in Chapter 5, state ownership of land is also the primary 




of land ownership in the Southern Islands. The prime source of land ownership 
information in Singapore is the public land-register, which is the authoritative record 
on the ownership of all properties. Did ‘residents of this Shell project’ (Berita Harian 
31 December 1968) as narrated in the newspapers own any part of Bukom Kechil at 
any point of time? When I told my protagonists that one of two areas that had not been 
state-owned belonged to an Arab, my Malay protagonists tried to figure out possible 
explanations. To their knowledge, the island never had Arabs living there. However, 
these distant landowners played a significant role in the land transactions on the 
islands. Not only did they hold the biggest plot of land on Bukom Kecil, it was the first 
plot of land to be sold to the state. I understood this as an indication between two 
understandings of ownership, occupying or living in the area and legally acquiring the 
space. This prompted me to consider the wider relationship between ownership and 
home, and what home meant to them in Chapter 4.  
In working through my data, I realised that their experiences, especially with SERS, 
necessarily involved real estate agents, even when they did not hire them. When I went 
around the blocks in Tanglin Halt, there were flyers placed at the front gates (Figure 
1). I understood that with SERS, the area became visibly shaped by the culture of 
property-mindedness. I explored this in Chapter 6. I thus interviewed real estate agents 
about their assessment of the growing interest in Tanglin Halt reported in the 
newspapers. What was their take on the newspaper coverage of Tanglin Halt? What 
kind of demand and supply of housing units did the neighbourhood experience, 
compared to other SERS-affected areas? I was especially interested in real estate 
agents that specialised in SERS housing units. While real estate agents were market 
experts, these SERS-specialists would be niche experts then who would be familiar 
with the resident profiles of SERS areas and they were able to tell me about the kind 







Figure 1: Flyer distributed by real estate agents 
 
 
Thus, Chapter 4, Lives in Housing, will first explore Malays’ understanding of 
redevelopment and their own relocation. It will show that Malays are displaced 
socioeconomically and emotionally through social, political and legal impositions. 
Chapter 5, Developing the Multiracial State, will then consider the early relocation 
policies on the Southern Islands beginning in 1959, which turned the Malays into a 
political minority and cultural diaspora in the Malay-majority region. In transforming 
the Southern Islands into a leading oil refinery centre, the fragmentation of the 
predominantly Malay population in the area spatially consolidated the multiracial 
nation-state. Finally, Chapter 6, Revitalising the World-class Nation, will look at the 
present relocation policy known as SERS and at its operations in Tanglin Halt. I will 
show how this new step in ongoing ‘universalist’ relocation policy, this time associated 
with clearer state fostering of property-mindedness (Haila 2017), has impacted and has 
been experienced by the Malays. Here, I find that the culture of property-mindedness 
as it exists within the larger discourse of housing as an infrastructure for social 
mobility, functions to support relocation.  
My overall argument is that although each period correlated with a different 
subjectivating logic – seen in how relocation policies were experienced and justified 
over time – majoritarian nation-building remained the overriding logic guiding 
housing policies. I have retrieved neglected voices that attest to the mismatch between 
the equalising discourse of housing policies and the inequalities suggested by their 




misrecognises the very diversity that is acknowledged by the PAP government. And 
in doing so, it reproduces social hierarchies and inequalities. Yet, there is a relative 
silence around inequalities especially in housing because the majoritarian nation-
building project is shrouded in a powerful ethos of social mobility. On this basis, I will 
argue that Singapore’s commitments to multiracialism and social mobility act as 
cloaking devices because they allow the misrecognition of underlying differences, 
hierarchies and inequalities. Universalist housing policies misrecognise racial 
inequalities and therefore perpetuate a form of majoritarian nation-building. 
Multiracial-meritocratic housing policies, which are synonymous for social mobility 
in Singapore, paradoxically continue to (re)produce class and cultural stratifications. 
In order to further understand these housing policies, I attempt to theoretically situate 
housing between multiracial nation-building and urban redevelopment in Singapore, 





Chapter 2 | Theorising housing between multiracial 
nation-building and urban redevelopment 
 
The chapter aims to situate Malays’ housing lives in Singapore between theories of 
land and urban redevelopment, housing and multiracial nation-building. This will help 
highlight how the state’s housing policies over the past 55 years have been instruments 
of both multiracial nation-building and state-led capitalist development, and with what 
consequences for the most socio-economically disadvantaged, the Malays. Three 
interrelated theoretical issues underlie this objective, and are elaborated in this chapter. 
First, the chapter reviews the ways in which two key defining concepts for this thesis, 
‘property state’ and ‘housing nation’, taken together, cast light on and explain 
Singapore’s much vaunted housing success. Urban redevelopment has been at the core 
of this model and of the work of the Singaporean state to uphold the multiracial 
housing nation; yet in the second section of this chapter, I review the changing 
dynamics of state-led urban redevelopment schemes in Singapore, and their fostering 
of racialised hierarchies. As I will show, the framework formed by the two inter-related 
concepts of ‘property state’ and ‘housing nation’ does not sufficiently account for the 
question of Malay relocation and relegation, and the matter of Malay housing 
constitutes a blind spot in this framework. A proper investigation of this question 
requires a re-assessment of the role of housing policies as instruments of multiracial 
nation-building from the founding of Singapore in 1965 to the present. In the third 
section of this chapter I therefore explain the workings of race and multiracialism in 
Singapore’s nation-building efforts, so as to inform my later assessment of the housing 
pillar of that edifice. I end the chapter with the notions of displacement and ‘un-






A property state-housing nation framework  
The greatest success story of ‘Singapore as model’ (Chua 2011) lies in housing. 
Singapore’s forte in housing was recognised internationally just four years after its 
establishment in 1960, when the then-Chairman of HDB, Lim Kim San, was given the 
1964 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Community Leadership for his efforts ‘in 
improving public housing in Singapore’ (Quah 1975: 1). Singapore became a member 
of the United Nations Committee on Building, Housing and Planning in 1967. This 
was regarded an accomplishment given the size of the young nation. In the same year, 
the Second Afro-Asian Housing Congress ‘called upon all Governments of Afro-Asian 
countries to intensify their efforts in the field of public housing and commended 
Singapore as worthy of study in the field of large-scale public housing’ (Quah 1975: 
2). By 1988, numerous countries, including the Soviet Union, South Korea, Japan, 
China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Malaysia had 
sent representatives to Singapore to study its housing programmes (Tai 1988: 96). 
Singapore has continued to assist countries such as China, Vietnam and Myanmar to 
develop their housing programs. In 2008, HDB received the UN Public Service Award 
for the Home Ownership Programme before being conferred the most prestigious 
human settlements award in the world, the 2010 UN-Habitat Scroll of Honour. 
Here, I will assess the proposition that housing management is considered the most 
promising aspect of the oft-touted ‘Singapore model’ by jointly considering Anne 
Haila’s ‘property state’ (2016) and Chua Beng Huat’s ‘social democracy’ (2017). 
Whilst the former illustrates the importance of land and real estate in engendering 
Singapore’s economic success, the latter elucidates how the state’s joint ideology of 
anti-liberalism and social democracy contributed to the resolution of the housing 
question in Singapore. Haila argues that Singapore’s housing success is tied to the 
policies and institutions that allow Singapore to function as a ‘property state’, notably 
state ownership of land and their control of land use. Chua attributes Singapore’s 
housing success to PAP’s ‘anti-liberal’ and ‘social democracy’ ideology. Both 
nevertheless examine the components of ‘property-owning democracy’ of Singapore 
(Kwang et al. 2011: 201). An exemplary property state (Haila 2016) effectively uses 




regime of regulating public land’ (Haila 2016: 215) lies in its ‘(i) monopolisation of 
land and (ii) active interventionist role of the state in managing real estate for certain 
desired national goals or outcome’ (Pow 2017: 60). The convergence of Haila’s and 
Chua’s lenses can be made manifest: I will refer to the ‘property state-housing nation’ 
as a nation-state which has monopoly of land and exercises heavy state intervention in 
land use and real estate to achieve national objectives characterised as both socially 
democratic and anti-liberal. In what follows I explore four features of what, drawing 
on Haila’s and Chua’s complementary analyses, I will call the ‘property state-housing 
nation’, which I will recapitulate further below. 
The first pillar of the property state is its substantial public land ownership. 90% of 
land in Singapore is publicly owned, which gives the state complete control over land-
use decisions. After owning the land, it then regulates land use firstly through leasing 
the ground to developers. The landowning state leases the land for defined time periods 
(30-, 60-, or 99-year leases). In Singapore, land is either held leasehold or freehold, 
and the conditions in the lease define the use of land. This means that land ownership 
is not absolute: both land and buildings revert to the government on the expiry of leases 
(Haila 2016, see Chapter 5). State ownership of land enables the Singaporean state to 
use its land for economic growth: ‘state land in Singapore is treated as a use value 
(public housing and industrial space), as exchange value (leased for private 
developers) and as a source of public revenue (land leases and property tax)’ (Haila 
2016: 16). More specifically, real estate matters for growth through land rent (Haila 
2000): other than land and buildings being significant sources of public revenue, 
property and development companies constitute an important portion of the stock 
markets, whereas expatriate housing is a ‘channel to fix part of the profits produced by 
MNCs locating in Singapore’ (Haila 2000: 2249, Pow 2017).  
The second pillar of the property state is characterised by the blend of market dynamics 
and state intervention in land and real estate. On one hand, public ownership of land 
allows land to be used for the greater good such as public housing. It determines land 
value and influences the social relations of rent by removing absolute rent. Absolute 
rent refers to ‘a withholding and hoarding type of speculation’ (Haila 2016: Glossary). 




speculation is absent. At the same time, the state seeks to maximise ‘fiscal rent’ which 
refers to ‘public revenue from the use of state or municipality land’ (Haila 2016: xx). 
It allows private developers to thrive, but under close watch, and imposes policy 
changes where required. But private developers also face direct competition from the 
government in land development. To achieve transparency and maintain 
competitiveness between developers, land is leased through public auctions. Land 
development is managed by the state through its four land institutions: the Singapore 
Land Authority (SLA), Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), Housing 
Development Board (HDB) and Jurong Town Corporation (JTC).  
Thus, Singapore’s housing and urban development is characterised both by a buoyant 
real estate market and a high level of state intervention. How did such unusual degree 
of state control over urban space become legitimised in Singapore? The answer lies in 
the way in which state control was put in the service of fostering homeownership. 
From the start, homeownership was presented by the government as ‘a means of giving 
ordinary citizens a stake in the national economy’ (Chua in Rodan et al. 2019: 200). 
Singapore homeowners were effectively made ‘clients of the state’, where they 
depended on state’s provision - in this case, the universal public housing provision 
(Chua 2000). At the same time, homeownership became a key pillar of the social 
compact between the state and citizens, across both middle and lower classes, which I 
discuss below. 
Indeed, public housing is the third pillar of the property state-housing nation. For Chua, 
Singapore’s particular brand of social democracy can be seen in a) (subsidised) public 
housing (in a ‘property state’, land is treated as public good), b) multiracialism (racial 
harmony as a common good) and c) state capitalism (profits are redistributed back to 
the people9). Chua (ibid.) analyses Singapore’s public housing programme as PAP’s 
strongest commitment to social democratic values. He criticises the trope of the alleged 
 
9 A proportion of the profits are channelled to the national reserve as well as finance government 
expenditure such as in the area of social spending where it ‘contributes directly to the social welfare 





reign of authoritarianism and free-market capitalism in Singapore as reductionist 
explanations for Singapore’s material and political success. While not a ‘[full] social 
democracy, elements of social democratic values were institutionalized in the early 
years of the PAP government [which] remain in place’ (Chua in Rodan et al. 2019: 
204). The forms of Singapore’s peculiar social democracy have evolved over time, but 
social redistributive policies have been a consistent feature according to Chua (2017). 
The state draws on a form of ‘communitarian ideology’ (see Chua 1995) which 
justifies state interventions, ensuring collective and societal wellbeing as opposed to 
privileging individual rights.  
Chua (2017) suggests that elements of social democracy and anti-liberalism can be 
found in public housing. The provision of public housing is universal, it is not only 
meant for the socially disadvantaged. Subsidised public housing as public good 
provides affordable housing for the majority of its citizens. They are allowed to 
purchase these 99-year leaseholds. Unlike in other countries, 95% of these public 
housing residents are owners who are able to sell their flats on the housing market at 
market price. This means that the flats remain public housing even after they are sold. 
The high rate of ownership in Singapore is made possible, then, by letting these 
homeowners use their social security savings fund (CPF) – to which the worker and 
her employer contribute – to buy property and make mortgage payments.  
In addition, public housing is part of an asset-based social security system as the flat 
can be monetized for retirement capital. Homeownership is enabled by the 
nationalization of land that dismisses ‘the sacrosanct liberal value of private property’ 
(Chua 2017: 96). Yet, the state’s commitment to affordable homeownership requires 
continuous monitoring of both housing supply and prices. By encouraging the nation 
to invest in public housing, the state ‘also bears the responsibility of ensuring the 
stability of the housing market and the value of the flat and its subsequent 
monetization’ (ibid.: 201). Critics claim that state capitalism’s heavy-handedness 
comes at the cost of the private sector. However, the government’s ability to maintain 
housing prices is structurally enabled by profits from state capitalism, specifically 
through internationalization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and sovereign wealth 




‘international standard accounting practices, transparent transactions, and the payment 
of regular dividends to the shareholders’ (ibid.: 192). As with any capitalist enterprise, 
these Singaporean SOEs’ first priority is profit, which means having an increasingly 
internationalised portfolio with worldwide direct investments. However, the difference 
with these profit-driven SOEs is that ‘half of the aggregated profits generated by all 
the SOEs are [then] channelled subsequently to the annual nation budget for social 
redistribution by the government’ (ibid.). This could range from stabilising the 
property market to rebates on public utilities. Therefore for Chua, ‘the 
institutionalization of selective social democratic elements in contemporary 
Singapore, [is] most notably [in] the national public housing programme and, less 
obviously, the heavy presence of the state in state-owned enterprises, locally called 
government-linked companies or GLCs’ (2019: 197). Both PAP’s abolition of private 
land ownership as well as its heavy intervention in both economy and society illustrate 
its disavowal of liberalism.  
Finally, the fourth pillar of the property state-housing nation is that it produces and 
relies on a property-minded population. Property states have institutions or laws that 
‘particularly incite people to make real estate their main hobby and business’ (Haila 
2016: 502). Her analysis of the property culture in Singapore allows us to understand 
how the state has effectively both institutionalised and fostered property-mindedness. 
Since public housing flats have a 99-year lease, the allowed practice of purchase and 
sale of property means that it has a vested interest in maximising temporary ownership 
to accumulate wealth through taxes and rising value.  
Therefore, this state-driven subjectivity of property-mindedness connects very deeply 
with notions of development and relocation. Based on Singapore’s model of 
population-linked economic growth, maximising population density remains a 
permanent goal. In order to facilitate infinite rounds of land recirculation, a culture of 
property-mindedness can be seen as necessary, which in turn creates a demand for 
more redevelopment and relocation.  
Thus to recapitulate, the property state-housing nation hinges on a number of balancing 




control over urban space, where more than 80% of residents live in public housing. 
Heavy state regulation is required for the property state to achieve the ‘right’ balance 
between public land ownership and free market economy. Together, Chua (2017) and 
Haila (2016) show how active state intervention and management, enabled by 
monopolisation of land, contribute to the ‘success’ of Singapore’s property state, itself 
seen in the wider context of a ‘social democracy’. Finally and overall, Chua’s and 
Haila’s analyses work well together because both point to a kind of moral economy of 
the housing nation, with homeownership as the economic dimension of citizenship and 
property-mindedness as the necessary moral disposition in that system. Moral 
economy refers to ‘the norms which govern or should govern economic activity […] 
often these concerns go beyond issues of economic responsibilities to other matters of 
public morality, such as neighbourliness and civility’ (Sayer 2000: 1).  
Despite its merits, however, conflicts and racialised inequalities in Singapore’s 
housing system are also an important part of the story. The proportion of HDB 
residents in rental flats decreased from 15.5% in 1987 to 3.7% in 2013 (HDB sample 
household survey 2013: 15), and as Haila (2016: 111) notes, ‘homeownership has 
increased even more markedly for those ethnic groups that used to be predominantly 
renters’. In other words, the Malays. However, recently in spite of the increased 
national homeownership rates between 2010 and 2015, the Malays were the only racial 
group that experienced a decline; as a result, Malay households in one and two-room 
rental flats ‘account for almost a third of 45,500 such households, up from about one 
in six a decade ago10’. This meant that the proportion of Malay families living in one 
and two-room rental flats had doubled in the last decade alone.  
In addition, rising housing prices had ‘generated inequality between generations’ 
(Haila 2016: 112). She compared the younger generation of first-time homebuyers who 
faced unaffordable housing prices to residents who were compensated for their slum 
dwellings in early resettlement and were able to benefit from the price increase. This 
 






idea that property gains play a significant role in wealth creation (and perhaps ethnic 
stratification) might also be influenced by the size (3-,4-, and 5-room) and type (public 
rental and owned; and private) of housing these residents start with. Above all, 
racialised inequalities have developed in the cracks of the neat public/private 
separation of real estate, a process I analyse below through a review of urban 
redevelopment in Singapore. But the following point should be underscored here; as 
Haila (2016: 111) briefly acknowledges that ‘Malay households are still less likely to 
be owners of private homes than Chinese or Indians’, a minority in private housing, 
yet very visible in rental housing, which is the lowest tier of housing – thereby making 
racialised inequalities more apparent, something which I address further below.  
 
Urban redevelopment and gentrification in Singapore  
In this section I draw on notions of gentrification and urban redevelopment and some 
of the debates they have given rise to with a view to more clearly specifying the kind 
of racialised displacement processes that have taken place in Singapore, and their 
evolution. My purpose here is not to discuss whether the displacements caused by the 
policies and politics of the ‘housing nation’ should be analysed as dimensions of 
processes of potentially racialised gentrification in Singapore. As noted by Haila, such 
questions raise the debatable usefulness of having a fixed set of criteria to decide 
whether something is or is not gentrification (2017: 506). Instead, she suggests turning 
our attention to explaining ‘the processes of redevelopment, gentrification, urban 
renewal, urban renaissance, or whatever we call it’ (ibid.: 506). I will thus use the 
notion as one amongst various others, and seek to learn from the debates surrounding 
it. The pragmatic use of the term is in line with recent contributions that state an interest 
in gentrification not ‘for its own sake’ but ‘processes of land use change that 
dispossess, displace and divide’ (Calderon et al. 2020: 34). However, I also seek to 
draw attention to the reality that whilst gentrification processes are not intended as 
racially differentiating in Singapore, they nevertheless have disparate impact on 
particular communities. It is this intersectional experience that my housing biographies 




In this context, the pursuit of the ‘highest and best’ use of urban land is 
instituted, in various forms, at the expense of those who inhabit space 
without the economic means to cling on in the face of rising rents, 
increased speculation, and the very concrete, emotional, and uprooting 
consequences of that most violent, and dare we say it, universal, form of 
abstraction, where all value is reduced to exchange value (Calderon et al. 
2020: 36) .  
It is the classed transformation of space that remains the focus, and a dynamic 
interpretation of the concept of gentrification might aid in understanding the socio-
spatial processes underlying it. But it is also more than this – it is also the socio-racial 
transformation of space as my biographies will illustrate.  
More than just a change in a neighbourhood’s physical appearance, gentrification 
involves a process of social-spatial change and economic restructuring (Zukin 1987; 
Smith 2002). Despite becoming more systematic and planned  (Smith 2008: 21), 
gentrification is essentially about a class transformation in and of space. The 
application of class analysis in gentrification studies (cf. Smith 1982; Hamnett 1991; 
Wyly and Hammel 1999) however, has usually been on the middle-class gentrifiers to 
the neglect of the non-gentrifying residents (Slater 2006: 742). And, one might argue, 
to the neglect of ethnic or racial dimensions of class.  
One of the strengths of gentrification research has been in showing the interlinkages 
between globalisation, neoliberalism and the changing role of the state under 
capitalism (Smith 2002; Lees et al. 2010). Such a perspective would help explain the 
changing residential trends described earlier in the context of ‘property state’ 
Singapore, whose unique form of state capitalism regularly intervenes in the built 
environment. Shatkin (2014: 5) defines Singapore’s model of state capitalism as:  
far from being a tool for patronage in which the state uses its wealth in an 
effort to buy off the population, ...a holistic model [is maintained] for state 
legitimation through interventions in the built environment, social control, 
controlled mobilizations of civil society, economic growth and wealth 
distribution.  
Many have also noted Singapore government’s lead role in the country’s urban 
development but the government’s obvious role in gentrification - seen in its 




Dale 1999; Wong et al. 2008). While the redevelopment of waterfronts and 
commercial buildings in Singapore has been analysed as gentrification, the concept is 
rarely used in the Singapore context - even less so for urban redevelopment involving 
public housing (Chang 2016). Urban planning is framed by state dominance of land, 
property and the economy, as explained in the first section of this chapter. While 
Singapore is in some ways an exceptional state, a full understanding of urban 
development processes requires we also understand state-driven ‘gentrification.’  
‘Residential’ gentrification in Singapore, under the purview of URA, comes in the 
form of numerous upgrading exercises by the government that involve public housing 
estates. It echoes Smith’s description of evolved gentrification where ‘the distinction 
between the renovation of old buildings and the construction of new ones, which made 
some sense in the early phases of gentrification, no longer resonates in a world where 
the production of large public housing projects has given way to condominiums and 
market rate luxury housing’ (2008: 21). 
For instance, I examine the Selective En-Bloc Redevelopment (SERS) programme and 
its operations in Singapore. SERS was launched by the HDB in 1995 as part of the 
Estate Renewal Strategy (ERS). Estate rejuvenation became a key emphasis of 
Singapore’s public housing policy in 1989. However, the main difference between 
SERS and other ERS improvement programmes is its relocation of residents. At the 
same time, the concept of SERS is designed to not disrupt the residents’ routines in 
the neighbourhood. The process is as follows: first, new 30 to 50-storey blocks are 
built on available vacant sites in the vicinity, sold to the tenants or lessees of the flats 
targeted for demolition, and then, the old flats are only demolished after the tenants 
have moved in the new flats. This means that only sites that have vacant spaces nearby 
would be targeted for SERS. ‘Residential’ gentrification through SERS here would 
have moved away from Ruth Glass’ strict conception of working/middle gentrifying 
class transitions with a more diverse mix of social classes involved. 
What leads the Singapore government to highly control the physical environment is 
the rationale that ‘local environments could be modelled and controlled in accordance 




the differences in the built environment in terms of location, quality and character, 
Singapore’s public housing landscape is strictly regulated by a series of planning and 
building design guidelines. Following the Concept Plan of 1971, land in the existing 
city area was reserved for businesses, whereas cluster of highly uniform new towns 
were developed along the mass transport lines such as underground and expressways 
that stretched to the suburbs. The only variations between different locations, given 
Singapore’s small land size, are limited to the commuting time to the downtown area, 
which is in turn facilitated by an effective transport system.  
The basic framework for public housing is nested precincts, made up of a new town, 
neighbourhood and residential. It starts with the smallest spatial unit: a residential 
precinct, a cluster of several residential buildings surrounding a communal open space, 
which covers 10–15 hectares and houses 2,500–5,000. Six to seven precincts make up 
a neighbourhood, which covers 80–100 hectares and houses 20,000 to 30,000. Five to 
six neighbourhoods, along with its facilities and infrastructure, creates a town, which 
covers 625 hectares and houses 125,000–250,000 (Foo 2001). This meant that 
Singapore initially had a clear socio-spatial demarcation between the public and 
private housing areas. Public housing was contained in standardized forms of suburban 
new towns. Private housing, on the other hand, enjoyed privileged locations that took 
the form of gated estates with swimming pools and sauna facilities. Granted, the socio-
economic divide of public/private neighbourhoods is not unique to Singapore. 
However, as Goh argues ‘in few other instances, is a massive machinery of public 
housing put to use to manage the disparities which threaten to grow wide and breed 
greater urban problems under a free market housing system in a global economy’ 
(2005: 73). 
The situation has changed in recent years, when socio-spatial stratification has been 
observed on the formerly homogenous public housing landscape. This is due to the 
surge of transnational elite enclaves in Singapore built in the midst of Singapore’s 
public housing estates (Pow 2011). These ‘quality’ private housing projects also led 
the way for a heterogenisation of the public housing landscape, powered by individual 
consumerism and supporting the discourse of an open, cosmopolitan Singapore. Thus 




well as newly designed and built flats, unravelled on Singapore’s public housing 
landscape (Teo and Kong 1997). Pow (2011: 223) describes these public housing 
upgrading schemes as giving: 
mature housing estates a new lease of life with improvement of common 
facilities such as multi-storey car parks, landscaped gardens, playgrounds 
as well as architectural enhancements to the façade and interior of flats 
with fixtures that rival privately built condominiums.  
In summary then, I use the concept of gentrification loosely, echoing the concept of 
‘planetary gentrification’ (Lees et al. 2016; Shin 2019: 17): 
While we try to retain a generic definition that gentrification is the class 
remake of urban space accompanying displacement, this process gets 
mutated and emerges in different forms across geographies to reflect the 
contingent factors that exist in various localities.  
Nevertheless, in contexts of racial diversity, capitalist development cannot be analysed 
without consideration of race (see Ong 2010; Li 2018). In this light, the above 
discussions of gentrification and the property state seem too economistic. Granted that 
the concept of ‘planetary gentrification’ emphasises ‘the state that is the key 
constituent in gentrification in the global South and East’ (Lees et al. 2016: 109); the 
anti-liberal property state, however, has to be situated within the multiracial housing 
nation.  
 
Race and nation-building in Singapore 
Having situated housing in Singapore within wider processes of capitalist and urban 
redevelopment, I now turn to how it might be understood within the state’s other 
project of multiracial nation-building. I begin by positioning Singapore within 
postcolonial frameworks before turning more specifically to the material consequences 
and instantiations of the racialised nation-state building project. In short, housing 
inequalities and how they are experienced are not simply functions of class but also of 
the ways in which class and race intersect. This is the story that my housing 





There are now some givens in scholarship on race and inequalities. Most immediately, 
race and its empirical referents are not historically consistent across time and place, 
and hence racial categories are always, and most fundamentally, about power 
relationships and configurations (see notably Dolby 2001; Zuberi 2001; Kramer 2006). 
Even as a social construct, in other words, ‘race’ does not stand still. And yet racialised 
hierarchies dominated by contextually defined and specific groups have historically 
remained remarkably constant across countries, from the US to Brazil to the UK to 
Singapore (Marx 1998; Goh 2008). Thus, understanding the persistence and 
reproduction of these racial hierarchies has been one aim of Critical Race Theory 
(CRT), a theoretical framework used to see an array of local, national, and global 
processes and practices of racial hierarchy formation as well as their social and 
political underpinnings and impact (Bell 1995; Delgado and Stefancic 2001; Crenshaw 
2011). Scholars elaborate the ways in which racialised mechanisms, values and 
practices jointly operate institutionally, politically, and economically. One particular 
focus of this work is around the creation of distinctive racial orders or racial hierarchies 
that are underpinned and maintained through a variety of structural and discursive 
forms (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2015). 
At the same time, the research on which this thesis is based also seeks to expand what 
has too often been US and US-centric or Western critical race scholarship, thus 
responding to Bonilla-Silva’s calls for ‘comparative work on racialization in various 
societies’ (1997: 476). There is now an increasingly growing literature attending to 
this lacuna (cf. Weiner, 2012; Suzuki, 2017; Christian, 2019). While Suzuki (2017: 
297) rejects ‘a single way, method, approach, or conceptualization of race, ethnicity, 
racism, or racial identity’ to avoid ‘hold(ing) the Western experience as normative’, 
Christian (2019: 181) explores race and racism through a framework based on a 
premise of ‘global white supremacy’. She argues that it highlights ‘the totality of the 
racial structure as always globally connected, if locally realized’. Nevertheless, what 
is common in comparative works is the focus on the ‘multiple articulations of racism 
across national divides’ (Christian et al. 2019: 1734). Taking on a postcolonial 




I am not speaking here of the lack of cross-national comparisons of race 
relations. There are plenty of those. The issue, rather, is about trans-
national and global systems of power and concomitant racialized 
hierarchies: systems and hierarchies that traverse national boundaries and 
which conjoin the experiences of subordinated racialized groups across 
those boundaries.  
I situate this project within this body of work. More specifically, in recognising that 
racism and its attendant processes and practices instantiate across political and cultural 
geographies in differing and complex ways, we might view these as ‘linked in 
historically varied ways to … [the] history of colonial encounters’ (Wade 1997: 21). 
We cannot understand racialised hierarchies in the so-called Global South, in other 
words, without situating them within (post)colonial nation-building projects. 
Then, what is the relationship between nation-building and race in the postcolonial 
context? And how can we understand racialised, postcolonial nation-building efforts 
through housing in Singapore? In seeking to understand how and why race is central 
to the project of nation-building, the thesis examines the specific use of racial politics 
in Singapore’s nation-building project. It explores how racial politics are deployed 
both materially and symbolically as instruments of nation-building, without losing 
sight of the relationships between global capitalism and both domestic and global 
colour lines. 
Five centuries of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism have had the result of 
entwining race with nation or nationalism (Mosse 1995; Mignolo 2002; Brubaker 
2009). And this is also true of Singapore. This means that issues around racism and 
the question of the ‘racial settlement’ historically undergird a number of modern 
nation-states, not least because race is understood as being constitutive of the initial 
crystallisation, development and transformation of modern states (Goldberg and 
Giroux 2014). From South Africa to the United States to Brazil and other South 
American countries, and more recently to Africa and the Middle East, racial 
settlements – or the particular configuration and institutionalisation of racial 
hierarchies in the national imaginary and its associated citizenship practices and social 
policies – have been continuously negotiated and renegotiated. Racialised social 




– and of capitalist development and quasi-gentrification, as I argued above. Therefore, 
understanding the social mechanisms that produce racialised hierarchies is also one 
way to highlight the differential forms of citizenship that emerge within ‘racial states’ 
(Goldberg 2002). Virdee (2014), for instance, refers to ‘racialised outsiders’ as 
casualties in nation-making, both in the process, contributions and its historiography. 
The notion ‘racialised outsider’ is utilised: 
to denote how this group’s (Irish Catholics) prior experience of 
subjugation and racialization as a people at the hands of the British elite 
helped inform their relative lack of enthusiasm for, and commitment to, 
the dominant politics and representations of the British nation once in 
Britain. After all, “their” nation was under the iron heel of the British state, 
they were castigated as Catholics and increasingly as members of an 
inferior Catholic race (2014: 24). 
This way, Virdee (ibid.) addresses the marginalisation of racialised minorities in the 
colour-blind historical accounts of the working class in England, by showing how race 
‘was constitutive in the making, unmaking and remaking of the working class in 
England across two centuries’ (ibid.: 5). Similarly, my dissertation seeks to understand 
whether Malays can be regarded as these ‘racialised outsiders’ in the context of 
Singapore’s postcolonial nation-building.  
I focus here on the material consequences and instantiations of racialised nation-
building here before integrating these with my theorisations of housing and urban 
redevelopment as above. Theorists of the complex relationship between racial 
diversity and the constitution of the nation-state argue that they are unavoidably linked 
constructs (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Marx 1998; Goldberg 2002; Virdee 2014). 
As a politically significant cultural category, race is historically bound up with 
colonialism and with the making of nation-states in the decades of de-colonisation. In 
his study of the US, South Africa and Brazil, for instance, Marx (1998), shows how 
nation-building processes in crucial moments crystallised and formed around 
particular racial hierarchies. In this way, race and nation co-constituted each other, not 
least because nation-states were built around distinctive racial formations. This co-
constitution of race and nation finds expression across a number of state formations 




(Fredrickson 1982; Dikötter 1990, 1997; Asgharzadeh 2007; Weiner 2009, 2012). 
Building a democratic nation-state can therefore incorporate strategies that are 
inclusive of certain groups while exclusionary of other groups, designed to consolidate 
state control over its diverse populations. These racialised nation-building strategies 
are however overall divisive. Nation-building and race’s entwined relationship 
suggests that racism – and racialised, institutional exclusion – might be fundamental 
to the functioning of the nation-state.  
Indeed, FitzGerald and Cook-Martín have suggested that democracies which have 
been institutionalised as majoritarian nevertheless tend to regard racialised groups as 
outside the democratic settlement (2014). They argue that the anti-racist turn in liberal 
democracies was ‘not a product of liberal ideology or democracy’ (ibid.: 2), by 
showing how racist immigration laws were often the product of democratic influences 
and institutions. For instance, liberal democracies were the first to lead the way in 
implement the racist immigration policy yet were slower to retract them. This brings 
into question the ‘nearly universal consensus’ that ‘takes it for granted that democracy 
and racism cannot coexist’ (ibid.), and further shows the ‘elective affinity’ between 
the two. 
In both its theoretical conception and material instantiation, then, the post-colonial 
nation state is founded on and operates by racial designs and racialised exclusions 
(Goldberg 2009). Therefore, the nation state becomes a nexus for racial politics, and 
an important site where the challenges of building a multiracial democracy play out. 
Despite Singapore’s ‘multiracial’ claim that it acknowledges the diversity that makes 
up its population, the Singapore democracy remains a majority-Chinese one. And as 
happened in 1991, governments issuing policies regarded as disadvantageous to the 
dominant ethnic groups are liable to suffering electoral backlash (Tan 2003).  
Nation-state building is both achieving the external validation by international law as 
a state and internal legitimation through people accepting both the state’s monopoly 
on force and their new identities as ‘citizens’. At issue is not just being a unified nation, 
it is being a cohesive nation-state that is able to politically and economically act. And 




state’ - ‘the gap has been bridged by the deliberate engineering of concern for ethnic, 
gender, linguistic, class, cultural and religious identity’ (2015: 548). It is in and 
through identity construction that nation-states claim space in people’s lives and to a 
large extent define and manage day-to-day living (Anderson 1991). 
Extending Benjamin’s (2015) idea of post-coloniality in nation-states, Chun suggests 
‘postcolonial theory (be applied) to institutions not literally related to colonialism – 
specifically the state – especially when ‘colonial imagination becomes real’ (2012: 
684). Chua, for instance, shows how the Anglophone transnational communities in 
colonial Malaya ‘overturned existing assumptions of nation and identity by creating 
the new category of Malayans as a non-ethnic descriptor for people of Malaya to 
function alongside the existing term ‘Malay’, which referred specifically to the ethnic 
group that located its roots in Malaya’; this linguistic usage reflected the constant need 
to shift their identity ‘from the transnational identities of Chinese and Indians to their 
status in British Malaya itself’(2012: 302). Using the prevailing idea of Malaya as a 
nation to define their identity and validate their presence in the nation-state shows the 
‘abstract, outward-looking, gesellschaftlich mode of consciousness could now be 
taken for granted by the people as the unspoken terms on which they must live their 
lives’ (Benjamin 2015: 598). In other words, not place of origin but of residence 
determined nationality in Malaya.  How did this transition from a unitary Malaya to a 
multiracial Singapore occur? Governance of ethnic diversity in postcolonial Singapore 
is, intriguingly enough, branded as ‘multiracialism’ by the ruling party. The next 
section will discuss how the multiracial postcolonial nation-state was formed over the 
years. 
Multiracialism  
Scholarship on multiracialism in Singapore has tended to focus on the impact of PAP’s 
racialist approach towards its own multiculturalism, which Lian (2016) argues is no 
less than that of a ‘racial state’ (Goldberg 2002). The notion of ‘racial state’ alludes to 
modern states that are by definition racial, where the state is seen as primarily 
responsible for bringing about racial divisions and bringing on racial exclusion. He 




racial state is in this sense the paradigmatically modern social formation’ (2002: 148); 
accordingly ‘we have come, if often only silently, to conceive of social subjects 
foremost in racial terms’ (2002: 1). In other words, if the racial state is the paradigmatic 
modern social formation, then one would expect race to be the master status - in Everett 
Hughes’ (1945) terms. The contemporary global diffusion of a broad and wide 
“colour-blind” ideology manifests itself in variously: multiculturalism and racial 
democracy.  
Multiculturalism was picked up late in Singapore. Discussions on multiracialism only 
ensued 20 years after Benjamin’s seminal piece on ‘The Cultural Logic of Singapore’s 
Multiculturalism’ (1976). While Benjamin (ibid.) examines multiracialism at the 
culturalist level through public discourse, Brown (1994) views multiracialism - a 
corporatist state’s strategy - as a socioeconomic problematic. He defines corporatism 
as ‘attempts by an avowedly autonomous state élite to organize the diverse interest 
associations in society so that their interests can be accommodated within the 
interdependent and organic national community’ (ibid.: 47). Benjamin argues that such 
corporatist inclinations can be seen as applied to ethnic management where state elites 
‘depict and organize Singaporean society along primarily ethnic lines, even for the 
discussion of economic, political and social issues which do not relate directly to the 
ethnic realm of linguistic, religious or racial matters’ (ibid.: 53). Recent works (for 
instance, see Goh 2008) nevertheless have begun to contextualise the 
institutionalisation of multiracialism in Singapore in terms of the prevailing historical 
and political conditions.  
In order to build a postcolonial nation-state, the PAP government adopted multiracial 
meritocracy (Moore 2000). Multiracial meritocracy meant that each race was 
recognised as an equal yet distinct part of the multiracial nation, however, denying any 
affirmative action or compensatory discrimination measures. Success would be based 
on merit alone and not on any form of racial, ethnic, religious or cultural favouritism. 
Such seemingly fair policy however was implemented ‘at the time of independence, 
(where) the Other/Eurasian category (then primarily British) was vastly wealthier than 
either the Chinese or Indians, and the Malays were much poorer than all the groups’ 




nevertheless leaves much to be said because the racialised economic hierarchy persists 
till today, ‘reflected in income, education, housing and virtually every other social and 
economic category’ (Moore 2000: 341). It has been argued that the very policy that 
alludes to merit-based social mobility functions to deflect attention from the structural 
bases of inequalities by reinforcing culturalist stereotypes (Rahim 1998; Barr and Low 
2005; Barr and Skrbiš 2008). Singapore’s multiracial meritocracy is manifested in 
three ways: racial self-help groups11, a meritocratic education system, and subsidised 
housing to allow people of all classes to live in relatively similar conditions. Housing 
nevertheless continues to remain the strongest pillar of multiracial meritocracy and an 
emblem of hope for social mobility – especially for the Malays who remain on the 
society’s bottom echelons.  
Multiracial housing nation 
One of the early steps Singapore took to consolidate as a multiracial nation state was 
through a set of resettlement and dispersal policies, ‘as the new government sought to 
mould a diverse and disparate population into a manageable and measurable modern 
Singaporean nation’ (Rocha 2011: 108). Resettlement into public housing had taken 
place for the majority of slum dwellers between 1965 and 1985. This is to be 
understood in the context that less than 10% lived in public housing when HDB was 
first established in 1960. The absence of slums in Singapore today depicts the success 
of the state’s resettlement approach, which has been described as ‘the most 
comprehensive in Asia, if not the world’ (Kleevens 1972: 57). HDB attributed it to its 
philosophy that ‘land assembly would be met with strong resistance unless every 
settlement case is offered alternative accommodation’ (Teh 1969; Wong and Yeh 
1985). Successful resettlement may be credited to other factors as well (Kleevens 
1972: 58): 
The families selected for relocation are given notice well in advance, at 
least six months. They are given S$250 disturbance allowance and S$50 
 
11 The state rationale behind the establishment of community-based self-help groups for each of the 
major racial groups in Singapore ‘is that the members of a racial group will best know what problems 





transport allowance. Farmers, usually small, are given alternate choices of 
new land and city dwellers can choose from alternative low rent flats. The 
building of new housing estates goes in advance of the slum-clearance... 
whole squatter-communities can be rehoused ‘in toto’... [where] even the 
shops moved over at the same time. Together with the provision of other 
basic facilities and amenities this scheme is successful in bringing about 
minimal inconveniences to the affected families.  
It can be said that from early on, great care is taken to minimise the disruptions caused 
by the move. Nevertheless, resettlement had effectively redistributed Malays 
geographically. This weakened them politically by removing the possibility of political 
representation based on electoral districts. The proportion of Malay representation in 
the legislature dropped from 20% in 1960 to 13% by 1974 (Kassim 1974). Malay 
legislative representation was strongest during the 1963 merger and immediate post-
merger years due to the Malay strongholds of Kampong Kembangan, Geylang Serai, 
and the Southern Islands. 
Before the Malays were resettled into new towns, they were concentrated 
in certain areas, Geylang Serai, Kembangan, Bedok, Siglap, Southern 
Islands, which evolved naturally into Malay political constituencies. 
Resettlement dispersed the Malays to live among Chinese, Indians and 
others. This served the purpose of national integration, but it also meant 
no more racially guaranteed seats for Malay candidates. Every electoral 
constituency was now a Chinese majority one (Lee 2008: 499). 
The electoral clout of the Malay community was effectively diluted by urban 
resettlement and public housing programmes in the 1960s and 1970s (MacDougall 
1969; Rahim 1998). The Malay community became a numerical minority in all 
electoral constituencies. Majoritarian nation-building had fragmented the Malay polity 
across Singapore and eroded the electoral base of Malay-based parties such as 
Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS)12. And the correlation between 
the numerical decline in Malay political representation and their limited electoral clout 
as a consequence of housing policies was further made conspicuous with the  
introduction of 1989 ethnic residential quotas in public housing estates (see Sin 2003). 
Such is the ambivalent ambiguity that the Malays in Singapore navigate in pursuit of 
 





a dignified life, seen through the prism of housing. Housing, on one hand, had meant 
resettlement and displacement, but it also offers the possibility of social mobility in 
Singapore. 
 
Displacement and un-homing: A lifelong experience of Malays in Singapore 
As I conceive of it in this thesis, displacement is more than just physical dislocation 
owing to resettlement or relocation. The thesis explores the biographical, lifelong 
experience of displacement, both as it unfolds in discrete events and in their social, 
political, economic and existential implications for the subjects concerned. Drawing 
on Atkinson’s (2015) symbolic displacement and Elliott-Cooper et al.’s 
phenomenological displacement (2020), Shin (2019: 2) writes that: 
it will be important to understand how displacement itself will be a 
longitudinal, long process– it may actually give us some difficulties in 
terms of identifying when is the actual starting point of displacement and 
also when is its last ending point.  
Being displaced does not necessarily entail nor can it be reduced to physically moving 
away, it can occur phenomenologically in a changing urban social context whilst 
remaining in one’s home. This means that, as Elliott-Cooper and colleagues (2020: 
504) write: 
displacement is not just about direct replacement of poorer by wealthy 
groups; it also involves forms of social, economic and cultural transition 
which alienate established populations. This can entail forms of slow 
violence, which render particular neighbourhood less hospitable and 
accommodating to established residents, as well as direct and forceful acts 
of expropriation which the vulnerable and precarious seem least able to 
cope with.  
Nevertheless, across the various forms of displacement, each has lasting implications. 
Understanding displacement is thus to see it as a longitudinal process, which allows 
specific points or pivotal moments to be highlighted. This can be gained from the point 
of view of individuals from vulnerable populations. Importantly, both symbolic and 
phenomenological displacement allude to the experience of continued displacement 




be conceived as the process of un-homing (Elliott-Cooper et al. 2020). Un-homing 
refers to the process which cuts the links between residents and the communities to 
which they belong. between people and place; and such displacement manifests 
‘through a range of modalities, including experiential, financial, social, familial and 
ecological’ (Elliott-Cooper et al. 2020: 494).  
Being Malay in Singapore is characterised by the existential tension between being, 
yet not feeling, at home (see Leow 2015, Poon 2016). The Singaporean-Malay identity 
entails the displacement of Malay language, history, and identity to a postcolonial one 
in the context of official multiculturalism in Singapore (Chua 2003). The different 
forms of displacement experienced by these Malays are underpinned by their status as 
an indigenous minority. In that context, what are the Malay experiences of ‘un-
homing’? What might have shaped these experiences? And can we derive a deeper 
conceptualisation of ‘un-homing’ in the context of nation-state building? The concept 
of un-homing shows how resettlement is displacement occurring simultaneously on 
different levels, and in my dissertation, I attempt to identify and explore these differing 
levels, as well as scales. While the break in community ties may make one more 
exposed to economic uncertainty on an individual level, this also has effects on another 
scale: ‘at what point [do] acts of individual un-homing can be described as having 
given way to a more encompassing form of displacement that involves the erasure of 
an entire community’ (Nowicki cited in Elliott-Cooper et al. 2020: 496)?  
Again, such erasure can happen on different levels. In the case of Malays in Singapore, 
with Separation, state building brought a significant change of circumstances and a 
rupture with the context of the predominantly Malay region Singapore was in. Might 
such loss of majority status in the Malay region, through the creation of post-
Separation Singapore itself, have led to a form of un-homing? A specific reason why 
the Malays might have experienced un-homing with Separation is due to their newly 
formed status as an economically backward minority. The ‘racial distrust and fear’ of 
the Malays towards the newly formed Chinese government, was based on the worry  
that the new government would not devote more resources to the Malays given ‘the 
imbalance in development between the races’ (Rahim cited in Ahmat, 1971, p. 10). 




being recognised as indigenous in the Constitution of Singapore, they felt ‘isolated in 
their own home country’ (Rahim cited in Ahmat 1971: 10). Might this ‘displacement 
at home’ be a key to understanding Malays’ social relegation and their acquiescence 
to the socio-economic stratification?  
Indicators for housing success in Singapore are various. Singapore’s annual census 
celebrates the ever-increasing homeownership rates of the nation state. The state’s 
commitment to a more ‘equitable’ mix of socioeconomic population is seen from the 
proportion of 3-,4-,5- room flats in different towns. The permanence of the ethnic 
quotas in public housing continually upkeeps the social integration in each block. 
These statistics show how devastatingly effective policies are in assigning where 
people can and cannot live, based on their income and race. What did these policies 
mean in practice? Does the diversity of the neighbourhood in Singapore mirror that of 
the nation-state? Is there a majority of minority neighbourhoods in select towns? These 
statistics and stated policy aims are in themselves insufficient to point to racial 
harmony nor do they carry the traces of the un-homing processes and resultant 
displacement that may have been involved in realising these policies. 
Thus, responding to calls for ‘the lived experiences of urban displacement from the 
perspective of established, lower-income groups, revealing the processes of un-
homing that impact violently on some of our most vulnerable populations’ (Elliott-
Cooper et al. 2020: 504), housing biography as method is able to show the nuanced 
experience of displacement, as well as the longitudinal nature of displacement in 
different forms at different times, whilst constantly cumulatively ‘un-homing’ both 
individuals and communities. These various considerations thus have culminated in 
developing the notion and methodological toolkit of the housing biography, which the 
following chapter details, in an attempt to see the macro structures in and through the 




Chapter 3 | Housing biography as method 
 
All five of my Malay respondents lived as protagonists through Singapore’s housing 
moments. They experienced its many inflections over the years, very literally 
inhabiting its varied practices. The youngest was 50 years old when interviewed in 
2015, whilst the oldest was 81. Even though they might not each have experienced 
every housing moment individually, they and Singapore’s housing policies are linked 
both through their parallel biographies and through the ways in which they experienced 
their place in their nation-state. The housing biographies detailed and theorised in this 
thesis critically interweave the state’s housing policies across several decades with the 
housing lives of five Malays in order to provide a fuller, richer account of an 
historically silenced narrative of Singapore’s ‘housing nation’. Together, the 
continuity of accounts through housing biographies ethnographically allows me to 
gain a sense of people’s housing lives.  
This chapter first details the methods, aims and pragmatics involved in conducting my 
research. I first elaborate my use of ‘the housing biography’ in its various dimensions 
as a methodological innovation for understanding the complicated ways in which 
Malays have lived through – and in – the nation-state’s housing history. Using their 
housing biographies as windows into their experiences allows me not only to tell their 
individual stories, but it also allows access to the wider story of Singapore as housing 
nation. Next, I detail the other sources of primary data that I draw on in this thesis: 
newspapers, maps, and reports. I close the chapter with some reflections on the ethical 
issues arising, and on some limitations of this project. 
 
The use of housing biography  
I had begun my research with a simple goal: to understand housing in Singapore. I 
sought to understand how housing is experienced, and how Malays experienced their 




around (re)housing, or state relocation in Singapore. I spoke to residents in Tanglin 
Halt, the largest SERS relocation site to date. They recognized their neighbourhood as 
prime land and were aware of emerging developments in the area. No complaints about 
unfair relocation arrangements arose because they were given new homes and duly 
compensated. There was, however, difficulty in talking in more depth to the residents. 
This constituted my first quandary - why the silence if all is good? I could feel their 
silence both in what they did not talk about or seemed to avoid talking about and in 
what they chose to say. Residents were hesitant to speak about this, not out of 
ignorance, it seemed to me, but out of a certain awareness. With time, and as I 
continued to speak with residents, I noticed that a sense of displacement lingered 
alongside the excitement of getting new homes. I became increasingly aware that 
displacement was not a binary – it was not about being displaced or not. Displacement, 
I understood, came to mean different things across different individuals and in 
different periods, as state practices of relocation evolved. A lifelong, biographical 
narrative of experience thus seemed a better way to approach these shifting meanings 
rather than my planned interviews simply focusing on participation in the latest 
government housing programme.  
Inspired by Alexievich’s (2016) beautiful reconstructions of lives in the Soviet period 
in Secondhand Time, I developed the notion of housing biography. Secondhand Time 
(2016) documents the final days of the Soviet Union by depicting the turbulent changes 
the Russian people experienced in the 1990s and 2000s. Most of the voices in 
Alexievich’s account are ordinary people who lived through some of the Soviet era’s 
most tumultuous events. Alexievich’s intention in assembling these biographies of 
everyday people was to narrate the ‘missing history’ of ‘everyday life of feelings, 
thoughts, and words’13. In other words, she is interested in exploring how history has 
been reflected in daily lives and understood by the everyday man – the type of history 
that is typically ignored by historians who examine major events. In her Nobel lecture, 
Alexievich explained, ‘[I was not] looking for heroes. I was writing history through 
 
13 “The Nobel Prize in Literature 2015,” Alexievich Svetlana, accessed January 6, 





the stories of its unnoticed witnesses and participants’14. This echoes Les Back’s 
(2007: 1) notion of listening sociologically to ‘the fragments, the voices and stories 
that are otherwise passed over or ignored. The task of sociology is to admit these voices 
and to pay them the courtesy of serious attention’. As people recounted their 
experiences in times of political and socio-economic changes, each personal narrative 
- cumulatively - gradually spoke to both Russia’s difficult transition and its current 
socioeconomic and political status. As Alexievich explains: 
I’m interested in little people. The little great people is how I would put it, 
because suffering expands people. In my books these people tell their own, 
little histories, and big history is told along the way15.  
She refers to interviews with her respondents as ‘conversations’. They captured the 
pain and joy of life’s realities during Russia’s transitions. And they are specifically 
conversations about experiences. The beauty of Secondhand Time lies both in the 
intimacy of these experiences and in their orchestration into a symphony of voices that 
convey the epoch. I could not aim for the symphony to deploy the themes of Malays’ 
lives in housing in Singapore; but I did find that a much smaller quintet of five Malays 
was quite evocative, and that it connected lives to moments of the nation – here 
housing and un-housing events.  
In this sense, my empirical use of the housing biography has been quite close to the 
life interviews of oral history, but through the more focused lens of lives in (and out 
of) housing. Through them, I seek to understand how my Malay ‘protagonists’ (to take 
up Alexievich’s term) experienced decades of housing policies in Singapore and what 
meaning these years and experiences held for them, an understanding on their terms 
and their interpretation. At the same time, my respondents’ housing biographies did 
point me to some specific housing and relocation events, as well as broader political 
moments – as is typical of oral history interviews more generally (Loh 2013), and I 
then documented these housing moments and assessed them further (see below). 
 





Above all these housing biographies breathed ‘life’ and brought colour and nuance to 
Singapore’s grand narrative as a global housing nation. 
 
Interviews: Five Malays 
With this inspiration and aim, I conducted repeated in-depth interviews with five 
Malays between October 2015 and August 2016. All of the interviews with the older 
respondents were conducted in Malay, whereas the youngest was more comfortable 
speaking English. I am familiar with local conversational practices and was alert to the 
cultural references they carried. Photos, maps, and newspapers accompanied these 
conversations and brought materiality to the housing memories. In particular, Malay 
films by Teuku Zakaria alias P. Ramlee served a bridging function in my 
conversations. His works had defined Malay cinema’s golden age in the 1950s and 
early 1960s. My older protagonists did not trust that I could fully grasp how dismal 
the living conditions they had narrated were. Acquainted with these films, though, I 
was able to refer to specific films that depicted the prevailing living conditions, 
reflecting the poverty in the Malay society. P. Ramlee’s films have been seen as a  
historical and archival resource for understanding Malay lives in the post-war years 
(Aljunied, 2005; Barnard, 2006). In addition, and in my case especially, the 
multifaceted audience that P. Ramlee’s films continue to draw were important: they 
were ‘made up of varying generations, from the generation that lived during the 
colonial period, post-independence Malaysians, Malaysians today and not forgetting 
his overseas following’ (Ahmad and Lee 2015: 412). This enabled me to use his films 
as an effective interview aid.  
Little by little, the stories of these five housing lives reconstructed for me how the 
nation’s history intersected with individuals’ lives over their lifetimes. At the same 
time, each biography allowed me to conjure a singular housing moment in multiple 
ways simultaneously – of the adventures of choosing to stay in one’s homeland with 
Separation, and with it, the difficulties of resettlement in the newly formed nation –
state. And across these biographies, the same (re)housing moment evokes a 




remote possibilities for companionship. The idea is not to depict coherence but to 
narrate a more expansive and expressive story of the nation – through significant 
episodes – deeply etched into the lives of five Malays, using housing as a prism and 
pieces of ethnography carefully put together.  
By nature, housing biographies can be private and sensitive as they tell of sleeping 
arrangements and family affairs. I put care in how I approached potential respondents, 
and sought to earn their trust. I was consistent and open in explaining my research 
from the beginning. Initially, I conveyed to them a description of my research, the 
purpose of my study, as well as information about myself and my institutional 
affiliations. But I also sought to make them full participants in the research, and to 
share its aims: for some, especially the older ones who had experienced the 
resettlement from the Southern Islands, there was a sense in which this project seemed 
worthwhile to them, as a means of recovering the Malay history of housing in 
Singapore. And after a period of time, there was no more description of research 
questions or giving directions because a clear relationship had been established. As the 
interviews progressed, there was a level of trust. Three protagonists encouraged me to 
record our conversations. 
After I had established myself as a student-researcher, I ventured to distinguish myself 
from ‘research tourism’. Adi highlighted that they were used to researchers who were 
keen to find out more about Tanglin Halt as a site of state relocation but disappeared 
after that. Gradually, I assumed the role of a young Malay Singaporean researching 
the community’s history, our community’s history. Due to the intersection of age, race 
and Singapore having been my home all my life - something I shared with my five 
respondents – they were explicit in telling me about racial redistribution, and in giving 
their opinions about racial quotas. There was a consciousness and understanding of 
what was going on as they were able to tell me the rationale behind their evictions, the 
political strategy then as how they understood it, all through their awareness of being 
a Malay during that period. They shared with me as they felt that I was able to 
understand these depictions (at least, to a certain extent) on their terms. This was 
important in having access or enabling conversations that hint at displacement. They 




Initial questions got respondents to describe their housing life, to allow me to put 
myself in their shoes i.e. I was asking them to tell me what “a day in the life of this 
house” was like. Before the first interview in the protagonists’ house, I did preliminary 
scoping to contextualize their experience and history by walking about ten minutes in 
each direction and noting the nearest facilities such as bus stops or post office. Asking 
them about their neighbourhood, activities, facilities and neighbours enabled me to 
find out more about their networks as well as their own sense of racial identity and 
boundaries, and how these interacted with their housing decisions. Alongside getting 
a sense of their current housing conditions and experience, I sought to stimulate 
respondents’ memories of their past homes, their own or their parents’ memories of 
relocations, as well as their perceptions and aspirations regarding home and homeland. 
Throughout the biographical interviews, I sought to explore not just where they lived 
but how they lived where they lived.  
The first protagonist I met was Yat. I had introduced myself and my research to a 
Malay female food stallholder in one of the hawker centres in Tanglin Halt. She 
straightaway suggested speaking to another stallholder selling chicken rice in the same 
centre. According to her, he had been in the area for a long time and would know more 
people. True enough, the male, 50-something chicken rice stallholder introduced me 
to a group of elderly men sitting in the hawker centre. One of them was Sazali, who 
later introduced me to my second protagonist, Adi. Before introducing me, he 
described Sazali as one of the most elderly men in Tanglin Halt. It was only after my 
first meeting with the group of men that I met Adi. Sazali and Adi were friends and 
had known each other for a long time. Adi also lived in the area. Sazali had invited 
him to join the next group discussion which took place in the same hawker centre. My 
conversations with Adi always occurred in a group setting in different hawker centres 
in Tanglin Halt. That same day, I returned to the chicken rice stall to thank the 
stallholder and ran into Yat who was helping out at the stall. She was very interested 
in my research and gave me her contact details. Yat then asked me to come by her 
house a few days after. She lived alone in a two-room flat a few blocks away. Unlike 




Yat then introduced me to my third protagonist, her younger brother Hans. She shared 
that it would be better to speak to him because he ‘collects a lot of historical things’. I 
then found out about Hans’ interest in a form of housing autobiography. He shared 
many photos and documents that he had accumulated over the years. Hans and I met 
with many other former residents of the Southern Islands in different homes, 
coffeeshops and public places. Due to our gender difference, if we met alone, it had to 
be a public place.  
My fourth protagonist, Airah, was introduced to me by Hans. Hans and Airah were 
fellow islanders on Bukom Kechil and remain in contact to the present day. Hans visits 
her regularly. All my conversations with Airah were at her home, yet our conversations 
would always have someone else present. For instance, I first met Airah with another 
islander, Zahara, who lived nearby. Airah is the only protagonist that does not live in 
the Tanglin Halt area. Hans did not live in Tanglin Halt per se, but lived nearby. My 
last protagonist, Zee, was a Tanglin Halt resident involved in SERS and she was the 
only one introduced to me by a friend. I met Zee in her flat.  
I had accessed my respondents through a mixture of snowball sampling, fieldwork in 
Tanglin Halt, and personal contacts. My final selection of the five protagonists, out of 
20 respondents, whose housing biographies form the backbone of this thesis, is 
grounded spatially and historically. I selected two protagonists from each housing 
moment: early resettlement policy in the Southern Islands and ongoing SERS 
relocation policy in Tanglin Halt. My fifth protagonist however was involved in both 
housing moments and was able to provide a form of continuity between the two 
policies. In addition, these respondents were the most open to me and my project, and 
as a result, shared the most forthcoming accounts of their housing lives. Thus, although 
these five housing biographies of course cannot claim any completeness in 
representing the Malay housing experience, they can, however, cast light on important 





Housing biographies and subjectivities 
This biographical approach has a rich tradition in sociology, anthropology and 
geography, but has not been well-used and only recently adopted by housing studies 
(Franklin 1990, 2008; Ronald 2011). In housing studies, biographies do more than 
document the impact of housing policies through residents’ experience with a view to 
anchoring relocation, capitalism, and, as the case may be, nation-building. Similarly, 
I understand the housing biography also as a way of ‘seeing’ the state – and the 
subjectivities it produces - through its intimate spaces, as a glimpse into how Malays 
actually experience the state and its policies and inequalities. In making sense of their 
housing lives and biographies, I asked:  
- Can we see the emotional experience of inequality though ‘home’?  
- What kind of subjects and subjectivities do Singapore’s housing policies produce 
among ethnic Malays?  
Thus, I use the notion of housing biography not only as empirical, data collection tool 
but also as an analytical tool, stylising, condensing my respondents’ experience of 
structural constraints and possibilities, and the subjective logics of these experiences. 
In other words, housing biographies open up a way of seeing structural relationships 
and the dispositions they foster through respondents’ experience and articulation of 
their housing lives.  
The structural power relationships in which people’s housing biographies develop can 
helpfully be understood through a Foucauldian (1977, 1980) lens. Thus, I will analyse 
how certain kinds of housing subjects are constituted, for instance, by looking at how 
respondents’ reflections on their experiences suggest both structural constraints and 
possibilities. As is well known, Foucault conceives of power as a productive relation. 
The subject is constituted through specific technologies of power. Foucault argues that 
the mechanism of this power-knowledge is not repressive and outrightly oppressive: 
‘We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 
‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’ (1977: 




state practices or ‘micropower’ in terms of its discourse, found at and permeating 
different knowledge systems.  
This is useful for my construction of housing biography as method and what it implies 
for seeing and understanding subjectivities. Subjectivity is a ‘synonym for inner life 
processes and affective states’ (Biehl et al. 2007: 6), which are ‘refracted through 
potent political, technological, psychological, and linguistic registers, capture the 
violence and dynamism of everyday life’ (ibid.: 5). I explore how the state’s 
technologies and materialities generate specific modalities of subjectivity and 
discourses around housing and belonging. As Foucault put it, ‘the individual is not a 
pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of power. The individual with his 
identity and characteristics is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, 
multiplicities, desires, forces’ (1980: 73). In other words, the productivity of the state’s 
technology of power might be seen in and through individuals and their subjective 
experience.  
While Foucault’s analysis helps me to account for the ways in which subjectivities are 
generated through technologies and discourses of power in the context of Singapore, 
subjectivity emerges from the constitutive tension between the individual and such 
technologies and discourses. Here, it is helpful to turn to Judith Butler’s theorisation 
of the constitutive character of agency for subjectivity: ‘If the subject is a reworking 
of the very discursive processes by which it is worked, then ‘agency’ is to be found in 
the possibilities of resignification opened up by discourse’ (2017: 135). Agency, for 
Biehl, Good and Kleinman, can be theorised as ‘the agonistic and practical activity of 
engaging identity and fate, patterned and felt in historically contingent settings and 
mediated by institutional processes and cultural forms’ (2007: 5). Subject positions 
thus emerge as products of an aggregate of state practices and agency. In taking up 
housing biography as a method, however, one must not forget, following Biehl, Good 
and Kleinman, that the focus on subjectivity is ‘to theorise not an intangible subject 
but human conditions’ (2007: 15). Therefore, as I was putting together the housing 
biographies and unravelling their themes, I became aware of specific features and ways 
of relating to housing and relocation, home and neighbours, which in each case pointed 





A quintet of housing biographies 
Whilst ‘human conditions’ cannot be subsumed under consistent subject positions, I 
was struck by the rather clear overall theme that emerged and seemed to organise each 
housing biography. On the one hand, I sought to convey the richness of some of the 
conversations with the protagonists – trying, like Alexievich, to remain faithful to 
them: their narratives are given space, to allow their voices and stories to come 
through. It is hoped that this achieves a certain integrity in terms of how these 
protagonists are narrated, as whole stories and substantive people.   
But at the same time, I stylise them to highlight significant features in relation to 
housing policies and relocation programmes. They definitely embodied some 
possibilities for Malays in this relation: some displayed property-mindedness and an 
aspiration to be a proper Singaporean; whilst others attempted to live with the legacy 
of the loss of their homes on the Southern Islands - as island biographer, displaced 
islander, or relegated citizen. These descriptors condensed the specificity of each 
experience, and in doing so, pointed towards common experiences. They suggest 
something that is true beyond the individual. 
But, like Alexievich’s symphony albeit in much more modest proportions for an also 
more focused topic, my quintet of voices also allowed me to understand how housing 
was experienced and lived in Singapore, as my protagonists themselves led me to the 
housing policies which had significantly affected them. Different individuals 
emphasised different policies. Zee was focused on the present SERS policy in Tanglin 
Halt while Hans and Airah preferred to speak about the resettlement policy in and from 
the Southern Islands. Adi was more interested in broadly comparing the housing 
policies before and after Separation. Finally, Yat did not speak much about the 
relocation policies, except to share with me how free she was living in the Southern 
Islands, yet at the same time, being a caregiver on the islands resulted in grave 





Contextualising housing stories with newspapers, maps and government reports 
That is more or less how my conversations with my protagonists begin. 
People speak from their own time, of course, they can’t speak out of a void. 
But it is difficult to reach the human soul, the path is littered with television 
and newspapers, and the superstitions of the century, its biases, its 
deceptions (Alexievich 2015: 8). 
After the interviews, I looked to newspapers, for instance, to find out about the politics 
surrounding the population resettlement from Bukom Kechil. Newspapers indicated 
economic reasons for the resettlement, whereas Hans pointed me in the direction of 
political tactics. I relied on secondary sources including newspapers to explore the 
historical background of the housing policies especially in the Southern Islands. With 
the few sources of information, access was further restricted including the National 
Archives. Newspaper reports enabled me to construct a timeline of Bukom's 
resettlement and situate it within the broader Southern Islands resettlement. The close 
relationship between Singapore’s government and the newspaper industry meant that 
newspapers could be seen as vehicles spreading and deploying government policies 
and taking part in the cultural-symbolic construction of the Singaporean nation (Hussin 
2001). I adopted this perspective when analysing newspaper articles discussing the 
Southern Islands, with a focus on Bukom Besar, Bukom Kechil and Semakau, from 
1957 to the 1970s.  
Since different languages presented ideological messages differently, I selected The 
Straits Times (abbrev. ST), which remains the most widely circulated English 
newspaper, as well as Berita Harian (abbrev. BH) and its Sunday edition Berita 
Minggu, which are the only Malay newspapers available in Singapore today. The 
Straits Times and Berita Harian/Minggu were founded in 1845 and 1970 respectively. 
An earlier notable Malay newspaper that could have been included was the Jawi-
scripted Utusan Melayu (Malay Mail) which was published from 1939 to 1970. Utusan 
Melayu not only published local news but had been recognised as being ‘strongly 
chauvinistic on the Malay behalf’ (Roff 1994: 177). Apart from lacking the fluency in 
the Jawi script, I noted that Utusan had been printed in Malaysia since 1956 (Maidin 
2013), which would have impacted its editorial slant. Therefore, practical and 




Apart from newspaper analysis and reports, I studied the changing land uses for 
Southern Islands at the land use registry. Drawing on the same source, I also carried 
out a land mapping exercise to find out about the history of land ownership on Bukom 
Kechil. Additionally, I complemented Adi and Zee’s housing biographies with 
interviews with seven real estate agents specialized or involved in SERS areas. I used 
these interviews for gaining an understanding of the market, the area and SERS, but 
also of the relations between the SERS programme and residents. Real estate agents 
have a feel for the market in Tanglin Halt as ‘market experts’, as their job requires 
them to know and be aware of the market, trends, history, rules and regulations as well 
as resident profile of the area. There was a long list of real estate agents previously 
involved in Tanglin Halt from property listings. I carried out phone interviews as this 
was the real estate agents’ preferred form of communication. Phone interviews were 
also the only way to establish my first contact with these real estate agents as I did not 
know any of them personally. Questions revolved around their own profiles, how long 
they had been in the profession, in the area, their assessment of competition and its 
evolution over the years. I also asked them about their customer base, and how price 
and sites had evolved over the years for SERS. I managed to follow a resident to ask a 
real estate agent about selling her SERS unit. She was still considering where to move, 
whether to the designated area or elsewhere, whether to sell her flat early or later and 
she wanted to ask the agent for his expert opinion. I then asked him further about SERS 
at the end of the session.  
 
Sensitivity and silencing 
My respondents’ accounts not only complicated the housing nation's narrative, but 
were also about retrieving parts of the Malay past that had either been silenced or never 
articulated. In bringing out a silenced part of that narrative, I was asking my 
protagonists to vocalise ‘unspeakable’ things, stories that have not been narrated 
before. There were a number of former residents from the Southern Islands who had 
been approached by my protagonists but did not want to associate themselves with the 




been changed and the only information included about my protagonists are age and 
gender. However, owing to Bukom Kecil’s tightly knit community, they are aware of 
the possibility of being identified. Also, some protagonists likely talked with one 
another about their conversations with me. I made it clear to people I talked to that 
they had the option to ask that their interview be withdrawn from my research and not 
included. I also did not pursue my protagonists if they no longer wanted to stay in 
contact with me. 
All interviews were done in locations in which respondents felt comfortable. This 
included public places and homes. Most protagonists were first interviewed in a group 
and in a public setting such as the void deck or hawker centre. It functioned as a safety 
net and allowed protagonists to find out more about the study. There was also a 
tendency for the group discussions to become individual interviews in turns. People 
were careful when they spoke. I thus encouraged interactions in these group interviews 
by introducing open questions, with minimal moderation. In-depth interviews were 
then conducted in the more private settings of their homes after these early interviews 
in public spaces. They were more forthcoming at home, especially when alone. 
However, once they were comfortable with opening up, the stories flowed. I paid 
attention to what the protagonists were telling me and what they were not and why. 
Different voices required different kinds of listening. Zee’s use of ‘so-called’ was a 
signal that she was critical of the term used or event that she was describing. These 
terms were usually those used by HDB such as upgrade, officer, future, notices and 
claims from HDB that Zee’s family were ‘so-called going to make about $30K’. I also 
paid attention to humour during the interviews. As I probed emergent themes over the 
course of my interviews, I was increasingly careful when asking for opinions. Asking 
for an opinion, versus an understanding or experience needed a different approach. I 
used indirect questions that revolved around their neighbours, community, and home 
in finding out their relationship with the state - through whom, in what ways and how 
it was experienced. I only raised it towards the end of the interview or when they 
themselves passed judgments on issues. I employed the use of gentle questioning, 




This led me to reflect on why they trusted me to uncover these sensitive housing 
biographies. 
The history of the Southern Islands had, for a long time, been absent. It was only 
recently narrated, and in a very selective manner. Silencing of the islands’ history can 
be seen in how memory was revised in conjunction with Singapore’s bicentennial 
celebration. I had looked at the official websites for ‘housing memories’. For instance, 
the state-sponsored documentary project ‘Island Nation’ that focus on the outlying 
Southern Islands is used to support the narrative that Singapore had been around for 
over half a century. Yet, the political significance of the Southern Islands in the nation-
state’s founding years had been glossed over. 
Second, silence could also be seen from the absence of not just histories but materials 
to write them. There had been an exhibit titled Balik Pulau: Stories from Singapore’s 
Islands, at the National Museum of Singapore in 2014. The curators of the exhibit 
identified the difficulty in getting materials for Southern Islands: 
In terms of researching for this exhibition, the hard part, for some of the 
islands, you really could not find anything. They were cleared many years 
ago, such as Pulau Semakau which was cleared in the early 1970s. In other 
cases, some islands were not inhabited in the past. All the more there was 
no reason for anyone to have ever written anything about them16.  
This was similar to the experience I had: in trying to obtain the limited data on the 
Southern Islands, organisations that I had approached including the National Archives 
granted me restricted access. The curators attributed the lack of evidence to the 
resettlement. Although the settlements may no longer exist, the islands’ former 
inhabitants were available though ageing. And their experiences of urban change were 
one of displacement, as suggested by the same curators: 
The first instance of island displacement was at Pulau Semulun, which 
appears in an old Dondang Sayang17 song. In the early 1960s, the place 
made way for shipyards. At that time, the authorities shifted the islanders 
to a nearby island and even built them new houses. […] Later on, in the 
 
16 “View from above,” Island Nation, accessed October 25, 2019, http://islandnation.sg/story/view-
from-above/.  




1960s and 1970s, the western part of Singapore was turned into a huge 
industrial zone. It was like a slow juggernaut. At different points, one 
island after another would get swallowed up: Damar Laut, Ayer Merbau, 
Merlimau and Ayer Chawan […]  
With regard to displacement, it seems that the window of time given for 
islanders to know that an island is targeted for development is short and 
uncertain18. 
And these curators seem to suggest alongside the history of the islands, displacement 
had occurred as a result of the resettlement. Not only are the histories of these islands 
absent, but also the stories of the islanders beyond living on the islands. Stories of their 
displacement have been silenced. Finally, in trying to retrieve stories that have not 
been read before, I met with a wall of silence even within the community. Political 
sensitivity was involved and they were not willing to share.  
The story of the world-class multiracial housing nation is a story that is easy to slip 
into when it is frequently referred to and dominantly narrated. Yet the moment I 
listened to stories from my protagonists, I began to unknow my home. How had I seen 
my home before this? I definitely did not see the Southern Islands. Neither did I see 
SERS as displacing select communities. My hope is that these stories, or at least my 
understanding thereof, tell of the nuances within this exceptional property state. These 
biographies provide us a way of escaping the first-person narration by the state to a 
story that is perhaps more sympathetic to more individuals - one where the plot opens 
up. Despite all of their differences, however, what is remarkable is that these stories 
revolve around a longing for belonging, a desire for connection. Even the most 
property-minded Zee moved to be close to her family, even Adi who sought to be more 
Chinese. He wanted to belong someplace, in some community. It is not that they enjoy 
being biographers of their displacement, continuously invested in their unhappiness – 
seen in the multiple processes of un-homing. But in telling their stories, they get to 
decide what is written in the pages imprinted in their minds which shapes their 
realities. Because just by virtue of telling their stories, they tell of the impossibilities 
of what the plot that could not be- for them. How they ended up, how they are, and 






if life is shaped by choosing which stories are worth listening to, there is an urgency 
in going beyond a singular story. Because while one might not have control over the 
structural constraints, perhaps the quality of our lives hinges on the stories we tell 
about them. Because these are the stories of our lives and we should be allowed to tell 








Chapter 4 | Five Malay lives in housing 
 
The chapter explores how the five Malays I met understand, navigate and respond to 
the various housing policies that shape their lives (Table 1). Whilst each is unique, 
when taken together their housing biographies can be suggestive of some ways in 
which housing policies have been lived and experienced by ethnic minority Malays in 
Singapore. In this chapter I therefore ask: how do my respondents make sense of their 
housing moves, of the state’s attempts over the years to position them in various ways 
in terms of home; how do they conceive social mobility, and how do they see 
themselves and their place in Singapore’s wider socio-economic development? Thus, 
in a bid to try to understand how five individual Malays navigate both constraints and 
possibilities in their housing lives, I hope to offer a deeper and more meaningful 
understanding of the state’s housing policies, and how as sites of these experiences, 
these policies in turn might enable the agential constitution of distinctive subjectivities. 
More than just exploring the produced subject positions, housing subjectivity is seen 
as embodied and agentially enacted. What might be some different ways of 
experiencing resettlement and relocation in Singapore?  
The chapter organises the five biographies loosely along two axes. First is what I will 
refer to as the axis of housing mobility, running from accommodation with (positive) 
to relegation from (negative) the housing mobility model promoted in Singapore. And 
the second is an axis of subjective investment in ‘home’ - which I take to be necessarily 
evolving. These correspond to what might be seen as external and internal subjective 
axes. The chapter begins with two housing biographies, embodying Malay versions of 
what Haila (2016, 2017) refers to as property-mindedness and orientation to housing 
mobility. I then turn to three biographies which shape Malay experiences of ‘un-







Table 1: My protagonists and their sequence of houses 
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Zee, the property-minded Malay 
Zee’s housing life challenged many of my assumptions about housing in Singapore. I 
had always thought Malays were house-proud. The first time I visited her flat I scanned 
it for something that I could use as an opening question. One could never go wrong 
with family photographs, of course. But there were none. I remember sitting on the 
floor. I waited for Zee in the living room. Her husband and daughter had received me 
at the door. The flat was simple, even bare. Since I only knew three things about Zee 
– she was a friend’s sister, a Tanglin Halt resident, and a teacher – I asked where her 
school was. Her reply was a primary school located a good half hours’ drive away. I 
thought to myself, weren’t teachers assigned to nearby schools? Zee must have read 
my expression and quickly explained: ‘It’s a long story. I’ve been living in Johor for 
about 16 years. I go in and out of Singapore every day. It’s just an address. I mean it’s 
my house’. I grew even more confused with her explanation. Although Zee was the 
youngest among all five protagonists and she had mainly experienced SERS, her 
housing biography proved to be the most complicated. 
House-moving culture 
As soon as Zee could sell her first flat, which was a 4-room flat in Pasir Ris town, she 
upgraded to a bigger executive apartment (EA) in the same town. Upgrading refers to 
a shift from a lower to higher category of dwelling unit. She could only sell her first 
flat after the minimum occupancy period (MOP) of five years. Zee then lived in the 
EA for a few years. It was after her father’s death that she moved to Johor in Malaysia. 
Zee then rented her EA to long-term tenants for ten years. They were Malaysians who 
worked in Singapore. Everything was going well; Zee then narrated how things came 
to an end with a frustrating discovery. 
My husband checked my (Central Provident Fund) CPF account, ‘do you 
know how much we’re paying?’ $1200 per month for the [EA] flat. About 
$500 to 600 is going to the interest alone. I said this is ridiculous and we 
were talking about ‘big loanshark HDB’, this and that. So, after that, we 
decided to sell off the [EA] flat. We still made a loss because of accrued 
interest. And then for a few years, I used my brother’s address in Bedok. 




address. It’s very, very near. It’s just like from here to that field (pointing 
at the field in front of the block).  
Zee was only able to escape crippling interest payments by selling that very flat. 
However, having a home in Malaysia entailed leaving as early as 4 a.m. to plough 
through the massive Causeway congestion on a daily basis. The Singapore-Malaysia 
overland border crossings remain among the busiest in the region, easily involving 
more than 300,000 commuters during peak hours19. Crossing the Causeway bridge 
connecting Singapore to Malaysia takes one to two hours at the very least. Upon 
reaching Singapore, they would have their breakfast, say their prayers, and then her 
husband would first send Zee to her school in Bedok and thereafter, drop off their 
daughter at his sister’s place in Tampines. Zee shared that her sister-in-law had helped 
to take care of their daughter since when their daughter was young. As Zee narrated 
her daily journey to Singapore, it seemed to be quite an ordeal. And it was something 
she acknowledged.  
Age is catching up, with the jam [over the causeway] and then, there’s my 
daughter. Previously, there were no remedial classes. Now she comes 
home after 5 p.m. By the time I go back to Johor, it’s already so late. 
Another one is that come August, we got to pay more than $20 (when 
entering Johor).  
Her daughter’s education and the upcoming threefold increase in the Causeway toll 
rendered living in Malaysia increasingly unsustainable for Zee’s family. 
Zee thus went to HDB to enquire about buying a new Build-to-Order (BTO) flat in 
Singapore. This was when they were told that they needed to pay more than $100,000. 
‘Because of the number of years since I sold my first flat,’ she recounted with dismay, 
‘if I had known, I would have paid then, [it was] cheaper. We didn’t know. So then of 
course, we cannot afford [it]. Who would have $100K lying around?’ She was 
referring to the HDB resale levy which aims to ‘maintain a fair allocation of public 
housing subsidies between first-timers and second-timers by reducing the subsidy 
 






enjoyed for the second HDB flat or executive condominium’20. Since HDB mortgage 
financing cannot be used to pay the levy, it needs to be paid in cash or from the 
proceeds of the sale from the first flat. However, in the event that one chooses to defer 
the resale levy payment until purchasing another flat from HDB, the interest is 5% per 
annum21. Zee might have chosen to defer paying her resale levy, which she found to 
have costly repercussions. 
Returning home: Options, options, options 
And the only affordable path that led the way home for Zee’s family was to buy a flat 
in an area where it was speculated to be involved in SERS soon. They decided to 
purchase a 3-room resale flat in Tanglin Halt, in anticipation of SERS. In this way they 
would not have to pay the hefty resale levy, since it does not apply when purchasing 
HDB resale flats. Imagine their joy at receiving news of SERS three years after the 
purchase.  
We ever walked about here. I mean I knew the place and we knew that it’s 
already en-bloc (involved in SERS). We saw the [new replacement] blocks 
being built [for the flats in the area that were already involved in SERS]. 
They were so tall, more than 20 storeys (Figure 2). But we never expected 
our area to be involved in SERS so soon. We thought maybe the earliest 
would be five years. Then we got a letter saying our area is being en-bloc 
too. 
Half of the Tanglin Halt estate was selected for SERS in 2003 and there was 
speculation that it was only a matter of time before the other half of the estate would 
be involved in SERS as well. 
 







Figure 2: Tall replacement flats 
 
 
Zee however did not want a flat in Dawson estate, the designated area. Unlike fellow 
residents who viewed living in Dawson as a privilege, Zee chose to move out of the 
area. 
They were saying that Dawson is a suburban area, near Holland and 
Orchard. But then, sorry I'm not an Orchard person. My husband is not an 
Orchard person. He will never step into Orchard. We don't shop at Orchard 
Road; the clothes are not the clothes that we would wear. I mean that's not 
our lifestyle.  
Both Holland Village and Orchard shopping district are located in prime residential 
districts. Holland Village is a particularly fashionable neighbourhood among the 
expatriates in Singapore, described as their ‘home away from home’ (Beaverstock, 
2012: 247). Due to the large expatriate community, a cluster of international schools 
/and ‘expatriate market’ where most of the shops and food outlets catered to expatriate 
preferences exist in Holland Village (Chang 1995). We might say that the sense of 
belonging to which Zee is referring to is ‘elective belonging’ (Savage et al. 2005), 




themselves as attached to certain lifestyles through their choice of residence’ (ibid.:  
94). At the same time, residents want to live in places with people like themselves. As 
such, it ‘implies a view of residential attachment that articulates a distinctive ethics of 
belonging that has nothing to do with the claims of history' (Savage et al. 2005: 53). 
In other words, the sense of belonging has to fit in with their biography. This seems to 
be true for Zee as she explained the other factors that shaped her decision. 
If you want to be near the suburban (area), they offer 3 sites - Strathmore, 
Stirling, Margaret Drive - but the price is high $360K for a 50sqm [3-room] 
flat […] You just imagine. This [flat] is 56sqm, and we were already like 
‘huh’. And then we went to Stirling and Strathmore, the flats are next to 
the road. […] The timing was [also] very long - I took the brochure. I 
remember the words... ‘welcome home in 2020’. I thought to myself, not 
sure whether I'll still be alive or not. 
Zee and her husband were then 50 and 56 years old respectively. Arguably, they would 
not be able to maintain a Dawson lifestyle: Its cheapest 4-room flats cost $434,000, 
whilst Zee’s choice of a 4-room flat in Punggol was $320,000. Despite being smaller 
and more expensive, these Dawson replacement flats have high investment value, 
however. And this would be something she would have known in navigating her 
decisions but perhaps reconsidered due to affordability. There was also the five-year 
MOP, during which they would not be allowed to rent their flat. Still, whilst it was 
possible to rent rooms during that period, this was not an option that Zee seemed 
inclined to consider. 
Instead, she was determined to apply for Sale of Balance Flats (SBF) flats in Punggol. 
Although she acknowledged SBF as ‘flats that people have rejected and do not want’, 
SBF allowed her to move into a brand new flat quickly. SBF flats are leftover or unsold 
flats from earlier BTO sales launches, surplus SERS replacement flats, and 
repurchased flats22. One unique feature of SERS is that one can choose a replacement 
flat outside of the designated area (in Zee’s case, Dawson) either through the BTO or 
 






SBF schemes. The difference between BTO and SBF schemes are their waiting times 
in getting a new flat: whilst BTO flats require a few years’ wait for completion, SBF 
flats are already completed or nearly so. The search for an instant house had its own 
appeal, not least in the context of Singapore’s long wait for new flats. 
Out of the many locations for SBF, Punggol had been their choice primarily due to 
family. Zee noted that Punggol was ‘midway between his [her husband’s] family and 
my family’. And more than just the completed amenities in the new town of Punggol, 
Zee explained that her daughter was excited because she never had a new flat. She 
described how her family would spend weekends in Punggol to look at the available 
SBF flats. Although Zee did not mention it, her daughter seems to be the one of the 
main concerns for moving back to Singapore. The journey to and from Malaysia would 
inadvertently impact her education, not only in terms of the time needed but the energy 
(left) to shuttle between countries. 
It took less than nine months for Zee’s family to move into a new flat. This is 
considered fast compared to the few years of wait under the BTO scheme. She signed 
up for the SBF scheme flats in November 2014, chose her new flat in April, and, when 
I met her in early July 2015, she was expecting to collect her keys soon. She even 
hoped to move in before Eid celebrations in mid-July. 
I did not want to wait. To be honest, I do not have any sentimental 
attachment. If people were to live here for over 30 years, maybe. My 
neighbours are okay, nice people, but I do not really know them. I think 
the next-door flat is rented by foreigners. Singapore is a very practical 
society.  
Zee sees her lack of attachment to the flat as pragmatic, which she claims is a 
Singaporean trait. Further, this pragmatic lack of attachment to one’s house can be 
viewed as a necessary trait of property-mindedness. Indeed, this is one way of 
understanding the appeal of the bare Tanglin Halt flat.  
Her description of the flat was especially telling: ‘this house was $300K. I mean, come 
on, look at this! What a crappy place. There is nothing in here. Even the furniture here 
was from the former owner’. But for Zee, the flat’s main attraction and value lay in 




bonus for her. Zee was surprised to be able to rent it at $2000 monthly. She narrated 
how it was her real estate agent who persuaded her to rent out her flat: 
How I rent out my flat is also very funny. When I first bought it, I never 
intended to rent it out. Then, my housing agent said people were desperate 
to rent a house. It was supposed to be for only six months only. Then from 
six months, it stretched to two years. It was my good fortune. They pay 
very well. They were locals, who were waiting for their flat. […] It was an 
Indian family – a mother and 2 adult sons. Indians like this place because 
it is very near the temple. So, in the late afternoons like this, you can hear 
their ceremony going on in there. So, they loved my place. After they 
moved out, again my housing agent [persuaded me]. This time round, it 
was Indian workers. 
The lack of property attachment made Zee an ‘easy-going landlord’, a term she used 
to described herself. When she finally moved into the Tanglin Halt flat, she learned 
that there were double the number of people staying in her flat. Nevertheless, she did 
not seem to mind it: ‘on paper, it was supposed to be four tenants, but when we moved 
in, we got to know that there were eight staying here previously. But it is alright as 
long as they do not make any trouble’. Different occupancy caps are set for different 
flat sizes, and there was a maximum of six persons for Zee’s 3-room flat. They stopped 
renting their flat after they were notified that it had been included in the SERS 
programme. She felt it would be inconvenient to follow-up with the SERS-related 
appointments and letters, so the whole family now lives in the flat. And their Malaysian 
home of sixteen years became a weekend home. Zee however did not have any 
complaints about the change nor the various relocation processes that accompanied it.  
‘Pleasant’ evictions 
In fact, Zee described how ‘it was very pleasant throughout the whole [SERS] 
experience’. While the options in SERS programme had allowed her flexibility to suit 
her housing needs, Zee noted that it was her SERS officer who helped with her 
application. An officer was personally assigned to her. She remembered meeting her 
officer in HDB to talk about financial planning and ‘their so-called future’. As she 
shared her concerns about needing to get a flat fast, she narrated how her application 




My officer immediately sent me the SBF link and all that. They’ve very 
good customer service. We looked at it and saw November had sales of 
balance flats. After that, I submitted an application online and I 
remembered it was the last day of the application. And then, my officer 
called me up and said, ‘Madam Zee I noticed that you had sent in your 
application. Do you want your SERS benefit?’ I said, ’Of course’. He said, 
‘You did not indicate, never mind I will do it for you now.’ Very good 
right? 
[…] Then straight away a few days later, I got a number. The officer called 
me saying, ‘Oh you want a queue number, don’t worry, you will get 
priority’. True enough, a few weeks later, they told me that the balloting 
number would be issued sometime in April. I got a bit worried when I did 
not receive any notification in April. So, I contacted my officer again but 
the voicemail answered. So, I emailed him, and he replied within a day 
saying that, ‘Oh from what I understand, it’s going to be in May’. I mean 
very efficient right? 
Her officer’s ‘efficient’ service had ensured that she selected the best option based on 
her situation.  
This included attending to Zee’s primary concern, which was her husband’s CPF 
account. Zee did not want their new flat purchase to affect her husband’s minimum 
sum, which is the amount that must be set aside in their CPF account for retirement 
needs when a member turns 55. Zee explained: 
Another issue that I brought up to the officer was that my husband is 55 
years old and I’m 50 and he just put in money to his minimum sum 
account. The whole idea of me buying the flat quickly was to… I don’t 
want him to go beyond that. Then my officer said, ‘It’s okay, we will write 
in an appeal to CPF to use your husbands, don’t take out your husband’s 
share and I think that one is going to be successful.  
[…] They were very confident. Don’t worry, we’ll appeal for you at HDB. 
They’re very good at communicating. They gave me the assurance and I 
also think I don’t need to worry.  
The officer’s confidence in resolving Zee’s concern reflected the close relationship 
between the key housing institutions in Singapore: CPF and HDB. This relationship is 
crucial to understand because it is one of the vehicles for Singaporeans’ property-
mindedness. CPF is a fully funded pension scheme into which employers and 
employees are each required to contribute a proportion of the monthly salary. In 1968, 
CPF savings were allowed to be utilized to purchase HDB flats. This created a ‘closed 




22), which was not only successful in helping Singaporeans own their homes, but 
created generations of homeowners. At the same time, the landmark tie up between 
CPF and HDB resulted in the proletarianization of labour (Tremewan 1994). This was 
because homeownership spelled mortgages for most. In addition, apart from 
cultivating property-mindedness, ‘having to service a mortgage can discourage risk-
taking behaviour needed in entrepreneurship, in changing careers or in finding jobs 
overseas’23. And there have been increased concerns regarding overutilizing CPF for 
housing leading to retirement inadequacy. 
Apart from her efficient personal officer, the SERS officers who informed their 
compensation sum were also described as ‘friendly’. This was because these officers 
would go door to door to personally notify each household of their valuation amount. 
After they sent the letter, they said they will serve compensation. Wah, I 
say ‘serve’. So how it’s done - they actually come to your house and it’s a 
Saturday and people are at home. There’s like a personal touch. And if you 
cannot make it, you just tell them.  
On that particular day, Zee remembered seeing them from a distance away. 
As I was walking, I saw a lot of people in the same T-shirt. They opened 
their ‘so-called’ notices at the void deck opposite my block. They were 
wearing T-shirts with the word SERS and they have their tag. So, I know 
them. It’s presentable you know, not shabby or untidy. I can see that 
they’re friendly sort of people. They’re not confrontational – ‘Hello, good 
morning, Sir, how are you? Okay, I’m here from HDB. Here’s your 
compensation letter’. 
I remembered laughing at how chirpy she sounded as she mimicked the officers’ 
cheerful serving of compensation. She nevertheless added that the officers’ 
friendliness however had qualifiers:  
Very friendly but they will not engage you if you say, ‘why so little’. So 
far, I’ve not heard of it but if I were to say that, I think they will say, ‘Oh 
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you can always take it up with HDB. This is HDB’s number’ or something 
like that.  
When she described the officers as not confrontational, it meant that instead of directly 
attending to or engaging with any disagreements from residents, she suspected that 
they would refer them to another department instead.  
Contrary to Zee’s assumption, I managed to speak to another resident, who told me 
how the officer had explained, albeit discouragingly, the process. The officer 
acknowledged the possibility but added that there had not been any successful appeals 
among HDB flat owners. Nadiah had asked the officer, who was serving her 
compensation letter, whether it was possible to appeal for a higher compensation 
amount. According to Nadiah, within fourteen days of receiving the compensation 
letter, the resident has to submit the appeal to a board and state the grounds of appeal. 
In response, HDB would justify the amount given; and in the event that the issue 
cannot be resolved between the two parties, the commissioner of land would decide 
whether to maintain or increase the value given by HDB in court. I was surprised that 
such precise details, even if clearly scripted, were given.  Since she had inquired about 
the process, I asked Nadiah whether she was considering whether to appeal her 
compensation. She laughed; she had asked out of curiosity. She could not imagine 
anyone actually winning their case against the HDB.  
The reason why Zee found these officers ‘friendly’ was perhaps due to the disjuncture 
between the compensation letters’ legal tone and the warm approach taken to convey 
the compensation sum to residents. Zee asked midway in our conversation whether I 
had seen the compensation notice.  
Interviewer: Yes, I’ve seen a friend’s. It’s very… comprehensive. 
Zee: Yes, it’s very comprehensive and very legal you know. First 
generation residents, if you don’t… 
I: Understand? 
Z: Understand is one but if you don’t… you will see and say wow legal 
you know. Scary. If I were a first-generation resident, I would be scared of 
it. For me, I’m fine. I’ll chuck it [to] one side but what I’m saying is that 
these older residents, they are served very legal terms. 
I: Yes, I know of an elderly couple who asked their children to take over 
all of the SERS matters because they can’t make any sense of it. But at the 




Z: They just want to know how much they are getting? 
I: Yes, also will they have a new house? Where is it going to be located? 
Z: So, what’s wrong? I’m also like that. Firstly, my flat is going to be fully 
paid for.  
I: And then there’s also cash involved. 
Z: Give me cash on top a of new flat - it’s good! And the way they put the 
compensation [amount], it is just nice to pay for the new flat. As I said 
earlier, my compensation is $350K right, and my new flat in Punggol is 
$320K right. Just nice, there’s just a little bit of difference. The person 
[living] below took a cheaper flat at Bukit Batok, a 3-room flat. 
Here, Zee emphasised her contentment with the compensation amount, which she 
found reasonable: 
We're happy because the compensation they offered is a lot and it's enough 
to gloss over any… I mean they offered us $350,000 and the ceiling is 
$400,000 if I wanted to contest. I mean come on… I never renovated this 
place. The most I did was move in and my husband painted the flat for a 
few hours, just here and there. He managed to do that… We would not 
have been able to do this with our [previous] EA or [current] Johor flat. I 
asked my husband, ‘you want to contest?’. In the document, [it said] if you 
were to contest, you would have to pay the court about $5,000. I have to 
pay the court $5,000 because I’m the one that is contesting. I said to him, 
‘Let’s say we get it (an increase), at the most we get another $10,000. How 
much more can they give? Look (she gestured at the house). I said forget 
it. I got no time to go up and down (back and forth to the court).  
While Zee might not have been afraid of the legal-sounding letters, navigating the 
SERS policy amidst its jargon, legal fees and nature of the legal procedures had 
nevertheless significantly influenced her decision not to appeal for higher 
compensation. Like Nadiah, Zee was convinced that she had a slim chance of winning 
the appeal. It seems that compensation in SERS was essentially fixed. For Zee, 
whatever strategies the SERS unit employed did not matter – as long as she got her 
ideal flat. 
Fate 
And yet, she was not able to get her ideal flat - despite practicing property-mindedness. 
As a SERS recipient, Zee was able to join the SBF queue fast. However, within the 
particular SBF queue she was in, she was subjected to the same balloting process as 




We had about 118 flats to choose from, and I got number 104. Never 
mind…  The earlier flats [were] all so exciting but let’s put it this way - all 
taken up. But in hindsight, we said it’s fate. And we got this flat at Blk24 
668 Punggol Edgefield Plains.  
Being among the last in the queue was regarded as predestined. This was perhaps Zee’s 
way of accepting it, even though she was disappointed not to have more choices. 
Resigned, she believed that fate had handed her a flat that was most ideal for her. She 
had done all she could. Zee then explained how they decided on the floor next: 
Second (floor), as usual for us. My family didn’t want high floors. Because 
in that block, the only flats available are on the second and tenth floor. And 
then, we chose the second floor, as usual as we are Malays.  
There is a general preference for a higher flat due to better views and reduced noise 
level. I could however understand Zee’s choice because their previous flats had been 
ground floor units. Nevertheless, when she justified it as a Malay choice, she was 
referring to the widespread belief that usually lower level flats are taken up by Malays 
either due to ‘greater accessibility to the ground floor space’ (Hee 2017: 146), or their 
low socioeconomic status. Flats on the higher floors are more expensive. In any case, 
if they decided not to proceed with their SBF application, HDB would place them at 
the back of the selection queue for flats at Dawson, an area which they did not even 
want. But Zee is quick to compare her issue with the real ‘problem’. She explains it 
like this: 
As a matter of fact, if you really want a problem, talk to Rita (her sister) 
because she was from the interim housing rental flats. And frankly, if you 
are talking about problem, I am treated so well, they were not - those who 
get the interim flats […] The flats are really crappy. There are two toilets 
but one of them did not work, the sink was clogged. As a matter of fact, 
Rita moved out. And it’s like a Malay ghetto. They call it a Malay ghetto. 
I know because those students come to me.  
Initially, I thought that what Zee implied was that she did not want to be identified 
with those amongst the Malays who were most severely racialised; that she was of the 
view that being savvy about housing is important, especially when one is Malay. Any 
less thought given to housing could land anyone, including her sister and nephew, in 
 




a housing crisis – worse still, a ghetto. Due to a divorce, her sister had to move into 
Interim Rental Housing (IRH) flats with her three children. IRH is a scheme that allows 
families in hardship to live in vacated HDB blocks slated for demolition (including 
SERS), while they work out permanent options. What distinguishes IRH from other 
rental housing is that HDB require two households to share such flats25.  
However, she was simply comparing a stark difference in their fates: Zee’s pleasant 
experience in spite of getting less than ideal balance purchase flats was incomparable 
to the living conditions experienced in IRH.  
 If downgrading was embarrassing, living in a rental flat carried a higher stigma. 
Importantly, these rental flat dwellers could not ‘downgrade’, or shift from a higher to 
lower category of dwelling unit, to stay afloat.  However, one needs to first own a flat 
to downgrade. Despite it being common knowledge that rental dwellers are typically 
Malays, this fact seems to be silenced. Unlike the ethnic composition of homeowners 
in Singapore, the ethnic composition of rental flat dwellers is not readily available (see 
below).   
The ethnic integration policy and mixing different flat types in meticulously planned 
new towns results in an idealised image of social integration. As Chua (1991: 351–2) 
argues, 
[w]hat is exemplary in the Singapore case is the absence of racial ghettos, 
in spite of the fact that its largest minority group, the Malays, are 
structurally economically behind the majority Chinese population. This is 
largely racial classes and different races in comprehensively planned new 
towns.  
Granted, Singapore does not have ghettos like other global cities. This, however, does 
not mean an absence of urban marginality. The same ethnic integration policy (EIP) 26 
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homeownership rates between 2010 and 2015 (see ST 11 May 2016). 
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that aims for social integration seems to hinder Malay families in need of housing. The 
policy applies to all HDB flats, including rentals. A block can be no more than 87% 
Chinese, 25% Malays and 15% for Indians/Others. Yet, 60% of HDB’s rental blocks 
had reached the EIP block limit for Malay households in 201227. Further details about 
the ethnic breakdown in terms of per block and zone was not provided by the Minister 
for National Development on the issue:  
What the public continue to be clueless about is whether Malays comprise 
30, 40 or 50% of a typical block of rental flats, as the Minister did not 
answer the question when it was asked earlier. No reason was given why 
this information could not be released. 
Crucially though, the Minister did let in on important detail – that the HDB 
was reviewing EIP limits for rental housing to take into account demand 
from the various ethnic groups. This would almost singularly be the result 
of a large number of Malay Singaporeans requiring rental housing, since 
the other races are still within the EIP limits28. 
In Aljunied and Hougang, the percentage of Malay households within each block 
ranged from 30 to 40%, with one block in particular having close to 50%29. Malays 
have the longest average waiting time of seven months for a public rental flat, 
compared to four months for Chinese and six months for Indians/Others. This is not 
only caused by the overwhelming number of Malay applicants, but also aggravated by 
enforcement of EIP limits. 
It seems as though in trying to prevent and perhaps deny the presence of ethnic ghettos, 
the most disadvantaged Malay have been effectively deprived even of shelter. There 
is very little information about rental flats. Nevertheless, Member of Parliament Dr 
Mohamad Maliki Osman, who was the prime overseer for IRH, explained that ‘IRH 
had come about because there were a number of old HDB blocks which were vacated, 
pending demolition. And to put them to some interim use, HDB decided to rent them 
 
“Ethnic integration policy and SPR Quota,” Housing and Development Board, accessed October 2, 
2020, https://www.hdb.gov.sg/cs/infoweb/residential/buying-a-flat/resale/eligibility/ethnic-
integration-policy-and-spr-quota.  
27 This issue was significant enough to be raised by an opposition group. “HDB’s rental housing 







out to families in financial hardship requiring urgent temporary accommodation’. And 
based on the Malay demographics in IRH as described by Zee, the situation of majority 
Malay rental dwellers has continued. 
By allowing them to partially bypass the resale levy and stamp duty, and the option of 
a replacement flat in areas that are less expensive than Dawson, SERS assured them a 
fully paid new flat that they can afford.  
And again, I had a very pleasant experience when I went to sign for the 
new flat […] You see it’s a very good experience in the sense that… we 
didn’t have to pay a single cent. […] in and out within 20 minutes. 
Anyway, we got it at 6 p.m., which I like because it’s after work right. So, 
we went there and, on the dot, they called us in at 6 p.m. 
They’re efficient and when we sat down, she asked in Malay, ‘Which one 
would you like sister’. We already wrote it down and so we showed her 
and said I want this if it’s available. […] The person was like ‘Sister, I 
don’t know what else to talk to you about. If it were other people, I would 
have to talk about finance, but you’re SERS – everything is covered, 
everything is paid. […] Later on, the SERS people will contact you, sis. 
Sis, you don’t have to take a financial loan, right?’. I said, ‘No need’ and 
she said, ‘Okay then, that’s it, choose a flat’. 
Zee had felt ‘taken care of’ and privileged as a SERS recipient. The final transaction 
at the HDB Hub seemed to reaffirm for her the success of her newest housing strategy 
- buying a flat in a speculated SERS area.  
Cho and colleagues (2017: 56) write that ‘it is too early to fully comprehend how these 
ongoing upgrading policies will impact Singapore’s economic and cultural landscape’. 
Nevertheless, the speculative nature of SERS has continued to perpetuate the culture 
of property-mindedness. As explained in Chapter 3, property-mindedness refers to a 
passion for real estate. Newspapers continue to identify SERS as a source of 
excitement in the property market in 2020:  
Since 2012, there has been one SERS announcement every two years, 
which means analysts are anticipating another this year […] analysts 
speculate that homeowners in the older parts of Holland Village or 
Queenstown might be told that their flats will undergo SERS. Affected 




year lease and are given a package comprising compensation and 
rehousing benefits30. 
And there are multiple websites that continue to speculate which area will be affected 
by SERS31. In Zee’s case, while her real estate agent brought her to Tanglin Halt, she 
had already identified SERS as her choice housing strategy. 
To be Singaporean is to be typically property-minded. This kind of passion for real 
estate is tied to or a precursor to investing in real estate as a source of passive or 
secondary income. And it necessarily involves capital and specific knowledge. 
Minority Malays may well be unlikely candidates for property-mindedness. Being one 
of the most socioeconomically disadvantaged races in Singapore, it is commonly 
accepted that rental dwellers re typically Malays. This certainly does not accord with 
the idea of property-mindedness as being a ‘collective consciousness of Singaporeans 
that [holds that] owning property is a big part of being - and getting – rich’32. 
There is a difference between owning property as a form of investment and having it 
as an asset for retirement. While Zee’s housing biography does show features of 
property-mindedness, she consistently seeks to reconcile with her identity as a Malay. 
Malays are somehow casually associated with not being financially savvy, especially 
when it comes to homeownership (see BH 17 February 2008). The issue of family 
homelessness was picked up in 2007 (ST 28 January 2007) and the local media has 
since proliferated beliefs that linked homeless Malay families living by the beach as 
culturally amenable to such a lifestyle (see BH 6 December 2009). This was echoed 
by a Malay real estate agent and Tanglin Halt resident to whom I spoke. She described 
how the homeless who pitched a tent at East Coast beach had sold their flats, made a 
handsome profit, but spent it all, or their families had borrowed from them. This seems 
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to be the stereotype for the homeless by the beach, who are typically Malays. The 
Malay ghetto/kampung by the beach has since disappeared due to a law that required 
permits for both day and night camping and restricted it to designated areas. There are 
very specific rules for the permit, which include having a valid residential address in 
Singapore, currently without any existing camping permit, and a limit of four camping 
days per month. Nevertheless, an unlicensed tented community of homeless called 
‘Tent Kampung’ persists. Complete with a penghulu (headman) in East Coast Park, 
there were more than 50 homeless individuals, with an increasing number of young 
Malays in the kampung (The New Paper 10 October 2016). These overstayers are 
liable to a fine of up to $2,000. The incompatibility of property-mindedness and being 
Malay seems sealed. Property-mindedness in terms of property investment or property 
as a retirement asset remain a dream alongside these ‘cultural’ failures to keep up with 
their mortgage payments as they grapple in housing arrears and having a roof over 
their head. And this has consequences for how the Malay ghetto is conceived, 
understood, and silenced. 
Thus, on one hand, Zee’s housing moves seem to be in pursuit of the Singaporean 
Dream, which is to own private property, and the path towards this typically begins 
with HDB flat ownership with subsequent upgrading. Despite eventually 
downgrading, her housing ‘achievements’ continued as she was able to quickly acquire 
a fully paid brand-new flat in Singapore through SERS. She was still keeping up with 
the housing trends, which was to relocate to an estate that she knew was going to be 
state relocated. Moving to speculated SERS sites might just continue to be the housing 
fad in Singapore, in the bid to reap SERS benefits. On the other hand, ‘passion for real 
estate’ is here not just a hobby, it feels like a necessity. There is very little room for 
error - not only for those who choose to downgrade or for retirees, but also for everyone 
else, especially when a significant proportion of their pension is invested in housing. 
Put differently, public housing is not a choice. There is no alternative to public housing 
in Singapore.  
Further, the complex and constantly changing housing rules in Singapore push the 
population, especially those who are state relocated, to be updated of changing laws 




penalty involved in selling their only flat in Singapore, and SERS became a way to fix 
their earlier ‘error’. Property-mindedness gave Zee more avenues for resolving her 
housing needs through the different stages of her life. It allowed her to exercise more 
informed choices. In short, property-mindedness (also seen in the SERS programme) 
accentuates the idea of choice. Nevertheless, and even after exercising her only option 
– SERS - she was unable to get the flat that she wanted. But instead of attributing this 
to the lack of affordability or to the very structure and rationale of housing policies, 
she resigned herself to her fate. Hers was not exactly a straightforward fatalism, 
however. Zee had thought her decisions through carefully given the existing 
constraints and she had accepted the flats she chose.  
But we see here how the culture of property-mindedness in Singapore also functions 
to support relocation and, therefore, redevelopment. Residents look forward to being 
relocated or choose to relocate to get compensation. Eviction becomes the ticket to a 
new flat, the idea being to buy an old flat to very quickly get a new replacement. At 
first glance, it seems as though Zee’s property-mindedness had simply led her to 
choose to be forcibly relocated; a situation perhaps only understandable in Singapore. 
However, it is more accurate to view the effectiveness of Singapore’s multiple housing 
policies, subsidies, and restrictions that have influenced such shrewd property-
mindedness. Brand new HDB flats are deemed valuable in Singapore because each 
Singaporean is allowed to buy only two subsidised new HDB flats. Described as ‘two 
bites of the cherry’, it ‘reflects the popular awareness that public housing 
homeownership is a good deal’ (Chua 2017: 80). Being a third-time home buyer, Zee 
could not afford to buy a brand new flat and had to resort to be relocated in order to be 
given rehousing benefits to offset the levy imposed. Property-mindedness enables the 
house-moving culture of upgrading in Singapore. Zee shows property-mindedness as 
a way of navigating through imprudent housing decisions, imperfect knowledge and 
changing housing needs. Rental dwellers perhaps show a similar need for real estate 
as a form of social mobility. Each housing upgrade feels like a step on the ‘escalator 
of social mobility’, on which Singaporeans are urged to keep moving (see Today 25 
October 2018). Property-mindedness is integral to the Singapore dream, and this 




Writing Zee’s biography compelled me to juggle many terms: EA, BTO, SBF, MOP, 
resale levy, accrued interest, occupancy cap, stamp duty, removal allowance, 
minimum sum. These were not unfamiliar terms for a Singaporean. But I began to 
scrutinise them – how these policies and their criteria are inhabited, experienced, and 
embodied – which in turn suggested questions about how they are navigated and 
negotiated and rationalised. Zee had it all worked out: the plan was to initially live in 
Malaysia but work in Singapore. Then plans changed, to seek a brand, new SERS 
replacement flat. New issues emerged - how much time would it would take to get an 
SBF flat compared to a SERS replacement flat in the designated Dawson area? How 
much sprucing up was needed for a respectable SERS valuation, and none too 
excessive for a flat that is to be lived-in for only a few months? Working the system 
meant a deft kind of property-mindedness - cutting the waiting time and costs and also, 
cutting back on her expectations. When plans fell apart, Zee fell back on fate. Yet in 
her understanding, she was not at all a prisoner of circumstances; she had battled the 
fate of the Malays and their attendant housing woes through property-mindedness. As 
I listened to Zee lay out and evaluate her calculations and plans, it occurred to me that 
playing the Singaporean housing game never failed to be accompanied by the need to 
reassert her Malay identity. This is because the Malay identity is one that ‘cannot 
participate in the contemporary spatio-temporality of Singapore that emphasizes the 
importance of property ownership’ (Leow 2015: 733) – for either ‘cultural’ or 
structural reasons. For Malay rental dwellers who aspire to own property, some have 
regarded it as financially imprudent. In their case, the idealised and idolised culture of 
property-mindedness is clearly not a reworking of their non-propertied fate.  
 
Adi, the impossible Singaporean 
Adi was the liveliest member of a group of men introduced to me by Sazali. 
Approaching 80, Sazali was referred to as the ‘elder Malay leader’ by the Malay food 
stallholders in one of the hawker centres in Tanglin Halt. Adi and Sazali knew each 
other from the kampung near Radin Mas where they had grown up. Sazali seemed to 




According to Sazali, Adi had done a lot of different jobs including being an auditor. 
These Malay men were all retirees and, having lived in the area for a long time, knew 
each other well. Adi never failed to act as gatekeeper at every meeting.  
In our early discussions, he would stop the rest of the group from speaking to me until 
he better understood my research project. And despite being seemingly very keen on 
my research, Adi did not want to have direct contact with me, refusing to give me his 
mobile number, and always making Sazali arrange our meetings. When I asked about 
his availability, he asked me to make arrangements with Sazali first because Sazali 
was busy with ‘JC’. JC normally stood for junior colleges and I could not think of any 
links possible between an 80-year-old grandfather and junior colleges. ‘JC’ was 
apparently short for ‘jaga cucu,’ or taking care of grandchildren. It was easier for Adi 
because he was ‘MRT’. This time he was referring to ‘makan rehat tidur’ - eat rest 
sleep - instead of Singapore’s public transport, the Mass Rapid Transit. I laughed not 
just because of the contrast - he used a fast mode of transport to refer to his relaxed 
pace of life - but also because Adi was speaking in abbreviations, a very Singaporean 
thing to do. There is a tendency to abbreviate names in Singapore, including 
expressways and public institutions, and this perhaps also suited Adi’s desire for 
objectivation well, particularly when it came to his employment and housing life.  
Downgrading 
As I progressively discovered, his housing life, rather than just being about finding the 
right fit of home across his different life stages, was also a tale of survival. Adi had 
moved five times. Yet the furthest distance he had ever moved was across the road. He 
moved within the same block twice, either a few storeys up or down. I wondered the 
point of these relocations for Adi, given that it was voluntary, repeated, and within 
close proximity. I soon understood that he saw relocation as a coping mechanism for 
overcoming life difficulties. These included retrenchment in 1998 and the painful loss 
of his wife to cancer soon after. It was, however, hard to feel much sympathy for Adi. 
He would answer my questions with more questions. And when he occasionally spoke 
about his personal experience, he would generalise it as if to objectify it for me – and 




Early in life, Adi had steadily upgraded from a 2-room to a 4-room flat. With 
retrenchment, Adi had to downgrade into a 3-room flat so as to stay afloat and planned 
to further downgrade into a 2-room flat with SERS. His first two flats had been in the 
same block in Tanglin Halt. He moved from his 2-room flat located on the right of the 
block to a 3-room flat located on the left of the block. His family was growing and 
there were not enough rooms. He wanted some privacy with his wife, he added 
cheekily. Similarly, his third and fourth flats were in the same block at Queen’s Close, 
across the road. Although both were 4-room flats, he moved up four floors to a flat on 
the higher level that was at the end of the corridor, which meant he could buy the area 
in front of the flat. This was Adi’s biggest flat and his favourite: ‘A lot of people liked 
the flat because of the privacy it allowed. Very quiet because HDB built it like a 
condominium’33. The location of a flat along the corridor determined the level of 
privacy. More than just about size, the quality of space mattered.  
Characteristically taking on an objective, scholarly stance, Adi gave me a sense of how 
he understood his own predicament: 
This person needs money. He asks his relatives for financial help, but they 
can’t afford to help him either. So downgrading is a way for him to get 
cash to pay the bills and everything else that needs to be paid. This is one 
of the many avenues that the Singapore government provides. Why do 
some people remain in the same flat? That’s because they are not in any 
[financial] difficulty. For people like this - it’s like, ‘I don’t have a 
problem. I like this place’. As for me, I have moved into five different flats 
– when I had children, when the economy changed, when the laws 
changed, and when I was laid off. Previously, workers were retrenched by 
the thousands. Not anymore, companies have learnt not to use the word 
‘retrench’ as this will cause shares to fall and bankruptcy. Right now, we’re 
in the middle of a recession, but it’s just that we are ‘clouded’ by the idea 
of having enough food, rest, and medicine. 
What Adi is describing is downgrading as a means of obtaining cash. In Singapore, 
downgrading has to be understood against the background of household finance. Yet 
it is a minority that downgrades, usually the elderly or those who lost their jobs 
(Reisman 2007). After Adi was retrenched, he sold his 4-room flat for $300,000 and 
 




bought his present 3-room flat in Commonwealth for half his previous flat’s selling 
price. Adi explained that his wife had just passed away at that time and a smaller house 
would be easier to maintain. After his two children got married and moved out, he 
lived with his youngest daughter in his current flat. Adi was aware of the stigma as he 
shared his plan to further downgrade with SERS: ‘This is my plan. I don’t care about 
other people. Anyway, I also don’t have any (mortgage) debts’.  
Having relocated in the same area meant that many would have known about Adi’s 
habit of moving in the same area, with the last move being a downgrade. Initially, I 
thought that Adi was in search of the familiar, remaining in the same neighbourhood, 
with minimal adjustments. However, it was rather that buying his future house from 
someone he knew gave him a sense of security.  
If I were to sell my flat here in Tanglin Halt and then move to Woodlands, 
I would not know the seller. What if the seller ran away after I had signed 
the documents? But if it’s a person from the neighbourhood, he wouldn’t 
be a stranger. I would know where for instance, Hashim, is moving to. I 
would also know where he lives presently. So, we won’t be able to cheat 
one another.  
Despite the flaws34 in Adi’s explanation, underlying his decision to relocate within the 
same area was the idea of a preventive measure. There was no room for error. 
Self-reliance 
Adi identified two factors that significantly impacted housing lives of Malays in 
Singapore: separation and employment. I understood this well because I had initially 
found it strange that my mother had been born in Malaysia. My grandmother, who 
lived in Singapore, had returned to her parents’ home in Malaysia to give birth. And 
this was the norm. People were free to travel to Malaysia without needing any form of 
documentation before Separation.  
 
34 While it is legally possible to sell, buy or rent a flat without appointing a real estate agent, in 
Singapore, real estate agents are regarded as safety nets to ensure a smooth transaction. Given that Adi 





Life in the kampung had been difficult. Adi described its inadequate sewerage system 
in the 1960s: ‘If the waste containers were not emptied on time every day, the waste 
would overflow. The waste truck had many windows, like ice-cream trucks with fixed 
deposit safes’ (laughs). While there was a water supply, the pipes were located by the 
roadside where everyone had to shower communally. Adi remembered the name of 
the company that supplied the water as the Pipe Company. Water was provided for 
free, but some would need help to carry the water back to their homes. It would cost 
about two cents per tin. Adi also briefly experienced living in the postman quarters as 
one of his uncles was a postman. 
It was not an easy life. Everyone on the whole floor needed to share a toilet. 
It was like being surrounded. Only high-ranking officers like the 
postmaster would get the units at the end. If you were a normal postman, 
you would be given the units in the middle. And within each unit, there 
were no rooms. It’s like an open concept. If you had five children, you 
needed to find wooden planks to make partitions. Another option was to 
find wood and make an ambin (makeshift area) outside. All the boys would 
then sleep outside. We would try to make a bigger ambin but it would still 
be cramped and we boys would sleep like sardines (in a tin).  
With Separation, there was a change in housing from kampung to flats. This was when 
the discussion with Adi and his group of friends would take an uneasy turn. One of the 
men, Abu Bakar, attributed the ‘drastic’ increase in people moving into flats due to 
suspicious fires/arson in Singapore (see Loh, 2013). I found Adi’s response rather 
chilling:  
If we are talking (about the fires recorded in) history, it’s Bukit Ho Swee. 
There were so many more (fires). Because when we were asked to move, 
we refused. It was the same at Geylang Lorong 3. The policy was if you 
don’t want to move, I will get rid of you. There were so many fires in the 
1960s and 1970s, and whose work was it, ‘I want to do a project but you 
don’t want (to cooperate). And when I visit the area, you beat me up. Okay 
then, I’ll set a fire’. Said (the then prime minister) Lee Kuan Yew, ‘Can’t 
be helped. There has to be pain. There will be bloodshed’. Bloodshed 
means either injury or death. This was in his speech. 
I was unsure which speech Adi was referring to, but he seemed to suggest the nation’s 
survival after Separation necessitated pain and bloodshed. Bukit Ho Swee and Geylang 




discussion went on, I found their pragmatic acceptance of these multiple fires rather 
discomforting. 
Abu Bakar: At that time, everyone ‘memberontak’ (revolted) but what was 
the point? The (replacement) flats were all prepared. 
Adi: It was the government’s responsibility because the ones affected by 
the tragedy are his citizens. So, the government needed to do something. 
From the fire site, surely, it’s not possible to build something straightaway. 
So, they tell us, ‘All this while, you’ve lived in suffering (in these houses). 
And so, we promise to let you live somewhere else, while we rebuild the 
site’. Because these citizens needed homes. Our homes had been burnt. We 
want to build our own homes, but that would be considered illegal. And 
so, who has to build homes for us, other than the government.  
When I asked whether the flats were affordable at that time, he added that there was 
no point in thinking about the affordability of flats. 
It was not a matter of whether you can afford it or not. At that time, if you 
wanted to survive, you had to work for it. Not like kids these days, ‘Dad, 
tomorrow I have this’. He just says it like that, and we have to prepare the 
money – which is why many of our people (referring to the Malays)…Not  
the Chinese though, (imitating a Chinese individual speaking the Malay 
language) ‘you want it, you’ve got to work for it’. There’s nothing free. 
So, our mindset, us Singaporeans, is that nothing is free. This is the 
developed mindset; we are used to it. 
Self-reliance emerged as a major theme that Adi wanted me to become aware of for 
interpreting his life: becoming a citizen of Singapore meant not taking everything into 
one’s own hands (such as re-building one’s house after the fires) and learning to trust 
the government but in a way that re-instated self-reliance on another level, dependent 
on earning one’s living.  
However, in the process, it seemed that Adi had to embrace and match the stereotypes 
for Chinese people rather than those he associated with his own ethnic group. In the 
meritocratic state, Malays are seen as not as successful as their ‘racial’ counterparts 
due to the ‘lazy’ nature of the Malays. Suratman (2010) outlines the social construction 
of the problematic Malays in the mass media  – as ‘slow to adapt to changes’ in the 
1960s, as ‘old-fashioned and traditional’ in the 1970s, and as ‘progressing but not quite 
there yet’ in the 1990s and 2000s. The context of Malays being structurally 




1998). The ‘myth of the lazy native’ had been born in the specific circumstances of 
colonialist capitalism during British administration, to justify colonial policies on 
immigration, land ownership, education, as well as exclusion from the market 
economy (Alatas 1977). And, as seen with Adi, Malays in Singapore continue to bear 
the brunt of racial stereotypes. 
Through brandishing his ethos of hard work, he claimed to be a deserving Singaporean, 
and took his distance from other Malays. Even when he was retrenched, Adi saw his 
choice to downgrade as reflecting the highly prized self-reliance and financial 
independence. Indeed, as Adi reiterated the reason for relocation: 
This is why people nowadays relocate. Because we need cash. All our 
money is in CPF […] nothing is free. Pay and pay (a word play on 
Singapore’s reigning political party, PAP). Although you are dead, the 
burial fees still need to be paid. This means that dead Singaporeans are 
‘rich’ because they still have the money to pay. 
With the changing housing rules over the years, and given Singapore’s high cost of 
living, Singaporeans have become asset-rich and cash-poor. The pension scheme left 
dead Singaporeans ‘rich’, where the remaining amount in CPF could be claimed by 
their family, which Sazali summarised with a modified Malay proverb: ‘When tigers 
die, they leave their stripes, when men die, they leave their reputation. Now, no longer. 
When men die, they leave behind their money’ (laughs). In an effort to be helpful, I 
mentioned organisations that could help with the burial fees. 
Interviewer: In any case, we do have khairat (a form of almsgiving fund 
for death) in Singapore, don’t we? 
Adi: Yes, but not all organisations provide such services. 
Sazali: That’s why it’s important to have your own savings. 
I: I see, and especially when one lives alone - without any family around. 
S: Yes, MUIS (the government body in charge of Muslim affairs) will be 
responsible. 
A: And the dead person will call MUIS (smiles). 
S: I am now dead, and I don’t have any relatives. Who is nearest to me 
then?  
I: The neighbours?  
S: Yes, the stench will be unbearable. 




S: Since the door is locked, the authorities break open the door, alamak 
(colloquialism to express shock or dismay), to find the body already badly 
decomposed. 
I: I think such cases will be rare. 
S: There are, which is why Indonesians say that however poor 
Singaporeans are, they will still have money.  
The ways of living (and dying) in the city call attention to perhaps the lack of social 
safety net in Singapore. The implausibility of the scenario underscored the 
government’s approach to welfare outlined by Deputy Prime Minister Tharman 
Shanmugaratnam (ST 6 March 2015): 
Our approach is quite different from the cradle-to-grave welfarism that 
was developed over 50 or 60 years in many of the advanced countries. Our 
approach is about empowering people and aspirations, and rewarding 
responsibility throughout life. It's about encouraging and empowering 
people to learn at every age, to work, to take second or third chances and 
to make meaningful contributions through our careers, whatever the job. 
Helping people to own a home and, whether it's breadwinners or 
homemakers, to raise the next generation. And helping people, helping 
everyone to make the most of life even in our senior years. 
The lack of welfare is linked to with a culture of self-reliance. And how do the Malays, 
who are the most socioeconomically disadvantaged, respond to this? This can be seen 
from Sazali’s remarks about the Indonesians’ take on Singaporeans. 
At the end of the conversation, Sazali offered this as proof that the minority 
Singaporean Malays are more financially successful compared to the Malays in the 
neighbouring countries, where Malays comprise the majority. They seemed at pains to 
demonstrate that although socioeconomically they fared the worst in Singapore, they 
were better off by comparison with Malays in neighbouring countries.35 Establishing 
oneself as a self-reliant Singaporean Malay through housing mobility seemed to matter 
hugely to this group of men. Here, Adi and his fellow Singaporeans subscribe to a 
 
35 Singapore remains the most developed country in Southeast Asia (see e.g. OECD 2020). 





home, in terms of the nation-state, one in which they believe to have benefitted in 
terms of its collective social mobility.  
This crucially differs, of course, from the earlier Malays’ bigger sense of home, which 
was the Nusantara, or the Malay Archipelago, where pride was located in a pan-
regional Malay identity. This sphere includes contemporary Indonesia, Singapore, 
Brunei, southern Philippines and southern Thailand (Rahim 1998). Separation between 
Malaysia and Singapore, narrated as ‘being kicked out of Malaysia’ however displaced 
and replaced the shared Malay identity with postcolonial national identities (Chua 
2003). Comparisons between Malaysian Malays, Indonesian Malays, and Singaporean 
Malays became measured ‘in terms of the levels of economic development, the 
differences in levels of corruption of public officials and, the most mundane of all 
comparisons, the level of public cleanliness in the neighbouring countries’ (Chua 
1996: 62). And this continues to be internalised until today, not only by Adi and his 
group of friends but also Malays across the border. 
I had joined a bus tour to Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. The purchasing power 
of Singaporeans automatically increases across the border due to the strong exchange 
rate. Our tour guide jokingly coined the term ‘sprinkle money’ as he encouraged us to 
shop more in his country. I thought to myself, Singaporean Malays ‘making it rain’ 
(money) perhaps can only be realised outside their home. The Malaysian tour guide’s 
repeated encouragement alludes to the idea of social mobility as a Singaporean Malay. 
For Adi and perhaps my fellow Malay Singaporeans on the bus tour, not only is the 
social mobility experienced cumulatively, it is also compared to other countries. 
Malays effectively become differentiated by their countries’ socioeconomic positions.  
Overall, Adi struck me as the impossible Singaporean, seeking to identify as such 
despite, or even against, his Malay ethnic belonging; and remaining a staunch 
supporter of relocation under all its forms when clearly, he is not a beneficiary of these 
redevelopment policies. I wonder whether he resolves or increases these tensions for 
himself by invoking the centrality of self-reliance and pragmatism to the Singaporean 
identity. For Adi, to be Singaporean is to be self-reliant. And to be self-reliant is to be 




government, his family and children in the future. Therefore, there is no shame in 
downgrading because at least, he stands by the principle of self-reliance, which he 
associates with Singapore’s success (see Teo 2015). He explained that while life in 
Singapore was difficult in the early years, it had shaped self-reliant citizens. However, 
Adi will continue to be the impossible Singaporean because the Singaporean dream of 
ever more successful property upgrades remains inaccessible to him, who has clung to 
housing as to a lifeline. My next protagonist, unlike Adi, viewed home through a more 
affective lens; a relationship of belonging. He insisted that the special bond with his 
island-home cannot be replicated, even with the present flat that he owned.  
Hans, the island biographer 
Hans recounted how the last family had held out on Bukom Kechil until 1970. The 
surrounding kampung had been levelled to build Shell’s oil tanks 133 and 139 (Figure 
3). It was the only house standing, surrounded by shovel trucks and lorries. The house 
belonged to a family he knew; he had recognised the house. The owner of the house, 
Ah Yang, used to sell charcoal made from mangrove to the islanders, while his 
daughter was Hans’ former primary school English language teacher. They had stayed 
to ask for more compensation. He explained that ‘leaving Bukom Kechil would mean 
more than a loss of income for Ah Yang’s family because they would need to start all 
over again’. It would be hard to find the type of mangrove used by Ah Yang’s family 
to make charcoal, on the mainland. Born and bred on the island, Hans would have 




Figure 3: Oil tanks on Bukom Kechil (Hans’ photo collection) 
 
 
The first wave of major resettlements that affected islanders on Bukom Kechil such as 
Hans and Ah Yang began as early as April 1963. To build Singapore’s first oil refinery 
on neighbouring Bukom Besar, 5000 workers were involved in Shell’s expansion 
(Figure 4); some of whom were relocated to Bukom Kechil (ST 12 April 1963). 
Singapore’s growing industrialization continued to impact the islanders as Shell 
continued its expansion onto Bukom Kechil in June 1968. All 2,500 residents were 
resettled: either to another island, Semakau, or mainland Singapore (ST 11 June 1968). 
Bukom Kechil’s resettlement, however, was different from Bukom Besar’s because 
unlike Shell who had been on Bukom Besar since 1891 (Moey 1991), Bukom Kechil 
had always been a residential area and home to islanders. Shell was not the only 
refinery to be built on the Southern Islands. Singapore did not have a refinery in 1960 
but by 1974, it had five, with a total capacity of about one million barrels per day: Esso 
on Pulau Ayer Chawan, Singapore Refining Company on Pulau Merlimau, Mobil Oil 
on Pulau Pesek, Shell on Bukom Besar and BP on Pasir Panjang. By the mid-1970s, 
Singapore became the world’s third largest refining centre after Amsterdam and 




was concentrated on the Southern islands and Pasir Panjang, populated mainly by the 
Malays.  





Hans shared with me that he had been both a witness to and participant in Bukom 
Kechil’s development from the very beginning. He had worked for Shell on Bukom 
for more than 40 years and added that not many islanders knew that he kept going back 
and forth to Bukom Kechil to take photos of the site, from the time of eviction until 
the completion of the tanks. It was part of his job. I was unsure whether it was due to 
the confidential nature of these projects, or if he was just uncomfortable telling others 
about his involvement in redeveloping his island home. Some might regard it as 
complicity, but Hans felt that it had allowed him to remain part of Bukom Kechil as 
long as he worked for Shell. There is an unspoken reciprocal relationship between the 
islanders and Shell. Hans, like many others with whom I spoke, felt a strong sense of 
gratitude towards Shell, who had provided them with a wide array of benefits over the 




presence and their home by ensuring their well-being. This created not so much a 
climate of mutual interest but loyalty, trust, and cooperation. As a result, a harmonious 
relationship had been firmly established. This perhaps had reduced feelings of anger 
surrounding the resettlement. Nevertheless, this contributed to the silencing of Shell’s 
expropriation of the islands. First, due to the feeling of indebtedness, Hans perhaps felt 
a moral obligation and the lack of a right to raise any issues with the eviction. Malays 
place utmost importance in reciprocating acts of benevolence, reflected in the saying, 
‘hutang emas boleh dibayar, hutang budi dibawa mati’ (while debts of gold can be 
repaid, debts of kindness are carried to the grave). Causing Shell any form of 
difficulties is perhaps similar to being ‘tak kenang budi’ (being ungrateful or forgetful 
of others’ good deeds or help). Second, islanders who were evicted by Shell were 
believed to have profited from it due to the large sum of compensation they received. 
This was evident from conversations I had with elderly men who had never lived on 
the Southern Islands but were aware of the waves of evictions. Shell’s reputation as 
‘generous’ was seemingly not limited to the Southern Islands. And this rendered 
Shell’s acts of island eviction as reasonable, absent any talk of injustice. 
Yet this also meant having to watch his home being redeveloped beyond recognition 
over the years:  
When I was living on Bukom Kechil, it never crossed my mind that Bukom 
Kechil would be merged with Pulau Busing. Busing was the place my 
friends and I canoed to have picnics. They combined Pulau Hantu, Pulau 
Busing, and Pulau Ular. Such a wide area, right? Just imagine Busing, a 
small coral island, becoming a big island through reclamation. I saw it with 
my own eyes. My colleagues would inform me, ‘Hans, we are going to 
reclaim the land at the end of Bukom Kecil to Pulau Ular. Then after Pulau 
Ular, we will continue to Pulau Busing’. And I would be the one to issue 
the clearance. I felt sad. Every day I could see how rapid, how fast the 
development was. Just imagine. 
Ever in need of more land for the Bukom refinery, Shell had requested Jurong Town 




Ular36. Presently, the cluster of three islands comprise an expansive petrochemicals 
complex as a result of reclamation and development works over the years. Merging 
and reclamation of the Southern Islands had the effect of erasing the islands’ history 
along with their names. Hans gave the example of Bukom which is composed of 
Bukom Kechil and Bukom Besar. After Bukom Besar was merged with Bukom 
Kechil, it was officially renamed as Bukom (ST 22 November 1995). Bukom Besar 
had once been a United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) stronghold, whereas 
the neighbouring Bukom Kechil had been important to PAP’s emergence on the 
Southern Islands. Nevertheless, Bukom’s history is often intertwined with the history 
of the oil giant, Shell on Bukom, rendering the history of Bukom Kechil absent37.  
To date, there have not been any studies examining the history of the Southern Islands, 
apart from a state-funded documentary project named Island Nation, which documents 
life on a number of Singapore's Southern islands through photos and short videos on a 
website38. Even in recovering memories on the Southern Islands, there seems to be a 
preference to refer to the majority Malay islands by their English names, such as St 
John’s Islands (Pulau Sekijang Bendera) and Lazarus Island (Pulau Sekijang Pelepah). 
Hans nevertheless strove to keep the memory of his island-home alive. ‘Staying home’ 
with Shell was key to such efforts. 
All his colleagues knew of his love for the island: ‘they will say Hans sayang to leave 
Bukom Kechil. What to do? When I bring the new staff around Bukom Kechil, I will 
tell them that once upon a time, this land belonged to my great-great grandfather’. He 
laughed as he told me how he would bring the new staff to the exact spot where his 
house once stood while showing them photos of the surrounding kampung. Hans’ 
storytelling was not restricted to Bukom Kechil. Just like Bukom, he would let them 
know that Jurong Island was also originally made up of numerous islands. Esso’s 
 
36 “Reclaiming the land, protecting the environment” DHI group, accessed January 19 , 
2020, http://www.dhigroup.com/upload/publications/scribd/228966594-Reclaiming-the-Land-
Protecting-the-Environment-DHI-Case-Story-SG.pdf. 
37 “Island mosque,” Island Nation, accessed October 25, 2019, http://islandnation.sg/story/island-
mosque/.  





establishment of an oil refinery on Ayer Cawan was just the beginning of industrial 
development that led to the merging of offshore islands into Jurong Island in the 1990s, 
as narrated by Hans. Multiple islands - Pulau Seraya, Pulau Ayer Merbau, Pulau Sakra 
(which in turn was previously made up of Pulau Sakra and Pulau Bakau), Pulau Pesek 
Kecil, Pulau Pesek, Pulau Ayer Chawan and Pulau Merlimau, Pulau Meskol, Pulau 
Mesemut Laut, Pulau Mesemut Darat and Anak Pulau – were reclaimed to form Jurong 
Island (Lee 2000).  
I thought to myself that a ‘Hans’ for each of the offshore islands would complete a 
wonderful history of the Southern Islands. The idea of offshore islands as homes, 
especially Bukom, was most surprising for me. For as long as I could I remember, 
Bukom had always been a restricted area. The area was off limits to the public, and 
unauthorised access is deemed a criminal offence. The concentration of Malays living 
on the Southern Islands thus seems unimaginable, given the racial quotas in housing 
estates today. Hans’ housing life had enriched my housing imagination and yet, in turn, 
it was also suggestive of its limits. I had never thought of my Singapore home as having 
been divided into the mainland and the offshore islands. Even fewer knew about 
Bukom Kechil, its residents and their multiple evictions. But given that this generation 
is slowly disappearing, their stories and the history that they contain need retrieval.  
It was Hans’ early housing life that resulted in my discovery of what happened at 
Bukom Kechil, the Southern Islands in general, and their neglected importance to 
Singapore’s history. Hans’ housing autobiography was especially significant to me 
given the affinity between my method and his own way of conceiving his life. In fact, 
he himself had elaborated a housing autobiography of sorts. Hans showed me his first 
photos of Bukom Kechil. Standing at the edge of the jetty, he had taken photos of 
Bukom Kechil’s landscape. Side by side, it was akin to a continuous panorama shot of 
the island during dusk. The concept was advanced, yet the tiny, black and white 
squares reflected rudimentary technology. The lack of colours felt like a disservice to 
the island’s beauty. Hans then got the help of his classmate, Mustafa Jekko. A most 
unexpected candidate, Mustafa had a hand disability and was without any formal 
training. He was from the island as well. He agreed on the condition that Hans would 




these moments - in the midst of painting, Mustafa would suddenly ask him to catch 
spiders or visit an exhibition on the mainland with him. It took two and the half years 
to complete the painting (Figure 5). Today replicas of the painting hang in the flats of 
Bukom Kechil’s former residents.  
Figure 5: Mustafa Jekko’s painting of Bukom Kechil 
 
 
When I asked Hans what made him undertake such meticulous documentation of the 
island's landscape at such a young age, he said it was simply his love for his Bukom 
Kechil home. He never expected to be resettled from the island; he thought it would 
be his home forever. Hans later uncovered that his love for the island was based on a 
deeper relationship to the island. Over the years, he looked for photos, documents, and 
stories related to Bukom Kechil. His colleague, Loh, also from Bukom Kechil, had 
shared with him that a person named Letong helped his father when he first arrived. 
Letong was described as a kind man with a good heart. He was responsible for buka 
tanah39 in Bukom Kechil and had advised Loh’s father to buy land on the hill. When 
Loh told this story, Hans was unaware that Letong was his maternal great grandfather. 
He then put two and two together using his father’s old documents (Figure 6). The 
connections he made between documents cannot be reduced to a coincidence of similar 
names. Malay names are more specific in that they include their father’s name instead 
of a family name. It would begin with the person’s name, followed by a patronymic: 
bin (son of) or binte (daughter of) and end with the father’s name. Hans’ housing 
autobiography was full of surprises. 
 
39 Buka tanah usually means opening up forested land. Here Hans alludes to the idea of his great-




Figure 6: Mohammad's marriage and birth certificate, as well as his grandfather’s 




Hans’ beloved island home did not have any facilities such as hospitals or formal 
schools in the beginning. He still remembered an incident when he was in primary 
three. His friend Raja, whose father had been a high-ranking Shell engineer, lived in 
the quarters near their school on neighbouring Bukom Besar. Raja had invited him to 
his house, and it became the first time Hans tasted French bread and cheese. When he 




Since Bukom Kechil didn’t have electricity, we would use kerosene lamps. 
We didn’t have fresh water either. So, we had to take fresh water from 
Bukom Besar. In comparison, everything was provided for in Bukom 
Besar, you just name it. There’s even a swimming pool. In Bukom Kechil, 
if you want to swim, there’s always the sea (laughs).  
The facilities on Bukom Besar such as a hospital, cinema, mosque, and ferry service 
to the mainland were open to Bukom Kechil residents as well. Even the kerosene they 
used was given by Shell, but this particular benefit was only for Shell workers living 
on Bukom Kechil. Hans referred to it as Shell’s ‘social corporate welfare’ to the local 
community.  
Things took a turn when Bukom Besar was vacated with Shell’s expansion in 1963. 
Bukom Kechil’s population increased with the relocated Shell workers from Bukom 
Besar. A Chinese taukey40 brought in a generator for electricity and started an open-
air cinema in Bukom Kechil. This made Bukom Kechil popular with residents from 
the other islands. According to Hans, not only did the relocation bring modernity, but 
it also increased Bukom Kechil’s importance in the political landscape. He explained 
that the workers on Bukom Besar were relocated because many were UMNO 
supporters. He showed me photos of the then Malaysia's Acting Prime Minister Tun 
Abdul Razak visiting Bukom Kechil. He was carried from the boat to the shore since 
the island did not yet have a jetty. It showed the respect the islanders had for Tun and 
strong UMNO support. In response, PAP built facilities on Bukom Kechil - where 
jetties, schools, mosque, clinics, playground, and community centre mushroomed on 
the island. According to Hans, they were determined to ‘to win the hearts and minds 
of the people’ especially the penghulu: 
If they could persuade the penghulu, the rest will follow. The penghulus 
were also wage earners, they received allowance from the government. It 
started with the British giving allowance and then after that, PAP governed 
so PAP took over. At the end of every month, they would go to the land 
 







office on mainland to receive the allowance. If I’m not wrong, they were 
also given retirement allowance.  
Popular events and activities such as pesta laut (sea carnival), were organised by the 
school. All of the islanders that I talked to mentioned pesta laut as the highlight of the 
year. A rift nonetheless grew between PAP and UMNO supporters, erupting in small 
brawls. 
While measuring the area designated to build a mosque on Bukom Kechil, a leading 
PAP supporter Embi had moved a small rock. The area was located beside an UMNO 
supporter who saw the act as a form of encroachment and punched Embi. The account 
was confirmed by his son, Aziz. As we went through his collection of photos of Bukom 
Kechil, Aziz insisted that the school in Bukom Kechil held a bigger role than its 
community centre.  
You can’t rely on the islanders because not everyone supports the PAP. 
For example, if you were to invite the minister to Bukom Kechil for an 
event, who would you contact first? Of course, the school. The children 
will be the ones holding up flags to welcome him. 
Aziz added that in any case, the penghulu needed to be consulted first. The political 
tension had impacted family relations including Hans’. His father, thought to be 
associated with the PAP, was ostracised by pro-UMNO relatives. As a result, separate 
seating arrangements had to be made during wedding lunches. Community life was 
not what it used to be. While coloured by Hans’ perhaps idealised view of harmony 
and trust in island life, I could see how the arrival of newcomers and heightened 
political tensions made the island home less comfortable. With gotong royong41 at an 
all-time low, Bukom Kechil islanders saw no reason to stay when resettlement plans 
were announced in 1968.  
Hans saw the resettlements as part of the government policy to scatter the Malays from 
the Southern Islands. At that time, he was aware of other Malay strongholds being 
resettled on the mainland. In addition, Hans mentioned that by then, not only was their 
 




Southern Islands constituency removed due to the redrawing of electoral districts, their 
favourite Member of Parliament (MP) Ya’acob Mohamed was transferred to another 
constituency. Hans, however, feels that even if Ya’acob had stayed in the Southern 
Islands, he would not have been able to stop Bukom Kechil’s resettlement. 
Redistribution of the Malays in the Southern Islands, according to him, had been 
planned a long time ago, a step by step process. It occurred to me that if in the past the 
majority Malays in the Southern Islands – seen as a problem – were resettled, today an 
overrepresentation of Malays seems to have been created in rental housing. Yet despite 
the shifts in locations and across time, a housing hierarchy that is co-extensive with 
that of Singapore’s ethnic hierarchy remains silently constant and persistent. 
Hans’ decision to remain on the islands can be seen as following in his father’s 
footsteps. His father, Mohammad, worked as an office attendant for Shell. One of his 
responsibilities was to raise the Shell flag every morning. Due to his close relationship 
with his manager, he was told that they would only be able to stay for five years in 
Semakau as there was an incoming project. Yet, Mohammad responded that he still 
had a choice to stay on the islands. However, Mohammad made sure that his housing 
decision did not affect his children’s education. He arranged for his school-going 
children to stay with his friend, a teacher, on the mainland. Their living expenses were 
paid for every month. Living apart was one of the sacrifices Hans’ family had to make 
in choosing to stay on the islands. The series of decisions were pragmatic: trying to 
hold onto their island home while making the best possible future for the children. It 
was an informed decision and one Mohammad could afford to make. Hans shared that 
they were the only family to establish such an arrangement.  
The very sad thing was during the last moments - when the islanders had 
to move to mainland Singapore, they mostly had low education. How they 
struggled. Although I had many siblings, my father had a bit of savings but 
those fishermen, they didn’t have any CPF. 
Hans attributed the lack of preparation among the other islanders to being kept in the 
dark. When they were relocated to Bukom Kechil, they were given the option to stay 
on Semakau without being told that it was temporary. They moved to Semakau neither 
knowing about nor expecting their eventual resettlement to the mainland. Their 




enquiring on the number of people living in the house, their occupation and household 
income.  
While Hans’ family were happy to be able to stay on the island for a few more years, 
their last days on Semakau were filled with anxiety and fear. They knew they would 
be resettled to the mainland, but they did not expect to be pressured into buying a five-
room flat. This was based on their household income and large family size of ten. 
Mohammad appealed to the then-incumbent MP for the area to allow them to stay in 
a 3-room flat. He explained that his children would eventually get married and move 
out. In response, the MP suggested to rent out the rooms then and highlighted that the 
5-room flats in Telok Blangah were ready. Despite being successful in their appeal, 
their troubles were far from over. Towards the end, there were fewer than 10 houses 
remaining on the island. Islanders had gradually moved out of Semakau depending on 
where their flat choices were located, such as Clementi or Telok Blangah. The flats in 
Teban Gardens had been the cheapest but were also the last to be built.  
The empty island was by now attracting fishermen from Indonesia. And the few 
remaining families constantly feared for their own safety.   
Every evening, we became like Red Indians. We made a big fire. There 
were no lights, no shops, nothing. We were afraid of the Indonesian 
fishermen who came to our island. They would sometimes steal because 
they knew there was no one around on the island. They would come and 
go, and made the island their home. We were especially worried because 
our house was by the sea.  
The seaside location of Hans’ house, in the pitch-black evenings, made them especially 
vulnerable to theft (Figure 7). Hans expressed his disappointment, and, perhaps, a 
sense of betrayal when the penghulu was one of the first to move out, leaving the 
remaining families on Semakau to fend for themselves. Resettlement had changed the 
people he once knew, the community bonds that had once existed, and the very island 








Hans today lives in a flat in Queen’s Close with his wife and two children. Yet, it will 
never compare to his home on Bukom Kechil.  
The name is home but not our home. Simple word. Home, but not ours. It 
is not true ownership. If on the islands, it is our home, our place, our 
birthplace, it belongs to us. Previously, I could say I’m proud to be born 
on Bukom Kechil, my great grandfather’s land. But now, what can I say? 
Queens Close, how big? The area is good but it’s not really my… I’m 
just… I cannot be proud about it. 
Flats on the mainland are not considered ‘true’ homes.  
This was completely different from Zee who regarded ‘home’ as not being important. 
Or at least she conceived home differently. Perhaps it is a generational difference; 
perhaps it is the varied entwining of home and house in the Malay experience in 
Singapore. Hans defined home with a sense of ownership that was tied to pride. Home 




in Bukom Kechil, he felt a connection to the island which his great-grandfather had 
buka tanah. His current homeownership could be better described as flat space under 
lease. One can never have full ownership of flats as long as flats are built on state land. 
This was because according to Hans, they are liable to relocation anytime.  
He had left the Teban Gardens flat when he got married, but continued to feel a sense 
of responsibility for his family home and eldest sister, Yat. She was single and 
unemployed. When their father passed away, Yat lived alone in the flat. By then, the 
rest of her siblings were married and had their own homes. Hans had to then make the 
painful decision to ask Yat to move out. He even consulted an ustaz42 to ask about the 
issue. 
Teban Gardens was the family home. Previously, my parents were around. 
It was not easy for me to tell her that it was not her house and that the 
house had to be sold under faraid [Muslim interstate laws]. The other issue 
is that it is our responsibility as brothers to take care of her, at least provide 
a house for her. Finally, it was agreed that the Teban Gardens flat would 
be sold and the proceeds would contribute to buying her a new flat, this 
time under her name. So that, in future, no one else can claim ownership 
of it. We managed to get a fully paid 2-room flat in Tanglin Halt for her.  
Here, the notion of family home seems to have taken over from ‘home’, creating its 
own obligations. The issue here is that resettlement into flats has normalised the 
nuclearization of families in Singapore (Chua 1997; Oswin 2010).  
Forced resettlement in HDB flats not only split up communities, but as the 
flats were designed for nuclear families, also split up generations, and 
ensured that the nuclear family became the [basic] social unit (Tremewan 
1994: 50). 
In Hans’ case, it has physically split up the big family. Isolating the nuclear family in 
flats had inadvertently isolated Yat who remained single. Yet, this was Hans’ way of 
trying to make the best arrangements for the family, especially for Yat. However in 
the context of islanders who were especially used to ‘an active community life of 
 






mutual support and a sense of local identity and security’ (Tremewan 1994: 50), Hans 
was labelled heartless by his family, relatives, fellow islanders to force his sister to 
leave. In addition, it had been a challenge to reach a consensus within the large family 
of eight siblings. And the sensitivity of the issue remained, it was only mentioned in 
the later interviews. 
And after all they had been through, Yat, who has stayed in her Tanglin Halt flat for 
more than 10 years, now faced yet another relocation, but this time under SERS. ‘This 
was what I was afraid of. It had been like a chain of evictions from Bukom Kechil to 
Semakau to Teban Gardens to Tanglin Halt’. As he put it, they ‘cannot escape from 
evictions in Singapore’. Hans and his immediate family members had experienced it 
multiple times in their housing lives, regardless of the resettlement choices made. And 
Yat’s present involvement with SERS in Tanglin Halt showed, for Hans, the limits of 
homeownership in Singapore. Namely, homeownership on the mainland did not offer 
any guarantee against future relocation. One cannot vote to stay unlike in private 
housing. He added that even if Yat had not moved to Tanglin Halt, she would still have 
been relocated because their family home in Teban Gardens was also involved in 
SERS. The flat was demolished earlier in 2016. Despite his view on the temporariness 
of homeownership, Hans still insisted on the importance for Yat to have her own 
house.  
However rich you are, without a house, you are still menumpang (putting 
up at someone else’s house, boarding). From the start, I thought about her 
privacy. This has got to do with my aunt that lives in Bukit Panjang. She 
lived with her elder sister till her elder sister passed on. Until today, she 
has money but not her own house. And presently, most of her money has 
been spent on her poor health. 
Menumpang is not seen as secure, even with a family member. As homeownership 
rates continue to soar to a present 90%43, it is not irrational to equate security with 
homeownership. Hans highlighted the lack of housing options, with rental housing 
conditions being poor. Building homes today remains the government’s prerogative, 
rendering buka tanah impossible. With the racial quotas in public housing, there is a 
 
43 “About us,” Housing and Development Board, accessed October 2, 




further lack of freedom in choosing one’s home. There is no choice but to own a home 
in Singapore. And although Hans’ residency at his first home also comes with an 
approaching end date, he has a plan: 
I can buy a jet ski and Kasmani44 can buy a speedboat and then, we can 
bring our friends to Pulau Hantu for picnics. If we had a chance to return 
to the islands, we would, but dreams remain dreams. Sometimes, I would 
joke with my colleagues, you can come to my house. I’m staying at the 
latest Semakau Cove (laughs). 
The term ‘Semakau Cove’ is inspired by Sentosa Cove. Sentosa Cove is the first full-
scale gated community in Singapore, located on the island of Sentosa. In comparison 
to Sentosa’s development into a housing enclave for the super-rich, Semakau had been 
turned into a landfill. Hans described the merger of his former home Semakau with 
Pulau Seking, ‘automatically, it is called rubbish island and automatically Seking’s 
name disappears’. When I reminded him of his Semakau Cove dreams, he replied that 
the area was only for millionaires and the way of life would be different. Even when 
the islands become a place of residence, a ‘true home’ remains out of reach for its 
original residents  – as over 60% of its homeowners are foreigners (see Pow 2017). He 
is aware that there will be a day when he has to ‘leave home’ forever. And when it 
happens, he might have the same question as his colleagues, ‘Hans, when you retire, 
who will take care of the mango tree on Bukom Kechil?’ 
I see Hans as the island biographer; tracing his housing story also means tracing the 
disappearing history of Southern Islands in Singapore. At its core, it is a story of an 
individual who does his best not to be separated from his first love, his island home. 
Yet in Singapore’s house-moving culture, Hans’ housing life reads like an impossible 
story. He continues searching for memories of his home, as a testament to its once 
lived reality. The island biographer can only dream of balik pulau45, of returning to 
the island. On the surface, balik pulau dreams seem to be about neither stasis nor 
mobility. They long to return home because they long to belong, and they long for the 
land to belong to them. But I wonder whether underneath it all, they long to go back 
 
44 His best friend and fellow Bukom Kechil islander 
45 The name has been used for an exhibit Balik Pulau: Stories from Singapore’s Islands in Singapore’s 




to a home that they remember as an oasis of stasis – away from the insecurities of their 
Singapore home today. The next protagonist however never gave in, recreating the 
home environment that she once lived in – a home in gotong royong. 
 
Airah, the displaced islander 
Airah was the last of a disappearing generation from the Southern Islands. Yet she 
moved quickly for an 81-year-old. Her tiny two-room flat46 had been home for over 40 
years. Every time I visited her, she never failed to cook a spread. And each time I was 
at Airah’s home, someone would come by unannounced - a neighbour, an old friend, 
a fellow islander. None came empty-handed, bringing kuih, or Malay cakes, or they 
would salam47 her gift money when leaving. As her Indonesian neighbour walked past 
Airah’s flat, she asked Airah whether she wanted some bananas. She had just returned 
from the market. Airah asked for just one or two and the bananas were passed through 
the gate and Airah’s neighbour went on her way, down the corridor. It was such a 
casual affair; it seemed so intimate. Community or in this case solidarity seemed to 
take on a particular meaning for Airah – what was it? 
Gotong royong  
I have never been fond of discussions on gotong royong. For Singaporeans, gotong 
royong is akin to ‘community’ in the West. But for the Malay community, the 
kampung once stood as the basic territorial and communal unit of organization. It was 
structured according to a division of labour where kampung dwellers met each other's 
basic needs through gotong royong. Such concepts of community however have tended 
to be co-opted by the state (Bell and Newby 1976) and Singapore is no exception (Chua 
2017). The Singaporean state calls upon previous forms of community support such as 
the Chinese clan associations and Malay gotong royong as being exemplary to 
 
46 A two-room flat in Singapore would mean a flat with one hall and one bedroom. This is a common 
description in Singaporean real estate. A three-room flat would mean a flat with one hall and two 
bedrooms. The hall seems to be considered as one room. 





encourage self-reliance. Listening to Airah, I realised that I had always been led to 
think of Chinese clans as having more resources to draw upon. Gotong royong had, on 
the other hand, always been characterised as a poor-man’s resource (see Lazaroo 
2017). But as I began to pay attention to Airah’s stories, which interwove 
socioeconomic differences with gotong royong, a different and more nuanced narrative 
emerges: gotong royong is not quite a poor man’s community resource, but it lends 
itself, in the context in which Airah used it, to ensure that everyone is cared for, leaving 
no one behind. This early form of gotong royong found in kampungs in Singapore was: 
the coming together of the community to help and sustain each other. […] 
When the kampong spirit is in evidence, nobody needs to feel alone or 
abandoned. This warm feeling of being cared for makes life meaningful 
and brings happiness. And being happy, one possesses a stronger 
foundation, better able to take the knocks of life more easily (Chia 2013: 
11).  
Gotong royong was not just about the self-sustenance of a community amidst the 
poverty but it met the emotional needs of individuals within the community. This 
contributed to feelings of trust and security, building a more cohesive family-
community. 
The first house Airah bought was by the seaside at Bukom Kechil. It was to be the start 
of a beautiful friendship with her Chinese neighbour, Mak Itik. Mak Itik had a son, Ah 
Hock, and a daughter, Ah Keng. Airah laughed as she described how Ah Hock liked 
to follow Airah’s husband and son to sea despite capsizing countless times. Their kolek 
or small boat was a far cry from the engine boats Ah Hock’s family owned. Airah 
shared that since they caught a lot of fish, sometimes they would share with her. They 
would also give Airah rice. Not only because the children preferred to have their meals 
at her house, but because they had a kedai rumah48. 
We would go to Mak Itik family’s shop for everything. Mak Itik’s husband 
looked like a poor man but he was actually a taukey. Back then, we would 
take items from the shop first and pay later. These ‘debts’ would be written 
in a book. When it was payday, you could find him going around the island 
 
48 Part of the one-level house is converted into a shop. A literal translation from Malay is shop house 
but this is different from the present shophouses which has the shop on ground floor and the 




collecting debt repayments with his rattan basket and clutch bag. He was 
such a clever man, whenever anyone needed to buy a wardrobe or 
anything, they would ask him. He would then go to the mainland where he 
had contacts to get his supplies.  
Mak Itik’s family had the resources and capital to run several successful businesses. 
Their kedai rumah was so prosperous that they brought in Mak Itik’s brother-in-law 
from China to assist them. Airah then shared that there were very few Malay shops on 
the islands and explained why: 
Majority on the island were Malays. They would take several items from 
the Malay shops and pay very little. They would then come back to take 
more items from the shop, again without paying much. And so, the debts 
kept increasing. How could these Malay shops survive, much less thrive! 
(laughs) 
I didn’t know whether to laugh or not; this was gotong royong effectively in action. 
From death to weddings, Airah highlighted that ‘everything was gotong-royong, which 
meant we did not use money at all’ (Figure 8). A week or so before the wedding, there 
would be a personal invitation to each house. There would continuously be people in 
both the bride and bridegrooms’ houses to help out. The women would make cakes 
together and clean the rice, while the men looked for wood to build tents and ambin. 
Not only were they not paid, they would bring one or two cups of rice, flour, coconuts, 





Figure 8: Island wedding in Bukom Kechil (Han’s photo collection) 
 
 
Things began to change with the relocation of Bukom Besar’s Shell workers to Bukom 
Kechil. Airah described how the huge increase in residents resulted in too many food 
gifts being given to the bride and bridegroom’s family. The rice, flour, coconuts, and 
oil would have to be redistributed back to those who came to the wedding. Monetary 
contributions were then suggested, and the amount increased gradually. Class 
differences became apparent, for example in housing, as reported by Airah: ‘Former 
Bukom Besar residents’ houses were beautiful - all concrete houses, rows of them built 
on the hills’. ‘Better’ housing began to look appealing in comparison to dilapidated 
houses by the sea that belonged to the fishermen. Airah however mentioned that these 
poor fishermen were helped by PAP: ‘When they see the houses of people who are 
poor, people without jobs like those who could not go out to sea, old people, they will 
help. They will give money’. The emergence of PAP on Bukom Kechil brought about 
welfare handouts and many facilities for the islanders: ‘After PAP came, there was 




viewed PAP’s welfare handouts as a form of gotong royong as ‘it lessened the burden 
of the islanders’. 
With resettlement to the mainland, life for Airah proved daunting. Without gotong 
royong, money had become the currency of life in flats. 
The difference here is that everything needs money. As soon as you leave 
the flat, you need money. At the kampung, even if we did not have money, 
we were not susah hati49 (troubled or worried). If there was no food at 
home, we would go outside and try to find something to cook. 
Airah gave the example of plucking cassava leaves from the back of her house to easily 
cook lemak ubi50. Living in flats meant they did not have the sea or ‘backyard’ to 
forage for food or grow fruit trees (Ahmat 1971). Buying groceries could not be paid 
in instalments (Xiong and Brownlee 2018) and for the islanders, water was no longer 
provided for free by Shell. The high cost of living on the mainland was a common fear 
among kampung dwellers who were slated to be resettled but was especially feared by 
islanders who had never before lived on the mainland51. Islanders such as Airah thus 
found means and ways to avoid living on the mainland. 
Pecahan (Fragmentation or broken up) 
When Bukom Kechil was cleared, some, like Airah, chose to move to another island, 
Semakau, instead of the mainland. She was used to living on the islands for years and 
did not know that they would eventually be resettled to the mainland. For islanders 
who worked for Shell on Bukom Besar, it was a closer commute from Semakau. It was 
however only a matter of time before all the islanders were resettled to the mainland. 
Airah was conscious that the waves of resettlement were not particular to Bukom 
Kechil at that time. Residents from all these affected islands were interspersed across 
mainland Singapore according to their relocation decisions. What was certain was that 
 
49 A literal translation is ‘difficult heart’ or ‘a heart filled with difficulties’. 
50 A Malay-style coconut stew dish, where young tapioca leaves are cooked with coconut milk and 
bird's eye chili. 
51 “Trouble on the isle of ease,” Island Nation, accessed February 6, 





the longer the islanders chose to stay on the islands, the more they were broken up. 
This pecahan continued as she remained in Telok Blangah over the years: 
When I initially moved to Telok Blangah, there were many Malays. They 
were all from the islands such as Semakau and Sekijang. Later, when their 
children bought houses, they would follow their children. Some sold their 
flats; others have passed away. The older ones, there are only four of us 
left. There’s one at the end of this corridor, a Sekijang islander on the third 
floor, and a Chinese from Semakau on the sixth floor. 
Many islanders in her block had moved to other areas of Singapore, leaving behind a 
handful of islanders. This may be attributed to the house-moving culture in Singapore. 
Even landmarks around Airah’s home ‘moved’: ‘there used to be a hill for Chinese 
burial grounds. Guang San was its name. Similarly, there used to be warehouses for 
oil and fish warehouse in front there. No longer here anymore’. Yet, Airah was 
adamant not to be part of the dominant relocation culture or pecahan.  
Airah chose to live alone in her own home rather than desert her island community. 
Pecahan nevertheless continued to be a fact of Airah’s housing life.  Her children were 
all married and one of her daughters comes home after work but returns to Batam in 
the evening, where she has married a local. After a long period of renting, HDB offered 
to sell the flat to Airah for $21,000 in 1997. One of their daughters, who was mute, 
paid in full thinking that she would not get married. Yet she did marry later and wanted 
to buy a flat. Zawiyah’s name was then replaced with Airah’s husband and her CPF 
money returned. Since Airah and her husband did not have any money left in their 
CPF, she told me that they ‘collected’ $21,000 from family and again, paid in full. 
They did not want to owe HDB anything, so that all they had to pay was the monthly 
utility bills and yearly waste disposal fee. It might have been that Zawiyah had asked 
Airah to live with her, and this was not the first time Airah had refused. Before 
Zawiyah met her husband, Zawiyah had applied for a new flat at Telok Blangah 
Heights to live with her mother. 
The flat was not far away from here. When the keys were ready for 
collection, I told HDB that I did not want to move. The HDB officer said, 
‘you cannot do that, you must follow your children’. At that time, Zawiyah 




me, ‘Ma, don’t you want to move?’ I said, ‘No, I don’t want to. I sayang 
this house. 
Sayang can uniquely be used as both ‘a term of endearment or an expression of regret’ 
(Lazaroo 2017: 101). In Airah’s case, she sayang her house so much that she could not 
bear to part with it. She had grown attached to her house, as it had been a fundamental 
part of her life all these years. She knows she would come to regret it if she were to 
leave the house. At the same time, perhaps she had grown used to the surrounding 
neighbourhood, including her neighbours. While the house does not necessarily bring 
her joy (although happiness is perhaps not something she is looking for), everything 
about it is familiar – the light blue paint, the furniture, the sound of steps outside when 
people walk by her flat, perhaps even the smell of the house that she’s acquainted with. 
And familiarity never fails to be comforting – bringing with it perhaps a feeling of 
safety and being at home. 
Airah reminds me of my late grandmother. Being in poor health, she rarely stepped 
out of her flat. The telephone was her best friend, which kept her connected to her 
loved ones. She shared the joy of school holidays. For my grandmother, her home was 
her world. It was her first and only flat after being resettled from the village. She was 
60 years old when her flat was included in the SERS programme. It never crossed her 
mind that she would relocate. She was prepared to spend the rest of her life in that flat. 
Relocation was not part of her worldview. For Airah, the resettlements she had gone 
through had brought only painful changes. Airah mournfully recounted when it was 
announced that they had to leave Bukom Kechil for good, ‘it was sedih (sad). Most of 
the trees were eaten up by worms, especially the coconut trees. All of them fell to the 
ground. It was as if they knew’. She again described with sorrow the diminishing 
community of islanders in Telok Blangah: ‘Sedih as more and more islanders move 
out. We are all such good friends’. It might seem that she had chosen her home over 
family but Airah had repeatedly experienced relocations that came with loss - she 
could not bear another relocation. 
Resettlement to the mainland marked the end of gotong royong, specifically the loss 
of close family ties. Bukom Kechil had been Airah’s island-home for generations. She 




There were no outsiders initially: ‘If someone brought in someone from the outside, 
everyone would know’. Yet Airah stressed that Bukom Kechil was a welcoming place. 
She added that moving to Bukom Kechil was easy because during the pre-Separation 
period when Singapore was part of Malaysia, and there were neither identity cards nor 
passports then. Nevertheless, marriages continued to take place among cousins to 
‘prevent land from falling into outsiders’ hands’. Their fears however were realised 
with an increasing government presence. Bukom Kechil was becoming increasingly 
regulated with the relocation of Bukom Besar workers to Bukom Kechil. Previously, 
all one needed to do to move to Bukom Kechil was ask the penghulu and pay the 
person who owned the land a small sum of money. Registration at the land office and 
permits became compulsory, where land area had to be measured. For those who 
already lived on Bukom Kechil, documents were required as proof of landownership. 
At Bukom Kechil, everyone had their own land. In the past, people didn’t 
know and were not the least concerned about grants or any such 
documents. The land was inherited, passed down for generations, it was 
our forefathers’. And then the government came. They asked for the grants, 
but we didn’t have any. We were then told to pay for the TOL (Temporary 
Occupation Licence). 
In other words, whilst once synonymous with family, land ownership now needed 
documented proof. Paying for the TOL meant the land was no longer theirs.  
Although they lost ownership of the island, Airah and her fellow islanders expected to 
co-exist with development of the oil refinery on Bukom. 
We didn’t expect to be evicted. We didn’t think the whole of Bukom 
Kechil would be taken because it’s our island. And then over the years, 
Shell saw that its branch in Bukom was doing better and better. The Shell 
people came every day. At first, they took a bit of the land near the hills, 
near the Chinese burial grounds. They dug up here and there. They did it 
little by little, to move people they said. Later, the Shell people would 
move to Bukom Kechil. And when the Shell people didn’t have any more 
place, they took the entirety of Bukom Kechil.  
The importance of possessing land rights on paper was however amplified with 
resettlement from Bukom Kechil.  
It had been my late paternal great grandfather’s land, but we did not have 




trees were compensated for. They did not compensate us for our land at 
all. 
This effectively ended Airah’s connection with and claim to her island-home. This 
form of ‘paper displacement’ was not new52.  
Her family having lived on the island for generations, Airah never imagined that her 
home would be ‘taken’ once, let alone repeatedly. She was relocated from Bukom 
Kechil by Shell only to be relocated again by JTC from Semakau. The compensation 
of $6,000 for her house in Bukom Kechil was all spent on rebuilding her house in 
Semakau, only to move again after five years. Evicted from the Southern Islands for 
good, the disappointment was crowded out by the fear of their new home on the 
mainland. 
My husband chose this flat in Telok Blangah. We wanted to buy a flat but 
at that time, my husband had stopped working. There was enough money 
to buy the flat, but we thought of our children that were still small. We had 
seven children and we were worried. Our children would need to go to 
school and what if there was not enough money. When he stopped working 
at that time, he did not receive a lot, about $25,000. We saved the money 
and rented this flat.  
The redevelopment policies on the Southern Islands caused Airah to not only lose her 
home but also the chance at a fresh start, since the compensation received to begin life 
anew on the mainland was insufficient.  
Her decision to remain on the Southern Islands had cost her financially. The islanders 
settled for less with each resettlement from the islands.  
They said that people from Bukom Kechil won’t get any compensation 
because we were compensated before. In the end, we did receive some 
 
52 It has always been assumed that the Malay rulers ‘sold’ Singapore to the British, due to self-interest 
and a lack of foresight. A fuller account nevertheless has been uncovered (see Kwa, 2006). In 1819, the 
British and Malay rulers had signed a treaty to allow the British to maintain a factory on Singapore for 
an annual rent. In 1824 however, John Crawfurd who was the second British Resident of Singapore 
highlighted to the Malay rulers that the past annual rent payments were unlawful because the 
engagement was never ratified by the government of Calcutta. Not only did he stop the payments, 
Crawfurd insisted that the Malay rulers cede Singapore to the British in return for the cancellation of 
their debts. These debts referred to the past rental payments which the Malay rulers were said to owe 





compensation from JTC but not much. They measured the size of the house 
and we received about $4,000. We were compensated a lot more by Shell 
because they counted everything including the fruit trees.  
In comparison, her neighbour Mak Itik, who decided to relocate straight to the 
mainland from Bukom Kechil was given a shophouse lot. This meant their source of 
income was not affected. On the other hand, Airah managed to pay the rent and bills 
because there were three people in the household working throughout. Her husband 
resumed work as a contract worker, her eldest child had started working as well, and 
she worked as a cleaner at a kindergarten with a starting pay of $80 without any CPF 
contribution. I was told by other islanders that women from the islands did not work. 
Airah must have been left without a choice.  
I wondered whether Airah regretted her decision to stay on the Southern Islands. One 
of her relatives and fellow islander, Zahara, who was around when I visited Airah 
clearly expressed her regret and reasons for it: 
Zahara: It was true what Lee Kuan Yew said about the danger of children 
going to school from the islands. Such tiny kolek in such deep waters; if 
they were to… (gestures drowning). But we persevered and no one died.  
Airah: But we didn’t stay at Semakau for long. 
Zahara: Just five years. 
Interviewer: Why did you still move to Semakau if it was only for five 
years?  
Airah: We didn’t know. (simultaneously) Zahara: We didn’t know, we 
thought we’d stay there forever.  
The irony was not lost on me - Airah had lived in a community even as her plot of land 
was requalified by government as under temporary ownership in Bukom Kechil; she 
lived with her family when the flat was rented, but today when she owns the flat, she 
lives alone. Yet, Airah chooses to maintain the ways of gotong royong. Home, for her, 
was not about its monetary value but the bonds created. There were no guests in her 
home, everyone was family. And her favourite person to have around has to be Mak 
Itik. It is a friendship that had survived both years and differences. Mak Itik makes 
every effort to see Airah, at least during Hari Raya Aidilfitri53. She brings her maid 
 
53 Hari Raya literally means ‘Day of Celebrations’. It rejoices the end of Ramadhan, which is the 
month of dawn to sunset fasting for Muslims. Varieties of traditional food will be prepared and 




along but last year, Mak Itik was not able to come due to her ailing health. Airah is 
unlike the typical Singaporean who values privacy and mobility. Her sense of loss 
reflects her attachment to her home. Airah chooses to stay alone in her flat than to 
relocate to her children’s homes because the latter would mean leaving her community, 
or what’s left of it, in Telok Blangah. The gotong royong she practises necessarily 
carries the sadness of loss and also longing for community. Eventually losing gotong 
royong in consequence of their resettlement on the mainland presented a cultural loss 
to the Malays. And in spite of the state’s emphasis on gotong royong or community, 
there is a constant valorisation of social mobility and individual self-reliance. Airah’s 
story is a story about norms, changing forms of solidarity and social control. It tells 
the changing use (and definition) of gotong royong: on the islands, the state’s co-option 
of it, and Airah’s attempt to preserve it in an attenuated form on the mainland. While 
Airah had never imagined a life without gotong royong, the final protagonist had never 
expected that she would have to live alone. Her story is the most tragic of the five, as 
her relocation process was not only instigated by the state but  carried out by her own 
family, felt more personal.  
Yat, the relegated citizen 
I first saw Yat seated at one of the round green tables cutting some vegetables in the 
hawker centre. She was helping out at the chicken rice stall, whose owner Hassan had 
introduced me to Sazali. The hawker centre is truly the place to meet people. She must 
have overheard our conversation. We started talking and she passed me her home 
phone number and address. Before I even thought to ask, Yat explained why she did 
not have a handphone54.  
I’m not working, so I try to save where I can because you know, I am 
sendirian berhad (laughs). But I don’t ask for government assistance. I 
make rempeyek55 (peanut crisps) and send them to shops. During Eid, I sell 
them in a bigger tin. My siblings support me also. (She sees me saving her 
 
54 This refers to the Singaporean dialect’s word for mobile or cell-phone.  
55 A popular snack in Southeast Asia, it refers to peanut crisps made with batter mixed in aromatic 




phone number in my handphone and refers to herself as) Makcik56 
rempeyek (peanut crisps auntie) (laughs). 
Sendirian berhad usually refers to a private limited company, but, in Yat’s perhaps 
self-ironical use of it, they meant ‘alone’ and ‘with limits’ respectively. This was to be 
an introduction to her life. As Yat shared with me her housing biography, it slowly 
became clear to me that the source of her relegation began early in life.  
Caregiving 
Like any other school-going child, Yat’s life on Bukom Kechil began with school. Her 
journey to school nevertheless was far from typical. 
To go to Yusof Ishak Secondary School, I would wake up at 3 a.m. and set 
out from home at 4 a.m. I needed to walk quickly and reach the jetty by 
4.30 a.m. to catch the sampan (small boat) (Figure 9). Pakcik (Uncle) 
Harun would have arrived in his sampan, he was always punctual. I would 
pay him five cents and he would take us to Bukom Besar. At Bukom Besar, 
again I needed to hurry to the ferry boarding area because it was far away, 
and I needed to reach it by 5 a.m. By then, everyone else from the other 
islands like Seking, Semakau, Bukom Kechil, Bukom Besar, and Sudong 
would have gathered. The ferry service to mainland was free. And I would 
finally reach school at about 7 a.m. By then, I was already tired – even 
before school began (laughs). 
There was an absence of secondary schools on the islands. While each island had their 
own primary schools, those who, like Yat, wanted to pursue their studies needed to 
travel daily to the mainland. And for all the precise timing described by Yat, imagine 
my surprise when I was told they did not have a watch. The rooster had been their 
alarm clock. And yet, the morning rush, for Yat, was the easier part of a school day.  
 
56 In Malay, makcik and pakcik is used to address an older woman and man respectively, followed by 




Figure 9: Sampan ferrying the islanders (Hans’ photo collection) 
 
 
After school, Yat faced another set of obligations.  
As soon as I reached home at 2 p.m., household chores would be waiting 
for me. I was interested in sports, but I had to go straight home. My mother 
would have already soaked the clothes in big basins. There were 10 of us 
and there were no washing machines. I was the only daughter then. It was 
only much later that I had a sister. She was the last one. During the dry 
spell, I would have to carry the laundry to the Chinese burial grounds. My 
father would accompany me, he was worried for me. 
Yat’s studies was not only affected by the long journey to school but her status as the 
only daughter in a large family.  
After school, I went to the madrasah57. It actually began at 2 p.m. but I 
would wash the clothes first and only reached the madrasah at 3 p.m., as 
though I was the ustazah58 (laughs). It was nearby, the government had 
built the madrasah for us. Then, as soon as I finished madrasah at 5 p.m., 
I would go back to rinse the clothes. I was so tired.  
Life for Yat alternated between school and domestic chores. 
 
57 Religious school 




After Maghrib prayer59, I would go to the Quran reading classes until 10 
p.m. Then, I would watch television at the community centre till 11 p.m. 
And after that? I went home to sleep (laughs). So, when did I do my 
homework? On the ferry to mainland (laughs). My best friend, Sarinah, 
would teach me on the ferry. I didn’t copy her work. She was the brightest 
student in class, but she didn’t finish her studies. Our teacher was so angry 
when she stopped school at secondary two to get married. 
Yat eventually met a fate similar to her best friend. Unable to juggle her many 
responsibilities and obligations, Yat decided to quit school. I wondered whether Yat 
and Hans’ father’s decision to send his children to the mainland was based on Yat’s 
experience. All her siblings had completed their secondary education. She told me that 
both her parents insisted on the importance of education for their children, but I could 
feel her sense of injury:  
My father didn’t allow me to quit school. I said I just couldn’t [do school 
anymore]. I was worn out. There was no time to study. I was too tired […] 
It was worse after quitting school. So much more work and I had to take 
care of my siblings too.  
Their dependence on her as a caregiver only increased when Yat left school. 
When I was 17 years old, my friend married an Australian and migrated 
there. She then returned because she wanted to matchmake her nephew 
with someone from the island. And she came to ask my hand in marriage, 
but my mother turned it down because I would have to leave Singapore 
and follow my husband. She said she needed me, that I was her tunggak 
(pillar). I wanted to get married not because I was looking for a life partner, 
but because I saw it as a way out. I was stressed and tired. At that time, all 
my siblings wore jeans. They were so heavy to wash, I wanted to cry. 
Yat’s decision to quit school was one she regretted, perhaps for life. When she made 
the decision however, it never crossed her mind that she would be resettled to mainland 
Singapore.  
Precarity 
Yat thought she would live in Bukom Kechil all her life and decided to discontinue 
her education which would later be crucial to employment - and life in general- on the 
 




mainland. I thought to myself -would there have been more systems of help available; 
would dependence take more acceptable forms on the islands? One thing is for sure, 
that she would not be living alone; it would have been an anomaly. Single Malays like 
Yat living on their own in flats are a minority. And single Malays over 55 living on 
their own are a rarity. Co-residence with children is the most prevalent form for Malay 
elderly in Singapore; whereas those who lived alone would be cared for by neighbours, 
who are treated as family (Blake and Mansur 1992; Mehta et al. 1995). Even if the 
same law had been applied to her on Bukom Kechil, they would still have lived close 
to one another. Based on Airah’s account, neighbours were family and vice-versa. This 
might explain the shock fellow islanders had upon discovering that Yat lived alone 
after being told to leave the family home. The notion of ‘family home’ did not exist 
for them – home was simply family. There would also not be any worries about the 
maintenance of the flat in terms of utility bills and the cost of living would not be an 
issue.  
In line with Hans’ take on the importance of Yat’s homeownership, Mehta, Osman 
and Alexander (1995) found that homeownership gave the elderly a better sense of 
independence in that they are not menumpang (boarding) in the child(ren)'s home. 
They preferred their children to live with them in their flat. In Yat’s case however, the 
sense of independence is unclear because Yat did not purchase the house and therefore, 
did not ‘own’ it. Under the SERS programme, the plan is to transfer the residents of 
the building where she currently lives to a nearby block in the area. But it comes with 
the realisation that with her age, it would not be for long anyway. She shared with me 
that if she were to pass away, her brothers have arranged for the flat to be divided 
according to a will. In other words, even when Yat finally has a home of her own, it 
feels temporary. That is, it is less the sense of pressure she feels, but that the flat does 
not rightfully belong to her. It will be ‘returned’ to her siblings once she is no longer 
around. It is as if in an important sense, she is still ‘menumpang’ – boarding. 
Yat and Hans are siblings, but their housing lives couldn’t be more different. Yat falls 
into two overlapping vulnerable populations, single elderly woman (Smith et al. 2015) 
and elderly Malays (Lee 1999). Each group faces specific problems in Singapore, 




scheme presents an inadequate solution to the problem of poverty in Singapore, 
especially amongst the elderly women and elderly Malays (Lee 2001). While all 
citizens face insecurity if they lose their jobs or are unable to work either temporarily 
or permanently, women -especially those who are single- who have been caregivers 
and not wage-earners face more substantial insecurity. Women such as Yat ‘either have 
not participated in the workforce because they were occupied by caregiving 
responsibilities, or they participated so little and/or at lower incomes and thus have 
very little in the way of savings’  (Smith et al. 2015: 35). Similarly, Malay elderly tend 
not to be able to support themselves in post-retirement age and tend to be overtly 
dependent on their family (Blake and Mansur 1992). As a result, Yat relies heavily on 
her married siblings in old age, in the absence of her parents, spouse or children to 
provide for her based on lifelong reciprocity between family members. Yat however 
did not want to be seen as over-reliant or needy. 
Requesting welfare benefits is stigmatising in all economically liberal countries where 
participation in the labour market is the condition for access to benefits, but is even 
more so in Singapore. The state moves in only as a last resort. Importantly, an ethic of 
‘differentiated deservedness’ (Teo 2015) is created, underpinned by subsidiarity of 
welfare, where everyone has to take care of themselves as individuals and their 
families. This was why right from the start, she made it clear to me that she did not 
receive any social assistance because she still has family and can work part time. In 
addition, elderly Malays prefer to depend on family members before turning to public 
support. Such familial assistance has long-term implications – being a drain on present 
incomes and savings, and therewith the wellbeing of future generations – and lead to 
graver consequences for the Malays, where they constitute the most economically 
disadvantaged. Blake’s (1992) study of elderly Malays found that 43% of the 
respondents lived in three-room public housing flats compared to the national average 
of 35.4%, and 48% of older Malays had an average household income of less than 
S$1,0003 a month, whilst the Chinese equivalent is approximately S$1,547.  
For me, Yat is the relegated citizen because she can never feel herself to be a fully 
autonomous person in a welfare system that prizes both independence through formal 




Yat remains one of the fortunate ones with family support, providing her with a home. 
I suggest, though, that it is sobering that the reality of housing in Singapore has 
rendered Yat’s story as among the lucky ones. Yat must have felt the pain and perhaps 
betrayal, at one point in time, of living alone and thereafter being evicted by her own 
family. She had been asked to move out of all four on the houses in which she lived – 
Bukom Kechil, Semakau, Teban Gardens and Tanglin Halt - relocated by different 
parties, including her own family. As she seems to drift along with housing decisions 
made on her behalf, she continues to be affected by past and present (re)housing 
policies. It is not that Yat keeps losing her home, but it was never hers to start with – 
despite her ‘homeownership’. Yat’s housing biography highlights the demographics 
and criteria of housing in Singapore. Housing oneself in Singapore is more difficult 
when one is unemployed, single, female, elderly Malay in a pro-family (anti-)welfare 
regime. They say home is where family is. Based on Adi’s, Airah’s and Yat’s account, 
the single-person household may become the norm very soon – a norm unimagined in 
Singapore, and especially, in the Southern Islands. 
 
Un-homing Malays in Singapore 
The housing lives of these five Malays – who are of varying ages and life courses – 
suggest very different stories about inhabiting and finding ‘home’ in Singapore as a 
Malay. Some convey a sense of loss, carried in the notion of home, which, following 
the first resettlement, is thereafter and forever felt as precarious. The impermanence 
and fragility of whatever stability housing – and indeed home – might offer is painful 
for some, more than others. Hans, the island biographer, contextualised the 
spatialization of the Malay community vis-à-vis resettlement within Singapore’s 
multiracial politics and saw such state practice continued in the ethnic ‘integration’ 
policy - EIP. However, he strives to ‘stay home’ and ‘fights’ the re-developmental 
erasure of his island home through collecting, preserving and sharing memories of his 
‘great grandfather’s land’. More, we see in Hans’ story how resettlement was a way of 




Airah, the displaced islander, seems to be impacted most by the fracturing of gotong 
royong due to resettlement. Nevertheless, she struggles to maintain the gotong royong 
way of life even today. On the other hand, relocation is sometimes embraced as an 
elusive vehicle for social mobility, reflecting how Malays see themselves and their 
place in Singapore’s wider development. This suggests something about resettlement 
as a source of not only cultural loss but racialised inequalities. I explore this and deepen 
the finding in Chapter 5. 
For Zee, contrary to stereotypes, as the property-minded Malay, we see how she 
associated participating in the house-moving culture with a real sense of agency and 
competence. Despite the lack of housing choices, she nevertheless assessed her own 
position as being as more favourable than that of her sister and those of other, poorer 
Malays forced to live in the rental, i.e. Malay, ghettos. The persistence of both the 
reality and the subjective experience of these ‘Malay rental ghettos’ testifies to the 
enduring racialised hierarchies in ‘multiracial-meritocratic’ Singapore’s housing 
system (see Moore 2000). And it drives a form of racialised gentrification in the 
property state, something I discuss in Chapter 6. 
Adi, the impossible Singaporean, viewed his choice of downgrading as an act of self-
reliance – a trait he thought most Malays lack. Yat, the relegated citizen’s notion of 
sendirian berhad, or self-sustenance (in the sense that she did not require government 
assistance), was similar to Adi’s understanding of self-reliance. This is not to be 
confused with self-sufficiency.  
Yet their housing moves and strategies – seeking to secure homeownership and 
housing mobility – might be seen in the context of fighting against the risk of social 
relegation. Home ownership is always a security: in case of extreme need, 
downgrading flat brings in cash for survival (although this is not even an option for 
rental dwellers, a majority of whom are Malays.) This runs contrary to how housing is 
viewed ‘an appreciating asset that promotes social mobility, financial security, and a 
sense of pride and belonging’ (Chan and Shanmugaratnam 2015: 140). Housing is seen 
as an escalator, a path to social mobility. And it can be. But sometimes that mobility 




even on the moving escalator, taking a step down isn’t a option, which means walking 
a tight-rope without any safety nets. 
Relatedly, taken in their accumulation, these five housing biographies might be 
usefully contextualised within the wider context of the Malays’ racialisation in 
Singapore. That is, we cannot comprehend these housing biographies without first 
understanding the cultural construction of the Malay generally, and in respect to 
housing in particular. There seemed to be a need for all five of my respondents to 
reconcile their housing biographies with their sense of themselves as Malays, and to 
do so in ways that illuminate the fate and positions of Malays in contemporary 
Singapore more generally. Regardless of whether they were making sense of their 
housing moves, or of the state’s attempts over the years to position them in various 
ways in terms of their homes, or of social mobility and their place in Singapore’s wider 
development, their primary frame of understanding was along racial lines.  
Moreover, the stories told by these respondents suggest Malay acquiescence towards 
redevelopment, resettlement, and relocation. They show the different ways in which 
Malays experience ‘un-homing’, which I will explore further in Chapters 5 and 6. The 
social, political, and legal impositions brought about by changes in their homes shaped 
Malays’ conception of their place in Singapore and of what they can call their 
home. For example, the legal form of ownership enforced by the new government on 
the islands caused Airah to lose the land her family had lived on for 
generations. The political tension between PAP and UMNO adversely affected gotong 
royong among islanders over the last years of their lives on the islands, as narrated by 
Hans and Yat. With Separation, islanders were obliged to see the development and 
resettlement policy as integral to the nation-state’s survival. Such rationale continues 
to be accepted, even by those of my respondents who never lived on the islands, such 
as Adi. 
On the basis of this understanding of their subjective experiences of their housing lives, 
the following two chapters seek to cast more systematic historical and analytical light 




Singapore’s history, and on the associated subjectivation processes shaping the Malay 








Chapter 5 | Southern Islanders and the making of the 
indigenous migrant-citizen 
 
We might begin with something Hans told me:  
Majority on Bukom Kechil were fishermen. For them, they are not the least 
bothered [about class]. That’s the difference between Bukom Besar dan 
Bukom Kechil – Bukom Besar residents are of a higher class than Bukom 
Kechil. I still remember when I was in primary three. I had a friend whose 
father was an engineer with Shell. He lived in the quarters, near our school. 
During recess time, he asked me to follow him home. I was like a fish out 
of water. It was the first time I tasted bread! When I went home, I told my 
mother – Mak, I went to my friend’s house and he cut bread using a ‘saw’. 
It was in the 1960s and they already had such cutlery. After that, I told 
myself, ‘I can’t stay this way forever - forever at the bottom’.  
This encapsulated, for me, how the logics of social mobility and development were 
felt and experienced in connection with housing policies in the Southern Islands.  Thus, 
exploring some of the issues that arose in connection with Hans’ and the other housing 
biographies – especially gotong royong and pecahan – in this chapter, I explore some 
of the workings and subjectivating logics of how these played out in the early housing 
policies in the Southern Islands, specifically Bukom. Exploring the relationship 
between gotong royong and some of the PAP strategies for canvassing the Southern 
Islands, I show how these strategies of development marked the beginning of a specific 
type of social democracy. The form of social democratic policy on the Southern Islands 
took a turn with implementation of redevelopment and oil industrial policy on the 
offshore islands.  
This chapter sees the beginnings of Singapore as property state. Here, I show how land 
was first appropriated gradually on the Southern Islands. We see hints in Airah’s 
biography, for instance when her family lost ownership of their home through a form 
of paper displacement, where only legal documents were accepted as proof of 
landownership. I then argue how the fostering of homeownership on the mainland had 
reduced Malays from the Southern Islands to a political minority and cultural diaspora. 




Malay population, which was experienced as pecahan, by the islanders. In addition, it 
also reinforced the racialised stratification in Singapore, which ultimately resulted in 
un-homing the Malays in the Southern Islands - a key step in the making of a 
multiracial nation-state. 
The dominant narrative around Singapore’s ‘development model’ is that it has made a 
virtue of transforming a third-world into a first-world country in one generation. What 
had enabled this success in both the dominant and counter narrative has been oil and 
the role of oil in Singapore’s economy (cf. Turnbull 1989; Barr 2019). In these tellings, 
the success of Singapore’s oil refinery on the Southern Islands has been touted. 
However, little has been written about the development of the Southern Islands, about 
the manner and the consequences of this. More specifically, Bukom Kechil, which was 
key to PAP’s development in the Southern Islands, has rarely been discussed, with the 
consequence that the histories and housing lives of those Malays who lived on the 
Southern Islands have also been neglected. This chapter seeks to tell this story, which 
is a story of how the development of Singapore’s multiracial housing nation was lived 
by the Southern Islanders. In what follows I will examine three of the key mechanisms 
that underpinned the relocation of the Southern Islands Malays: the harnessing of key 
institutions, such as gotong royong, for political canvassing, the appropriation of the 
state by the land, and the tight alliance with global investors. 
Gotong royong: Developing the Southern Islands 
Airah saw development of Bukom Kechil as gotong royong because it reduced the 
burden of islanders. Facilities on Bukom Kechil had turned their lives around and she 
was grateful for the PAP support. Souvenir programme booklets were published to 
document the various facilities built on each island and their respective costs (PAP 
1966, 1969). The affinity between its social-democratic ideology and Islam was 
highlighted in the preface (PAP 1969: 67): 
our ideology of democratic socialism is completely in accord with Islam. 
In fact, the aims and objectives of socialism, which is to bring about an 
equal and just society where there is no exploitation of man by man and 




teachings of Islam, which, besides, calls for peace and understanding 
among peoples of all races.  
Most of the Southern islanders who were Malays would also be Muslims. At the same 
time, gotong royong is highly valued and a central tenet to the lives on the island as 
narrated by Airah. These gotong royong strategies to develop the Southern Islands thus 
reflected the social democratic beginnings of PAP. This can be seen as one of the ways 
to increases buy-in to ‘development’ policies by matching governmental ideology with 
local beliefs.  
Importantly, the islanders were recognised as the most socioeconomically 
disadvantaged. The development initiatives were based on claims that highlighted that 
the islanders were ‘the most downtrodden people of Singapore’ who have been 
neglected by UMNO and the former colonial government (BH 18 July 1959, ST 23 
June 1959). This was based on the declining government budget and expenditure over 
the years - only $1 had been spent per person in the ward over the last three years (ST 
5 July 1959, 22 August 1959). In 1957, only 10% of the $80,000 budget was spent and 
in the following year, 20% of the $60,000 budget was used. The budget was further 
reduced to $45,000 in 1959 (BH 18 July 1959, 28 March 1960). Uneven development 
was also noted across the islands. Hans had described the vast difference between 
Bukom Kechil and Bukom Besar in the early days. Bukom Kechil was highly 
dependent on Bukom Besar not only for its facilities but also for basic necessities such 
as fresh water. The level of development in each island depended on its voting 
population, and the number of voters on the few big islands - Pulau Brani, Pulau 
Blakang Mati, and Pulau Bukom Besar with 3,800 residents in total - were enough to 
control the particular Southern Islands ward (Figure 10). The result was ‘truly 




Figure 10: Map showing the electoral division for Southern Islands in 1959 
(National Archives of Singapore) 
 
 
Nevertheless, islanders such as Hans were aware on the political motives behind these 
development initiatives.  
Lee Kuan Yew was smart. He can foresee 10, 20 years ahead and plan. 
That’s why he ‘caught’ Ya’acob Mohamed first and put him as the MP for 
the Southern Islands. This man was charismatic and persuasive. Next, he 
identified what was lacking in Bukom Kecil. Instead of building a jetty, he 
built two - but this was only for Bukom Kechil. One was facing Bukom 
Besar while the other faced Semakau. He had his reasons. The jetty facing 
Semakau was in deep waters and would make it easier for political leaders 
to come. The other jetty was for the islanders to ferry themselves to Bukom 
Besar using the sampan. This was how Lee Kuan Yew won the hearts and 
minds of the island people. 
It was during the tumultuous political mobilisations in Singapore by multiple parties 




Southern Islands ward, made up of the southwestern islands off mainland Singapore, 
was created in 1955 during Singapore’s first local election. The ward was regarded as 
a Malay ward, because of its predominantly Malay population and all the winning 
candidates had been Malay.   
In the first election, the Southern Islands were won by the Malay Union and UMNO. 
Progressive Party’s candidate H. J. C Kulasingha lost to Mohamed Sidik Bin Haji 
Abdul Hamid. This despite strong support from the newspapers describing ‘King 
Kulasingha’ as being held in high regard by his predominantly Malay electorate, even 
though his opponent was Malay (ST 4 August 1955). In the second election, UMNO’s 
Ahmad Jabri bin Mohammad Akib emerged victorious. 66.4% of the 5,330 voters had 
been Malay. Despite forming a government with majority votes and seats, PAP’s Kum 
Teng Hock was defeated in the 1959 elections. PAP had not won any of the three 
Malay electoral strongholds: neither the Southern Islands, Geylang Serai nor Kampong 
Kembangan. Finally, in the third and final election in which the Southern Islands were 
involved, the Malay candidate fielded by PAP won. It was a narrow 10.8% win by 
Ya’acob bin Mohamed over Ahmad Jabri bin Mohammad Akib (Table 2). Thus, one 
thing was becoming clear: voting had consistently been on racial lines in the Southern 
Islands from the beginning.  






Rahim writes that ‘promises to recognise the special status of the Malays and rectify 
the imbalance between the Malay and non-Malay communities, principally through 
educational assistance, were regularly issued by the PAP leadership after the 1959 
elections’ (2008: 102). The first Malay secondary school was established in 1961, and 
by 1965 there were thirteen Malay secondary schools (Rahim 1998). Even whilst 
education took up a huge proportion of the Southern Islands’ development 
expenditure, the huge financial assistance was nevertheless linked to an absence of 
secondary schools on the Southern Islands. Ya’acob Mohamed highlighted the 
government’s commitment to helping Malay youths with their education, where 268 
Malay students had received the transportation financial assistance, while all 21 
education bursary recipients were Malays (BH 18 March 1966). And the sum of 
$99,770 for students’ transport financial assistances on the Southern Islands was more 
than eight times the sum of $12,000 spent on students on mainland Singapore (ibid.). 
Despite the available island bursaries, Hans observed that majority of those who 
moved to Semakau discontinued their secondary education. Travelling daily to 
mainland secondary schools was more than financially taxing.  
Yat’s housing biography was a testament to such circumstances. As we saw in Chapter 
4, one of the main reasons Yat quit school was her long and exhausting journey to 
school. Unlike primary schools, where Aziz explained were a source of support for the 
PAP, there remained no secondary schools amidst the plethora of facilities built on the 
Southern Islands. Zahara mentioned safety concerns for children travelling to school 
by boat - a novel issue for islanders. Not only was further education discouraged 
among islanders, it became a push factor from living on the Southern Islands. This was 
important because according to Hans, low education among islanders, including the 
penghulu’s family, made life difficult on the mainland after resettlement.  
I suggest that these strategies to develop the Southern Islands reflected a specific form 
of social democracy in the area, one which omitted secondary education which was to 
be important to resettlement later. It might be said that PAP’s success on the Southern 




facilities, but also to assurances from the Malay leadership as well. PAP had 
recognised the importance of race in developing the property state, yet it 
misrecognised the hierarchy within its multiracial population in the housing nation. 
Development efforts on the Southern Islands were launched with an emphasis on 
gotong royong, in order to court and convince the Singapore Malays that PAP was ‘a 
genuine multiracial party supported by the various ethnic communities’ (Rahim 2008: 
101). This was echoed by Hans, who described PAP’s political motivations as being 
‘to win the hearts and minds of the people’. Indeed, a campaign to clean the islands 
was reportedly organised in the spirit of gotong royong, where the National 
Construction Corp volunteers tasked to clean the islands were referred to as a ‘gotong 
royong collective’ (BH 18 September 1959)60. Volunteerism among the PAP’s task 
force was thus melded into gotong royong under the national flag, within the 
parameters of development discourse. Gotong royong helped bridge the people of 
mainland Singapore with the islanders as fellow ‘nation builders’ through their 
common goal of improving the Southern Islands’ living conditions. And in addition, 
Bukom Kechil’s penghulu reportedly praised ‘the spirit of cooperation and self-help 
of the people of Singapore and the islands’ (ST 21 September 1959).  
These development strategies, which centred on Malay values, can be seen as 
successful in ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of islanders such as Airah, who regarded 
PAP’s assistance as a form of gotong royong. Moreover: in order to showcase the 
authenticity of its gotong royong spirit, development efforts on the majority Malay 
Southern Islands harnessed Malay political leadership. The multiracial PAP sought to 
align itself with various traditional and political Malay leaders. For instance, PAP’s 
development efforts in the Southern Islands was led by a Malay development minister, 
Ya’acob Mohamed. The choice was strategic; Ya’acob had a formidable reputation as 
a veteran of the Malasoyan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, the Malay Nationalist Party, 
and Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) and former head of a Singapore UMNO branch in 
Bukit Panjang. Support from all 12 penghulus in the Southern Islands also reinforced 
 
60 Different Southern Islands were cleaned by volunteers from the mainland. A long list of cleaning 
tasks was reported on Bukom Kechil, ‘rubbish was collected and burned, beaches were cleaned, coconut 
stumps cut, grass burned, drains dug, roads repaired, and houses whitewashed and painted. This cleaning 




the gotong royong ethos of its development policy (Berita Harian 1 July 1959, The 
Straits Times 23 June 1959). They had reportedly approached the PAP for assistance.  
While the penghulu’s role traditionally is to take care of the island, absorption of these 
local forms of leadership into the state was complete when the penghulus became 
employed (Figure 11). In line with Hans’ description of penghulus as salaried 
mediators, they began to work with the colonial government as intermediaries for 
housing requests, financial assistance and land matters such as prevention of intrusion, 
encroachment and trespass on Crown lands, collection of levies on behalf of the Land 
Office, and recovering possession of lands in case of forfeiture (ST 8 August 1948; 2 
September 1949; 1 January 1949). Their half-yearly allowances later became monthly 
salaries (ST 18 March 1957) and this continued with the next PAP government, which 
promised them an increment (ST 23 June 1959). This meant that the penghulus 
relinquished their rights to administer the land independently; and this also explains 
Airah’s observations that living on Bukom Kechil gradually involved more extensive 




Figure 11: Accreditation ceremony involving Penghulus and Yang diPertuan Yusof 
Ishak (Hans’ photo collection) 
 
 
These gotong royong efforts in developing Southern Islands also focused on religious 
facilities or events. The Yang DiPertuan Negara, or Head of State, made a first official 
visit to the Southern Island during the fasting month of Ramadan. The month was 
spiritually important for Muslims as it culminated in Eid celebrations. Like Ya’acob 
Mohamed, Yusof also had a large Malay following, and he had been the chief editor 
of Utusan, the first Malay-owned nationalist newspaper to reflect the aspirations and 
concerns of the ra’ayat, or citizen. Yusof Ishak had been installed as Singapore’s Yang 
DiPertuan Negara in the bid ‘to cloak the infant state in the swaddling clothes of 
Malayness’ (Bedlington 1975: 134). And in his first visit, Yusof planted a stick to mark 
the site of a new mosque on Bukom Kechil that was built by a PAP supporter (Figure 
12). In fact, this was the same mosque that Hans described as the start of a PAP-UMNO 
brawl. In his address, Yusof asked the islanders to cooperate with the government, and 




and light, making life in the island more comfortable (ST 18 January 1960). By 1965, 
there were four madrasahs and a mosque on each island (BH 28 September 1965). 
Figure 12: Bukom Kechil mosque and its donors (Hans’ photo collection) 
 
 
In summary, the early form of social democracy espoused by PAP had neglected 
secondary education while focusing on primary education. Two consequences 
emerged. First, the residents’ subsequent resettlement to the mainland was 
complicated by hindering their opportunities for social advancement.  Second and 
more immediately, it enabled smooth transition to next phase of the islands’ 
redevelopment. The mechanisms under social democracy, through which it developed 
the Southern Islands, therefore showed an early form of majoritarian nation-building 
at work. And it had a decided focus on Malay-Muslims and their underdevelopment. 
While it did benefit the Malays, then, it prepared them neither for the subsequent 
resettlement to the mainland nor for life in the new property state that was about to 





The property state, from the margins 
While resettlement was not a new experience for the islanders on Bukom Kechil, Airah 
did not expect Shell to ‘take’ the entire island. She had observed residents being 
relocated from different parts of Bukom Kechil on a small scale over the years and 
regarded it as a sign of Shell’s growing success. But she never imagined it would 
ultimately be at the expense of her island home. More, Bukom Kechil was ‘so 
developed’ with facilities and PAP’s branch office had been located on the island, so 
mass resettlement was never expected. As importantly for Airah, it had always been 
her home. But Bukom Kechil’s resettlement was significantly different from Bukom 
Besar’s because Shell had been working on the latter since 1891 (Moey 1991) and 
because expansion had involved uprooting the workers’ quarters and relocating them 
to Bukom Kechil. As a result, Bukom Kechil had always been a residential area and 
home to islanders such as Hans, Airah and Yat. During the post-Separation period, 
PAP shifted from developing to redeveloping the Southern Islands for oil 
industrialisation. Singapore’s strongest commitment to social democracy is its 
universal provision of public housing (Chua 2017), specifically on the mainland. But 
here, the form of social democratic policy on the Southern Islands took a different turn 
with implementation of redevelopment and an oil industrial policy on the offshore 
islands.  
I thus begin by examining the government’s appropriation of land on Bukom, and the 
Southern Islands more generally. It did this in a changing political context, first 
through particular land legislation; second by changing the development priorities and 
land use on the Southern Islands; and third, in its partnership with Shell. The 
mechanics of land appropriation in Bukom were underlaid by the particular social, 
economic, and political dynamics. Relocating the local Malay population would have 
been impossible if land appropriation did not account for these local factors. And these 
in turn allow insight into the specific subjectivating logics that accompanied the 
development of the property state-housing nation, and into how those like Hans, Yat 




State ownership of land: From island-home to temporary occupation 
The first wave of resettlement involving the islanders on Bukom Kechil was 
announced in April 1963. Shell’s expansion implicated 5,000 people on Bukom Besar 
(ST 12 April 1963). According to Hans, Shell’s expansion plans had removed 
UMNO’s political base. And indeed, five months later, Singapore merged with 
Malaysia on 16 September 1963, and five days after this merger, Lee Kuan Yew called 
for a snap election. The refinery on Bukom Besar was offered as one of the reasons for 
the merger. And in consequence, the merger resulted in delaying the start-up of a 
previously approved, competing refinery project in Malaysia (Ng 2012). However, its 
construction, which was reported in November 1959, only began after Bukom Besar’s 
refinery started operations. And while the merger did not last, it did give Singapore a 
significant head-start in the oil refining industry. Additionally, PAP had captured all 
three Malay wards - including the Southern Islands – as it gained a two-thirds majority. 
Still, PAP’s victory in these 1963 elections was anything but a significant shift in 
Malay support for the PAP.  
Its narrow margin of victory, particularly in the Southern Islands and Geylang Serai, 
suggests that there were many variables contributing to its success. Malay support for 
the PAP in these three constituencies was at best cautious and conditional (Rahim 
2008: 103). In the Southern Islands, PAP’s win could be reflective of the high approval 
among residents during the PAP’s gotong royong phase, discussed in the earlier 
section. Nevertheless, it has been argued that PAP’s win in the three Malay strongholds 
was due to strong backing from the Chinese community, which stems from the fear of 
Malay political dominance with the merger (Bedlington 1975: 190). After the union, 
what constituted the mainland shifted from Singapore’s central island to the larger 
Malay dominated mainland. In the Southern Islands ward, the majority Malays had 
shown support not so much for PAP but for Ya’acob Mohamed who was seen as 
charismatic. This resulted in a split in Malay votes which also mirrored the internal 
divisions within the SMNO. SMNO members such as Ya’acob had defected to the 




The pecahan intensified with a second wave of post-Separation resettlements that 
similarly followed the (bigger) success of PAP’s election victory. Hans, for instance, 
regarded the 1968 election as another heavy blow to the Malays in Singapore. This is 
because the results of the 1968 elections cumulated in the one-party dominance of PAP 
and marked the start of the government’s unusual degree of control, not least over 
urban space. In June 1968, two months after the elections, Shell’s expansion into 
Bukom Kechil was announced. This time, 2,500 residents were involved. If previously 
the Southern Islands ward was removed vis-a-vis electoral gerrymandering, the 
predominantly Malay islanders on Bukom Kechil met the same fate - all of the 
residents on Bukom Kechil were resettled due to Shell’s expansion (ST 11 June 1968). 
In summary, Bukom Besar, UMNO’s stronghold, was first removed with Shell’s 
expansion in 1963. It was then followed by the removal of the Southern Islands 
constituency in the 1968 elections. Finally, Malay voting power and leadership in the 
area were completely razed with the resettlement of islanders from Bukom Kechil.  
More importantly, Hans was of the opinion that Ya’acob Mohamed was ‘sent away’ 
so that he would not be in the way of Bukom Kechil’s relocation. Ya’acob was moved 
to Kampong Ubi constituency and replaced by the then Minister of Social Affairs 
Othman Wok, who was supportive of redevelopment. This was the MP that insisted 
Mohammad purchase a 5-room flat and rent out the rooms later after his children got 
married. The Southern Islands ward was ‘pecah’ or divided into the nearby mainland 
wards of Jurong, Pasir Panjang and Telok Blangah. As residents allegedly had moved 
to the mainland for employment, the stated reason for elimination was the reduction in 
voters (BH 22 January 1968). The 1968 relocation occurred in a post-Separation 
climate, with a change in Malay leadership and pecahan in Malay votes. In order to 
achieve the property state, the state needed to own most of the land in Singapore, 
especially its offshore islands. Importantly, state ownership of land characterising the 
development of the property state has to be understood within the prevailing political 
context. In other words, appropriation of land on Bukom, experienced as pecahan by 
islanders Hans, Airah and Yat, was carried out effectively through a combination of 
Shell resettlements, punctuated by the elections that were called by PAP and the 




Despite it having been their home for years, Hans, Yat and Airah had long accepted 
that they did not own Bukom Kechil. Before the PAP’s change in the land regulation 
and zoning and the corresponding resettlement, land appropriation had already begun 
through land legislation during the gotong royong phase. Through the Land 
Acquisition Act (LAA) 1966 alone, state ownership of land increased from 31% in 
1949 to 80% in 1992 (Han 2005) as the government could now acquire land ‘for any 
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes’. The LAA 1966 thus provided the 
government with broad powers to acquire land, with as little as 7-day notice to 
landowners that the land has been gazetted. By 2010, the state had claimed 
approximately 90% of the nation’s land by various means – the colonial regime’s 
transfer of crown land to Singapore, the radical acquisition in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and extensive land reclamation from the sea, where Chua notes that ‘committed to its 
vision of social democracy, the PAP government was very aggressive in acquiring 
privately held land for national development’ (2017: 76). Airah had observed the 
increased regulation to live on the island, which included measurement of the land 
area, registration at the land office and permits with increased presence of PAP. State 
ownership of land also meant that every square inch of land on Bukom Kechil had to 
be accounted for and with documented proof. And the penghulus ensured locals’ 
compliance with the process. Bureaucratic documentation of ownership resulted in 
some residents like Airah losing their land earlier. Notions of ownership shifted from 
inheritance and lineage to papers and proof. ‘Rationalising’ government practice 
therefore once more enabled appropriation and what I have referred to as paper-
displacement in Chapter 4. When Airah started paying the annual TOL or temporary 
occupation licenses, it was a painful acknowledgement that they no longer owned the 




Figure 13: Mukim XXXIV showing residents with TOL on Bukom Kechil (National 
Archives of Singapore) 
 
At the same time, the resettlement occurred in a post-separation climate of uncertainty, 
where national development programmes were seen as reassurances towards the future 
of Singapore. Resettlement was previously seen as a problem in the Southern Islands, 
overshadowed by national survival upon separation in 1965. Separation was depicted 
as the young nation of Singapore - with few resources – being evicted from Malaysia, 
but it was later revealed that Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee had engineered the 
separation and its narrative (see Chew 2015; ST 5 August 2015). During resettlements 
in the 1950s, the government was held accountable in parliament with regards to ‘how 
the interests of the inhabitants of the island are being protected’ (ST 9 October 1952; 
4 August 1955; 22 October 1960). Subsequently, an organized collective dissent to 
Bukom Besar’s resettlement was led by UMNO in 1963 (BH 14 April 1963). By 
contrast, there was very little resistance during the 1968 resettlement, and Airah 
described the residents feeling of vulnerability: ‘we the people below could only 
follow’ the majoritarian priorities at that time. This could be seen from the important 
shift in the nature of development on the Southern Islands - from developing the land 
for islanders during the gotong royong period to redeveloping the land for 




land was repurposed from residential to industrial use on Bukom Kechil, while still 
maintaining that this was ‘development’. The idea of the property state (Haila 2016) 
includes land redevelopment for industrial development, and in this case, from 
building the first oil refinery in Singapore with Bukom Besar’s expansion to making 
Singapore the biggest oil installation in Southeast Asia with Bukom Kechil’s 
expansion (ST 11 June 1968). This illustrates the second mechanism at play in the 
resettlement of the Southern Islands Malays: the role of global investors. 
Role of investors: From inhabitants of the island to residents of the Shell project 
Of course, the change in land use and development priorities in the Southern Islands 
would not have been successful without global investors, specifically Shell. Major oil 
companies had previously held back from investing in refineries in Singapore due to 
the political instability of Southeast Asia from communists, labour unions, racial and 
religious unrest as well as fears of high costs and nationalization (Ng 2012). The 
government’s active pursuit of an oil hub the Southern Islands could be seen by its 
economic policies and implementation. PAP introduced the Pioneer Industries (Relief 
from Income Tax) Ordinance (No. 1 of 1959) that reduced the tax rate from 40% to 
4% for a five-year period for companies that qualified as pioneer industries. Shell was 
the first to be awarded such a ‘Pioneer Certificate’. 
Local governments were cooperative and understanding but none more so 
than in Singapore where trust between us developed quickly to the point 
where on the strength of a handshake with the Minister of Finance, I would 
commit millions of dollars’ worth materials etc. towards… the refinery 
project, much to the consternation of the Shell ‘armchair’ legal who tried 
to insist on the paperwork first. How very different in Japan! (Ng 2012: 
12) 
Soon after Shell established the first oil refinery in Singapore in 1961, the huge vote 
of confidence led to more oil majors building refineries in Singapore. Singapore holds 
the world record for building a major oil refining industry from scratch in the shortest 
time (Ng 2012). More than just representing the start of Singapore’s oil refining 
industry, Shell was then the single biggest investment for Singapore, which had just 




relationship with the Malay islanders facilitated the resettlement policy on Bukom 
Kechil and therefore, the emergence of oil refining industry in Singapore (Figure 14).  
Figure 14: Islanders with a Shell staff in 1958 (Hans’ photo collection) 
 
 
The sense of indebtedness towards Shell for being the provider of facilities is evident 
in Hans, Airah and Yat’s accounts. There were no grudges as Hans described Shell’s 
managing director being invited to the farewell party. They were one of the sponsors 
– which Hans understood as part of their corporate welfare duties to the islanders. 
Airah described Shell as generous, as compared with JTC with which she later had to 
deal with. For instance, Shell had included their trees for compensation unlike JTC. 
They were dependent on the compensation from Shell to facilitate their relocation from 
Bukom Kechil, after their land had been ‘taken away’. Yat, together with the rest of 
the residents from the other Southern Islands, would not have been able to attend 
secondary school without the free ferry to the mainland that Shell provided. Islanders 
were so used to the idea of Shell as the provider of facilities and basic needs that PAP 
had to clarify that the fresh water provided at Bukom Besar was paid by the Ministry 
of Development. PAP had asked Shell to allow nearby islanders access to water on 
Bukom Besar without limits and at any time (ST 25 September 1959, BH 28 March 




(Figure 15). When PAP first contested the Southern Islands ward in 1959, the 
candidate it fielded, Kum Teck Hock, was the president of the Shell Employees’ Union 
and vice-president of the Federation of Oil Workers Union in Singapore (ST 29 May 
1959). This was but one instance of the close relationship between capital and nation-
building as a state development project. 
Figure 15: Map showing residents with TOL and proposed development of land by 
Shell on Bukom Kechil in 1960 
 
 
Evidence of this close relationship between Shell and the PAP ran contrary to official 
accounts downplaying the economic contribution of oil to Singapore’s emerging 
economy (Ng 2012) as well as its role in the political development of Singapore had 
been neglected. The islanders previously identified as ‘inhabitants of the island’ (ST 9 
October 1952) who ‘had lived on the island for generations’ (BH 27 March 1958) thus 
became referred to as ‘residents of the Shell project’ (BH 31 December 1968). In short, 




involved the residents and PAP’s strong alliance with Shell constituted the third and 
most important mechanism that facilitated the waves of relocation on and from the 
Southern Islands. 
State ownership of land alone however is not sufficient, the property state is particular 
about its land use (Haila 2016). Firstly, there was a focus on expanding the oil industry 
from storage to refinery on the Southern Islands. Singapore did not have a refinery in 
1960 but by 1974, it had five, with a total capacity of about one million barrels per 
day: Esso on Pulau Ayer Chawan, Singapore Refining Company on Pulau Merlimau, 
Mobil Oil on Pulau Pesek, Shell on Bukom Besar and BP on Pasir Panjang. By the 
mid-1970s, Singapore became the world’s third largest refining centre after 
Amsterdam and Houston (Ng 2012). Once the oil majors were confirmed, each island 
was assigned a specific use to efficiently maximise its use value. Esso was persuaded 
to build its oil refinery on Ayer Cawan instead of Pulau Belakang Mati (present-day 
Sentosa) as Pulau Belakang Mati was slated to be developed into a recreational facility.  
Esso’s establishment of an oil refinery on Ayer Cawan allowed future expansion: as 
Hans’ biography illustrated, this was the start of industrial development as it led to the 
merging of seven offshore islands into Jurong Island in the 1990s. Hans, in his housing 
biography, constantly reminded his colleagues that Jurong Island, just like Bukom, 
was an amalgamation of multiple islands through extensive reclamation work and 
merging. PAP reclaimed all of the Southern Islands, which Hans had described in 
terms of its magnitude and speed. The Southern Islands were reclaimed, their history 
together with their land modified beyond recognition. Importantly, expansion of the 
oil industry was concentrated on the southern offshore islands and Pasir Panjang, 
populated mainly by the Malays. This meant that the successful oil development policy 
resettled the majority Malay area and resulted in the demise of Malay political power 
and resettlement of all the majority Malay residents on the Southern Islands, described 
as pecahan by Airah. Redevelopment of the Southern Islands that characterises the 
pecahan period highlights the racial dynamics at the heart of the construction of the 
property state, but pecahan also expresses how these dynamics were understood and 





Pecahan: Fragmentation and the making of the indigenous migrant-citizen  
Indeed the break-up suggested by the notion of pecahan not only designated 
fragmenting voting numbers within the constituency; it also entailed disrupting 
connections for the Malays and doing so on different levels – family, home, 
community, regions, culture. So, it is important to understand how the property state 
developed in tandem with the multiracial nation and particularly what this meant for 
the Malays and their lives. The common narratives of the property state’s development 
often do not take sufficient account of the impact it had on the majority Malay 
islanders. Development on Bukom and the bigger Southern Islands had meant pecahan 
in all its forms for Hans, Yat, and Airah. The pecahan of the Southern Islands due to 
the waves of resettlement in the 1960s becomes an important housing moment that not 
only marks the crystallisation of the property state, but also the successful constitution 
of the multiracial state. During the opening of the PAP branch office at Bukom Kechil 
in 1966, the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew highlighted he could have chosen to 
neglect the three Malay-majority areas, the Southern islands, Geylang Serai, and 
Kampong Kembangan – and he still won the election in 1963. However, it was 
‘important that the party worked hard for all sections of the community’(ST 4 April 
1966). In contrast, PAP’s future electoral successes could not be secured in Malay 
electoral strongholds as long as it had Malay-majority population and Malay-based 
parties. This was because PAP has never won more than 50% of the Malay vote, 
according to Lee Kuan Yew (ST 16 December 1986). Therefore, the Malay majority 
areas were redistributed, under the idea of a multiracial state.  
While concentrations of the Malays were seen as a potential political or social force, 
the islanders posed a more potent risk.  Their geographic proximity to other Malay 
majority nation-states with links to them and might have been seen as potentially 
threatening the integrity of the nation-state. The islanders were both geographically 
and socially located at the margins of the new nation. With separation, the political 
influence of the Singaporean Malays could no longer rely on their ethnic affiliation 




Malaysia and Indonesia. Chua argued that ‘the highest cost [of citizenship] is paid by 
the Malays, given Singapore’s geographical proximity to Malaysia and Indonesia, the 
contiguous ancestral homeland of all Malays’ (Chua 2003: 66). The cost here alludes 
to the separation or pecahan that Airah experiences from her home and fellow 
islanders. Not only were the islanders relocated from their island-home, but they were 
also fragmented across the mainland. Moving the islanders further away from other 
Malays in other countries, however, did not make them any less indigenous. 
The historical erasure of Nusantara61 as a Malay home functioned to render everyone 
in Singapore a migrant, especially the indigenous Malays. This was in line with 
Singapore’s characterisation of multiracialism as consisting of ‘separate but equal’ 
races. Resettling the islanders from their homes breaks Singapore’s chain to its Malay 
history. Home before the multiracial housing nation was the wider Nusantara that 
corresponds historically to the Indonesian and Malay sphere of influence. In a study 
by Nurliza Yusuf, her informant described the Malay Archipelago as ‘a big house’, 
where ‘the Malays in Singapore hanya tukar bilik dan bukan tukar rumah (are merely 
changing rooms and not changing houses)’ (1986: 5). This reflects their pan-Malay 
consciousness, specifically Singapore’s place in the Nusantara or Malay world. In 
addition, the history of Separation as ‘being kicked out of Malaysia’ participated in 
the replacement of a shared regional and Indigenous Malay identity between Malays 
in Singapore and Malaysia by postcolonial national identities (Chua 2003). The 
Malays in Singapore have even been referred to as a cultural diaspora, not least because 
of the Southern Islands, whose development had ravaged their only recently 
documented history. 
Despite its separate but equal multiracialism, migrants are valued according to their 
contribution to national development. Occupying the bottom socioeconomic strata of 
society, Malays feel a lack of ‘indigenous’ entitlement vis-à-vis their insufficient 
contribution to the nation. This potent mix effective slows the pace of Malay social 
 





inclusion and continues the Malay displacement. At the same time, resettlement was 
justified in terms of preventing Singapore from having Malay-Muslim deprived areas. 
Resettlement started in earnest after the riots in 1969. A decision had to be 
made on whether to resettle Malay Singaporeans into high-rise flats 
together, or to disperse them throughout the island. After months of soul-
searching, the conclusion was to disperse the Malays. The fear was that if 
they were resettled as a group, although they would be in a new town, after 
a while, this new town would become a new town version of Kampong 
Ubi or Geylang Serai or Kampong Kembangan. During an election when 
candidates hit that new town, they would know that they were in a Muslim 
area or Malay area. The danger was that the town might pervade a sense 
of deprivation because the shops would be poorer, the hawkers would be 
less wealthy and so on… The old guard leaders have no doubt today that 
they made the right decision then (Business Times 22 January 1988).  
I thus argue that resettlement was not just fragmenting the Malay ward but un-homing 
this indigenous community into the new unequal multiracial housing nation. It un-
homed the Malays on many levels, disrupting their links to the surrounding Malay 
region, island community, family, and culture. The second level of un-homing was 
Malay resettlement to the mainland, and to homeownership, which adversely affected 
the community and added new layers to the experience of un-homing, whilst 
reactivating past ones.  
Chua discusses the four socio-political consequences of homeownership which include 
proletarianisation, veiling inequalities, shoring up family, and extracting political 
support (2017: 82–6). I extend this to show the racialised and disparate impact of 
homeownership which reinforced the generational inequalities. Instead of extracting 
political support from residents, even before being rehoused on the mainland, Malay 
political support had already been significantly reduced. When asked why there was 
no resistance to Bukom Kechil’s resettlement, Hans replied that, ‘before PAP 
fragmented the Southern Islands constituency, they sent Ya’acob Mohamed to be an 
ambassador to other countries. So that there would no longer be a voice for the 
Malays’. They seem to trust and depend on Ya’acob to champion their issues. Ya’acob 
was however replaced by another MP, Othman Wok, who they regarded as not 




Second, Chua writes that, ‘for the first three decades of the public housing program 
only families were eligible to purchase new subsidised flats as the HDB (and the 
government) did not want to facilitate the break-up of families’ (2017: 84). In the case 
of the Southern Islands, families were broken up as various resettlements took place. 
The families on Bukom Kechil were broken up as they had to choose different 
locations due to their budget and preference to remain on the islands as much as they 
could. They did neither knew about nor expected to be resettled to the mainland 
eventually. In the case of Airah and Yat, their housing lives seem to show the extreme 
consequences as they ended up living alone. HDB also contributed to growing 
inequalities in the sense that ‘all towns and their residents are equally served without 
discrimination’ in each public housing estate, ‘which reduces the visibility of social 
and economic inequalities among the residents’ (Chua 2017: 83–4). My data further 
suggests that this fostered specifically racialised inequalities among the 
socioeconomically disadvantaged islanders, predominantly Malays, who were 
prepared neither emotionally nor financially for the new way of life and resettlement 
onto the mainland. Hans told me how he was sad because no one from Bukom Kechil 
was able to attain university education in the 1960s and 1970s. He saw how they 
struggled to eke out a living on the mainland with low educational attainment. 
The five housing Malay lives were caught in the interstices of the parallel development 
of the property state and the multiracial housing nation. The (re)development of 
Southern Islands shaped the multiracial nation-state in its early years. This meant 
Malays became a political minority and with this, the collective loss of identity 
rendered them a cultural diaspora. The subjectivating logics guiding the fragmentation 
of the Malay ward and polity or majoritarian nation-building might be most visible 
through how development was experienced as gotong royong and pecahan in different 
moments.  
In order to understand the Malay resettlement from the Southern Islands, we need to 
go further than noting the centrality of land control and land legislation in building the 
multiracial base of the housing nation, and explore the mechanisms at work in this 
resettlement. As I have shown, this involved harnessing Malay leadership and values, 




refining industry in the changing electoral context. These three mechanisms thus 
marked the beginnings of the formation of the property state-housing nation. At the 
same time, the waves of resettlement from Southern Islands show the beginnings of 
universal homeownership, something as being at the core of social democracy and 
anti-liberalism in Singapore. For the Southern Islanders, however the development of 
the property state-housing nation involved the indigenous question as the people to 
displace. These early experiences of un-homing through resettlement are echoed in 
some ways by new state relocations. And for those who have lived through both 
rehousing policies, these previous experiences only serve to innerve these more recent 
ones. In the following chapter, I look at other aspects of the property state-housing 
nation that contribute to variants of un-homing processes experienced by residents of 






Chapter 6 | Malay homeowners become property-
minded migrant-citizens 
As we saw in Chapter 4, Zee had identified the people with the ‘real housing problem’:  
As a matter of fact, if you really want a problem, talk to Rita (her sister) 
because she was from the interim housing rental flats. And frankly, if you 
are talking about problem, I am treated so well, they were not - those who 
get the interim flats […] The flats are really crappy. There are two toilets 
but one of it cannot work, the sink was clogged. As a matter of fact, Rita 
moved out. And it’s like a Malay ghetto. They call it a Malay ghetto. I 
know because those students come to me.  
This showed, for me, how the logics of social mobility and development continue to 
be intertwined with, if not intensified by, housing policies in Singapore. Discussing 
some of the issues that emerge in Zee’s and others’ housing biographies – especially 
the idea of relocation as beneficial for all and downgrading  – in this chapter, I explore 
several subjectivating logics prevalent in the SERS programme in Tanglin Halt, one 
of the first high-rise developments in Singapore. Exploring the relationship between 
upgrading as a PAP strategy for both political legitimacy and social engineering 
through homeownership, I show how these strategies of (re)development regarded as 
aspects of social democracy by the PAP, seem to result in disparate impact for 
Singapore’s different communities. 
Here, I show how land was redeveloped in Tanglin Halt whilst enveloped in a culture 
of property-mindedness. This fourth aspect of the property state is a result of the three 
dimensions of the property state discussed earlier – state ownership of land, mix of 
market and state, and fostering homeownership. For instance, despite being aware that 
homeownership did not guarantee exclusion from future state relocation in Singapore, 
Hans insists that Yat own a flat as a form of economic security. And when she had 
settled into her fully paid one-room flat in Tanglin Halt, she was relocated again by 
SERS. I then show how the fostering of property-mindedness on the mainland pushes 
Malays in Singapore to accept the ongoing ‘universalist’ relocation policy. We see 
hints of this in both Zee and Adi’s biographies, for instance, when they view SERS 




thus seems to result in a material and subjective struggle among Malay homeowners, 
a struggle which is in some ways similar to un-homing processes. And yet, seen as 
property-mindedness, their housing decisions are framed in terms that suggest agency, 
even when it appears to be stolen by ‘fate’. In addition, property-mindedness 
reinforced and naturalised racialised stratification in Singapore. As such, I argue that 
the culture of property-mindedness is linked to the broader discourse on housing as an 
infrastructure for social mobility, and as such, it functions to support relocation and 
the unequal socio-racial transformation of space. 
 
The political appeal of economic growth: Upgrading Tanglin Halt 
Yet this racialised dimension is not widely acknowledged. Zee, for instance, could not 
wait to move from her 3-room resale Tanglin Halt flat to a brand new 4-room flat 
through the SERS exercise. This was in line with the narrative characterising SERS as 
being well-received by residents. SERS had been launched by the Housing 
Development Board in the 1995 National Day Rally as part of the Estate Renewal 
Strategy (ERS). Estate rejuvenation had begun as a key emphasis of Singapore’s public 
housing policy in 1989. There was a shift in HDB’s aims (Goh 2005: 62) - from that 
of providing ‘the basic amenities for comfortable living’ espoused in 1970 by then 
minister E.W. Barker (HDB 1970: 3), the HDB’s mission in the 1990s was 
increasingly forward-looking and ambitious: to meet the ‘aspirations of an affluent 
society’ by providing ‘better quality homes’ and ‘a quality living environment’. 
SERS organises regular resident satisfaction surveys and these have registered 
continually high scores favourable to SERS. An HDB survey of 890 households 
affected by SERS in 2000 and 2001 found that 85% supported the scheme when it was 
first announced and 90% were in favour of it by the time they had moved into the 
replacement flats. The focus of official communications about SERS and relocation 
has been on older residents who are the least residentially mobile. According to Melvin 
Yong, Chairman of Tanjong Pagar Town Council: 
At Tanglin Halt where we have some of our oldest residential blocks, flat 




Redevelopment Scheme. Many chose to select the brand-new flats being 
built in the rejuvenated Dawson Estate62.  
A 74-year-old resident is depicted as favouring brand-new flats in rejuvenated estates, 
‘my neighbours and I are all really happy. Why wouldn’t you want a new flat’ (The 
Straits Times, 28 June 2014). And those who lament having to move are comforted by 
the fact that ‘at least we [long term neighbours] can all move together and won’t be 
alone’ (ibid.). The higher number of elderly residents, along with their long-term 
needs, were recognised in these estates. 
Unlike earlier resettlement policies, SERS is characterized as a form of relocation that 
is not disruptive. It is the proximity of the replacement flats to the old flats that allows 
the government to claim that no uprooting takes place (Figure 16). Great emphasis is 
placed on the state being highly selective of the area based on three main criteria: (i) 
high redevelopment value, (ii) availability of nearby vacant alternative site for 
replacement flats, and (iii) age of building (Ho et. al. 2009). The process is as follows: 
first, new 30 to 50-storey blocks are built on vacant sites in the vicinity, sold to the 
tenants or lessees of the flats targeted for demolition, and old flats are only demolished 
after the tenants have moved into the new flats. This is so that it would not disrupt their 
routines in the neighbourhood. Financially, residents are compensated at prevailing 
market prices for the old flats plus removal expenses. They are given priority in buying 
new 99-year lease or 30-year lease (for the elderly) replacement flats at a 20% discount 
in either nearby mature estates or other locations. Chua explains that few families that 
have been affected by SERS have protested due to these multiple benefits especially 
obtaining profit in cash and an absence of disruption to everyday life (2015: 32). 
However, outside of these state surveys, little has been written about how SERS has 
been experienced by the affected residents. Thus, this chapter seeks to tell this story, 
which is really a story of how redevelopment of Singapore’s property state continues 
to be experienced by Malay homeowners. 
 
62 “Tanjong Pagar Town Council Annual Report,” Tanjong Pagar Town Council, accessed January 16, 




Figure 16: The close proximity between the old and new replacement flats 
 
 
Adi regarded the redevelopment and upgrading of Tanglin Halt town as essential for 
economic growth and, equally importantly, as essential also for national survival – and 
this despite not being a beneficiary of these redevelopment policies. This is line with 
claims that Singapore’s physical built environment requires constant renewal, which 
Adi fully supported. The main difference between SERS and other ERS improvement 
programmes is its relocation of residents. SERS is justified on two grounds: ‘first is 
the need to optimize scarce land resources; second is the emphasis on providing a 
better housing environment than that from which the residents come’ (Wong 1985: 
56). The project’s first aim of intensifying development has to be placed in the context 




as one of Singapore’s most expensive resources, with space continually being at a 
premium. The government periodically makes projections of the size of the total 
population needed to sustain economic expansion. In 2001, it was announced that the 
population would increase, from 3.2 million to 5.5 million, and this was reached within 
a decade due to heavy immigration as the arrival of foreign labour had been facilitated 
since the mid-1970s. The projection was then revised in 2013 to an eventual population 
of 6.9 million by 2030. This under-estimation of population projections has been 
repeatedly raised by Liu Thai Ker, the former CEO of HDB and Chief Planner of URA, 
who called for a population projection of 10 million by 2100 (The Straits Times 2013; 
ChannelNewsAsia 2017). Singapore’s population density is the third highest in the 
world. In 2017, it had 7,796 people per km2, with an even higher urban built-up density 
of over 9,500 persons per km2  (Yuen and Yeh 2011: 135). Previously, the development 
intensity63 for residential development was measured in terms of density i.e. persons 
per hectare. In 1989, following the introduction of the new development charge 
system, a Gross Floor Area (GFA) concept was adopted to determine the development 
intensity of a building. All covered floor areas of a building if not otherwise exempted, 
and uncovered areas for commercial uses, are deemed the gross floor area of the 
building. In 2001, the land use plot ratio for the entire island was radically increased 
(Urban Redevelopment Authority 2001), potentially up to a multiple of three from 
existing density.  
All of this meant that the entire island was effectively rendered as being ‘under’ 
utilised and all existing settlements became targets for intensification of use and 
redevelopment (Chua 2015: 32). Therefore, in the context of persistent pressure on 
state planners to maximise the carrying capacity of every square inch of land especially 
the prime areas, SERS becomes an instrument by which low-density older flats are 
replaced by taller buildings with 4- and 5-room flats in order to achieve better yield of 
land. Zee explained that before they moved into Tanglin Halt, they knew that the area 
was involved in SERS because of the new 40-storey replacement flats being built. She 
 





commented the stark difference in height between the new and old 10-storey old blocks 
in Tanglin Halt. In short, relocation is viewed as necessary to accommodate anticipated 
population increases and more widely for economic growth. 
SERS’ second aim is to reinvigorate the older public housing estates by attracting 
younger residents and catering to the long-term needs of the residents, in particular the 
higher number of elderly residents in these estates. In 2014, the Minister of National 
Development assured that (ST 28 June 2014): 
With every new HDB town becoming more modern and better designed, 
there is a need to ensure that the older towns do not end up too far behind. 
They [affected households] will get a new modern flat with a fresh 99- 
year lease, with greenery on their doorstep, and panoramic views of the 
city and surrounding areas. I am sure they will find this attractive and 
exciting.  
In these upgrading schemes, mature housing estates saw improvement in common 
facilities such as the building of multi-storey carparks, landscaped gardens and 
playgrounds, as well as architectural enhancements to the façade and interior of flats 
with fixtures which were said to rival condominiums built by private developers. SERS 
is thus justified publicly in the language of revitalisation and redevelopment. 
Chua argues that SERS reflects the social democratic values of PAP. These 
redevelopment initiatives were based on the growing stock of ageing housing in the 
mature estates seen as needing a new lease on life. The earlier HDB estates had been 
designed to shelter the population and clear slums in a period of acute housing 
shortage, whereas SERS was set up to prevent older estates from degrading into slums 
in the bid to position Singapore as a global city (Li 2014). As a result, it was reported 
that younger generations were becoming reluctant to live on these estates, also due to 
increasing living standards (ibid.). More importantly, housing as an asset-based social 
security needed the government to maintain its value appreciation. To date, no HDB 
block in Singapore has lived until the end of its lease and while there is no clear 
government policy on this, SERS remain the only policy that has ensured this as it 
continues to be the only HDB programme that redevelops selected public housing 




will theoretically have no resale value (van Eggermond et al. 2018: 16). And HDB in 
Singapore represents economic security.  
We might see this, for instance Hans’ insistence that Yat own a flat, despite the limits 
of homeownership. At the 2018 National Day rally, the Prime Minister promised to 
gradually upgrade all estates in Singapore. There is also now a spin off to SERS, called 
Voluntary Early Redevelopment Scheme or VERS. Instead of the areas being selected 
for redevelopment, residents can now vote for their estates to be relocated. As the need 
to upgrade and redevelop the older estates will take on greater urgency, this is not 
surprising - especially since one third of the flats in Singapore were built before the 
1980s (Seek et al. 2016: 44). Similarly, Phang (2013) notes HDB’s ongoing 
modernisation of older estates and SERS will become even more important then, 
because in cities of developed countries, new construction of housing is a small 
percentage of existing stock and comprises mostly high-quality housing.  
Even whilst SERS is said to illustrate these social democratic strategies, it has been 
seen as politically motivated. The upgrading of older estates has also been used 
astutely as a political tool to garner votes for the ruling party during elections, 
prompting political commentators to term SERS as a form of ‘pork barrel’ politics 
(Pow 2013: 50). Only Singaporean citizens are entitled to upgrading subsidies, while 
no political opposition areas have been selected for SERS. Furthermore, SERS’ 
benefits are tied to the status of homeowners and citizenship. There are also households 
that are not given any grants, such as: 
1) Singapore permanent resident households,  
2) households with more than one flat bought from the HDB or enjoyed a CPF 
Housing Grant and bought at least one flat directly from the HDB, and  
3) households that owned a private property bought before the SERS 
announcement.  
The size and type of new flat that the owners are eligible to buy are also important. 
Owners with a non-citizen spouse, such as Nadiah whose husband is a permanent 




citizen households, such as Yat’s, have a $15,000 grant but can only buy up to a new 
3-room flat or the same flat type as the SERS flat, whichever is bigger. Therefore, the 
effective use of upgrading to appeal to voters can be seen through SERS. Upgrading 
Tanglin Halt is discussed as both universal and inclusive progress in terms of better 
living environment for all residents affected.  
 
Sustaining the property state, shuffling its core 
Apart from being politically driven, SERS can be seen as a mechanism for social 
engineering of sorts. Contrary to the ideology of upgrading, I suggest that there is only 
relative mobility where the last tier remains unchanged, and for some, left behind. This 
would refer to residents who are pressured to relocate earlier at a loss. With SERS, Adi 
plans to further downgrade and he faces stigma for having to incessantly do so, 
especially in the same area. Yet, despite actually downgrading, for Adi, SERS did not 
feel like a downgrade because he would soon not need that extra space as his daughter 
would get married and he would live on his own. As Adi’s housing biography 
suggested, he had already taken his first ‘downgrade’ philosophically and had 
explained that a smaller house was easier for him to manage and that even that smaller 
house maintained maximum comfort and privacy.  
According to real estate agents I interviewed, there were three categories of SERS 
residents and Adi falls into the second. First, most of the residents in the area would 
move into flats of the same type i.e. from a 3-room to a 3-room replacement flat rather 
than ‘upgrading’ to bigger flats. They added that the costing is such that a new 
replacement flat with same number of rooms is just about affordable but to upgrade to 
a larger flat was expensive. The difference between better-off and poorer residents is 
that the poorer will either downgrade to a smaller flat or get a flat on the lower floors. 
This constitutes the second group of residents. Finally, there are residents who opt to 
move out of the area early - usually the elderly who cannot wait five more years, 
households who have already bought a BTO flat earlier, divorce cases, or those in 
financial circumstances that require cash fast. Loh notes that many elderly persons 




(2009:410). They are then replaced by new residents, who are usually young couples 
with a shared income of more than S$12,000 per month, and who either want to be 
near their family or it becomes as a form of investment so that they can sell the 
replacement flats five years later for profit. They can also be households who maxed 
out their opportunities to buy a brand new flat. 
With housing blocks of rental and purchased flats between 4 and 12 stories, SERS only 
involves selected housing estates in the city and in its immediate vicinity, which were 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s. The majority of the SERS sites are located in older 
new towns such as Queenstown and Bukit Merah. They are clustered along the 
expressway to the central city. As such, they enjoy proximity to the city centre as they 
were built in the early stages of urban sprawl (Wang 2012: 373). With the assumption 
that the sizes of flats indicate the income levels of neighbourhood homeowners, the 
diversification of flats effectively redistributes the concentration of elderly and the 
low-income in its central areas, bringing in higher income, younger families through 
rehousing policies. This could be viewed as a form on social engineering, using the 
number of rooms in a flat to direct population flow. While the trend of younger families 
moving out of older HDB towns as they were allocated new flats in outlying new towns 
predominates, the younger families attracted to SERS sites would be those with high 
incomes. In other words, SERS prevent slums by replacing smaller flats with different 
sized flats, as the majority rebuilt in the estate are of bigger size. HDB has shifted from 
making sure flats remain affordable to catering to the needs of class-conscious 
homeowners and producing demand for bigger flats in terms of rooms. In short, SERS 
as a whole was altogether a programme envisioned by the young to benefit the young 
(Loh 2009: 410).  
These upgrading exercises in many of Singapore’s HDB estates signal a change in the 
function of public housing in order to position itself as a global city. They are part of 
a larger entwined process of social transformation in terms of housing policy, class 
and social mobility, governance and community value systems (Goh 2001). The global 
city does not tolerate urban marginality in the centre. Thus, SERS can be seen as a 
correcting mechanism to address the socio-spatial implications and the embodiment of 




effectively functions to reshape the class composition of the selected area. There is a 
need to redistribute the concentration of elderly and low-income residents, even if only 
two blocks away, and through the ideology of mixed flats. SERS’ aim is not to displace 
these communities out of the estate but rather to disseminate them. For this reason, 
then, for Tanglin Halt, SERS provided five replacement sites which would result in 
more varied relocation trajectories. 
Secondly, they were also typically flats with lesser number of rooms. What is 
important is that all of the residential units in Tanglin Halt Estate before SERS were 
majority 2- and 3-room public housing flats. A typical block would have 70% 3-room 
flats, 20% 2-room flats and three 4-room flats (where the owner bought 2 adjacent 2-
room flats). With the residents affected by the policy not given the option of remaining 
in their current flats, SERS becomes the only program responsible for targeting and 
demolishing flats with a smaller number of rooms, and the replacement units offered 
are chiefly more expensive flats with more rooms. With the first SERS exercise then, 
the number of 2- and 3-room flats decreased in the subzone and was replaced with a 
steadily increasing number of 4- and 5-room flats. This has resulted in the range of 
proposed housing types being enlarged, but it has also resulted in the proportion of 
flats with a smaller number of rooms being reduced. Thus, there has been a reduction 
of smaller flats across the city state, especially in the prime areas. The most significant 
effect of this, for the purposes of my argument, is that affordable housing units for low 
and middle-income households - most notably Malays - have declined together with 
residential mobility options.  
The government’s concern thus lies not only with accommodating an increasing 
population on a fixed amount of land, but with the distribution of its population. 
Especially near prime areas, the concern is also to socially balance the area. In other 
words, to spatially integrate different classes in the area. These gradually deteriorating 
estates had a high concentration of lower income and ageing populations (Joo and 
Wong 2008:143). The high concentration of elderly residents in the area also meant an 
increase in social issues. Jane, a real estate agent who find renters for residents in the 
Tanglin Halt area, described a normal encounter of the elderly often cared by maids, 




elderly man in a hospital bed with a maid whilst the children did not regularly visit. 
While housing contributes to the invisibility of the poor and elderly as flats function 
to contain these kinds of social problems, a concentration of flats with fewer rooms is 
hard to conceal in the prime areas. In the context of Tanglin Halt, these flats would be 
located next door to development of the world-class facility named One-north, a 200-
hectacre development strategically positioned in the heart of Singapore to host a cluster 
of world-class research facilities and business park space64. ‘Clearing up’ the rundown 
old town thus took on greater urgency. The presence of a town in need of upgrading 
next door to a world-class facility was not only regarded as unappealing, it would 
discredit the reputation of a world-class Singapore especially when one who prided 
itself as a model for public housing.  
At the same time, it had also been highlighted that such asset enhancement in older 
towns can be seen as a capital reinvestment measure (Chua 2015: 32). As the newer 
blocks of flats are usually higher and contain more flats, the HDB also has surplus 
units to sell after accounting for households in the old block. With SERS ‘solving’ the 
problem of declining value of flats with progressively shortening leases in old estates 
(ibid.), it highlights SERS’ role in a systematic updating of precincts (Goh 2001: 
1593). Less about the quality of housing, SERS allows regeneration of housing, 
neighbourhoods and towns through the renewal of housing loans and smaller homes. 
The government valuation of HDB land sold between the government bodies are 
internal, which means the information on HDB land price will never be released. It is 
only when the HDB land is sold by the government to top developers that the numbers 
would be made available on HDB website. Nevertheless, the capital continues to 
circulate among the government institutions.  
In short, upgrading is actually for select residents where Goh notes that HDB has 
reconfigured some of its policies to foster upward mobility particularly among its 
higher-income clientele (2001:1593). Lehmann notes that SERS has significant 
disadvantages for social sustainability in that residents have to be resettled and existing 
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community ties, which developed and evolved over decades, are destroyed and lost 
forever (2011: 167). This would apply to the elderly who has lived in the estate for a 
long time. Loh describes SERS in this respect as ‘an updated version’ of the 
government’s compulsory acquisition of land for development in the 1960s. This is 
based on the analogy used by the-then Minister for National Development, Lim Hng 
Kiang, in explaining the need to carry out this relentless pursuit of modernity in the 
name of progress: ‘adjust we must. If we had not adjusted to the redevelopment 
programme for farmers and squatters, we would not have been able to build modern 
Singapore’ (cited in Loh 2009: 410).  
Therefore, as we can see, the way SERS is implemented effectively redistributes the 
elderly and low-income residents to lessen their concentration in prime areas. The 
outcome of which seems to be a social engineering mechanism, which is spatially 
reallocating target populations, seems to be somewhat similar to the earlier 
resettlement policies, despite SERS’ distinct characterisation as a non-disruptive 
relocation policy. By enticing high income young residents into these areas with its 
multiple benefits, SERS is different in that it ‘dilutes’ social problems in the area, 
perceived to be caused by problematic resident communities. This constitutes shuffling 
the core – where different residents are ‘pushed’ and ‘pulled’ into the area depending 
on their age and social class. And in Singapore’s case, this rearrangement has become 
a way to sustain the property state.  
 
From homeownership to property-mindedness 
Relocation was not new to all of my protagonists and as Hans puts it, they ‘cannot 
escape from evictions in Singapore’. Living in Singapore means getting accustomed 
to the house-moving culture. For Hans, Yat’s present involvement with SERS in 
Tanglin Halt showed the limits of homeownership in Singapore. Recall that even if 
Yat had not moved to Tanglin Halt, she would still be affected by SERS in their Teban 
Gardens family home. The only difference was that Yat informs me that the islanders 
from Bukom Kechil were the pioneer residents in Tanglin Halt, Queenstown. 




crystallised from the extensive rehousing schemes across the nation-state continues to 
sustain itself through a singular official rehousing policy repackaged as an urban 
redevelopment scheme - SERS. In addition, we see how SERS illustrates the fourth 
dimension of the property state: property-mindedness emerges in the interplay of three 
earlier discussed dimensions - state ownership of land, the mix of market dynamics 
and state intervention, and fostering homeownership. 
Speaking the language of (property) development 
One of the main reasons why Zee bought a flat in Tanglin Halt was due to the value 
attached to the housing units identified for SERS. One of the real estate agents 
described the replacement flats as ‘the golden egg’ because the flats were located in a 
hotspot area – District 10 – which would only increase in value. It was no longer about 
owning flats but purchasing a subsequent brand new flat. The most valued SERS 
‘privilege’ is a new flat. This is a result of the HDB public housing rules that limits 
every citizen to the purchase of two subsidised new flats, described as ‘two bites of 
the cherry’. Secondly, to get new flats one has to go through the BTO application. The 
BTO system requires a waiting period of three to four years. Eligible buyers who want 
to shift into a new HDB apartment have to apply for units in their preferred location at 
specific sites. Tender for construction will be called only when 65-70% of the 
apartments in a specific contract have been booked. SERS thus becomes viewed as an 
opportunity to move into a new flat quickly for those who have maxed out their ‘new 
flat’ quota.  
This results in continuous speculation around which areas will be redeveloped under 
SERS. Educational websites offer everyday people instructions for how to speculate 
SERS sites. Speculation is done by residents: not just real estate agents but everyday 
people. And there are real estate agents who act upon this speculation. April, a resident 
who was also a real estate agent, bought her flat earlier in anticipation of SERS. She 
added that the replacement flats are in a prime location because ‘that is where all the 
embassies are’. As a result of SERS, older blocks in ‘favourable areas’ in Singapore 
become preferred by the property-minded. The reasons are various – the flats are more 




chance of being considered for redevelopment under SERS (van Eggermond, Erath 
and Axhausen 2018:16).  
Nadiah, a 2-room flat owner in Tanglin Halt, noted that before SERS the selling price 
was $300,000. With SERS, it was $340,000 and $70,000 more than the price she paid 
for her flat. Once SERS is announced in an area, the value of the flats increases, and 
newspaper reports portray SERS flats in Tanglin Halt as selling well. Headlines are 
indicative of this: ‘Resale market for Tanglin Halt hotting up’ (i.e. becoming buoyant), 
‘Buyers paying premium for Tanglin Halt SERS flats’ ‘More than 60 Tanglin Halt 
SERS flats sold’. It was reported that ‘Tanglin Halt flats marked for redevelopment 
are fetching premiums in the resale market, as buyers look forward to new replacement 
flats in nearby Dawson estate’65. It was also reported that more than half of the 61 
resale units transacted over the eight months since the SERS announcement were 
above valuation. The narrative was that there was a long line of people who wanted 
the replacement flats at Dawson, which are hard to get. SERS’ benefits however 
extended to residents who do not move into the replacement flats as the compensation 
alone is seen as a windfall.  
The second claim in the news reports revolved around the financial incentives to sell 
the SERS flats. The average cash-over-valuation was S$25,000 for 2-room flats, and 
about S$50,000 for 3-room flats (Channel NewsAsia, 2015). It was highlighted that 
while 2-room units selling price were comparable to HDB’s estimated compensation, 
3-room units were markedly more. 2-room units have been sold for $280,000 to 
$323,000 on the open market, similar to HDB's estimated compensation of $283,000 
to $309,000 for 2-room units (43-64m2). In contrast, 3-room units had been sold higher 
than HDB’s estimated compensation of S$340,000 to S$406,000, namely fetching 
prices from S$350,000 to S$440,000. Premiums for SERS flats sold on the open 
market represented a profit over HDB’s estimated valuation, which thus encouraged 
such sales of larger flats. Despite mentioning that premiums for Tanglin Halt were 
 







lower than in previous SERS areas, these reports continued to present SERS flats as a 
coveted flat to own, both to buy or to sell. This is especially due to the incentive of 
getting replacement flats in a good central location with well-developed amenities at 
subsidised price within a shorter duration. How did the language fare with my affected 
respondents?  
Zee and Nadiah were satisfied with their valuation prices. Nadiah added that the 
valuation price was the price she had asked for and higher than the value quoted from 
the brochures given by the government. She said that the ‘valuation price’ quoted by 
the government is higher than the market prices. While the level of compensation may 
be subject to negotiation, the right to repossession is not (Chua 2015). Even then, 
Nadiah was informed by a SERS officer there have not been any successful 
compensation appeals to date. Similarly, the decision to redevelop, which lies with the 
Ministry of National Development, is not subject to voting (Teo and Kong 1997: 446). 
As the landowner, the state reserves the right to repossess the land by compensating 
the leaseholders.  
As homeowners, SERS residents are aware they are leaseholders, that the land on 
which their 99-year lease flats are built remained state land. Therefore, they try to 
maximise the options they have in SERS. An example of such calculation is provided 
by Zee’s well thought-out decisions to opt out from the designated SERS replacement 
sites, to agree to the competitive market valuation for her flat, and thus to maximise 
her purchase of a resale flat through SERS. In summary, SERS is justified in terms of 
the prevailing property-minded culture in Singapore. It encourages relocation in the 
property state, which no longer becomes about homes but rather focuses instead on 
transactions and getting a good deal. Therefore, as we can see, both residents and real 
estate agents adopted in the language of development as soon as SERS was announced 
in Tanglin Halt. This meant navigating the numerous housing rules and maximising 
the SERS benefits – which are in turn determined by the resident’s status, such as type 
of homeowner i.e. number of times purchasing a subsidised flat from HDB, type of 




Homeowners graduated to being property-minded as soon as they conversed in the 
language of the developer - making the best housing decision they could. While SERS 
may not be the only factor converting homeowners to property-mindedness, SERS had 
definitely pushed the affected homeowners into that cognitive frame. And perhaps 
those residents who were unable to understand the language of developers would be 
the hardest hit by the relocation. Despite Zee’s assurance that everyone would be 
‘taken care of’, Nani’s situation showed there were still residents unaware of being 
able to ballot together with their neighbours or parents. Her ‘error’ was a cause of 
concern because there was a high chance that they would not be able to live near each 
other. Their balloting dates were two months apart. The reason she moved to Tanglin 
Halt was to live near her parents and look after them. Being well-informed and fighting 
for one’s interests thus matters crucially to avoid being penalised in the property state. 
In summary, property-mindedness seemed to be a necessary trait for all homeowners, 
especially those affected by SERS, failing which there would be a price to be paid in 
the property state.  
Real estate agents, agents of relocation 
PAP’s ability to move people into the mindset of the developer is assisted by real estate 
agents, who act almost as property-mindedness coaches. It was Zee’s real estate agent 
that led her to Tanglin Halt. And property-mindedness was further cultivated as her 
real estate agent encouraged her to sublet her flat before moving in due to the attractive 
rates. The list of real estate agents selling flats in Tanglin Halt was extensive, with 
some specializing in SERS-affected areas and handling three to six units 
simultaneously. There were 80 flats advertised, an average of three flats per block: 
16% were 2-room flats, 80% were 3-room flats, and 3 were 4-room flats. Residents 
who want to sell their flats on the open market were first asked by the real estate agents:  
(i) the size of flat i.e. number of rooms, (ii) where the resident would be staying next,  
(iii) the seller’s benefit i.e. upgrade to 4 or 5 room flat and $30k grant, and  
(iv) if the resident had stayed more than five years, the minimum occupancy period 
before being able to sell or sublet the flat. These questions are posed because the 
answers will determine the type and price of replacement flats to which they are 




Even after all the SERS-affected households were informed of their compensation 
valuations by SERS officers at a later stage, real estate agents continued to ask people 
to sell their flats. They went door to door explaining to residents the financial 
incentives involved in selling their flats in the market. The renewed sales pitch was to 
sell while they still had time. Residents would not be able to sell their flats after 31 
August 2015, after which they would be ‘tied down’ to the HDB flat for the next 12 
years. This included the construction time and the period during which one is barred 
from reselling when buying a new flat. Real estate agents sought to encourage SERS 
residents to sell their flats rather than move into the replacement flats. In short, SERS 
had in a way revitalised the area, even before its redevelopment. And the 
announcement of SERS in the neighbourhood had given these flats not just a new lease 
on life but even increased their value. Yet despite its appearances of fostering 
instrumental rationality for all, SERS did leave many behind, along the prevailing class 
and race hierarchy. 
Un-homing ambivalences  
More specifically, SERS, which Zee saw as giving housing privileges, had 
inadvertently created ‘Malay ghettos’. Teo notes that (2018: 63): 
While rental flats for low-income persons in Singapore are not ghettoized 
spaces in the extreme ways that low-income housing often is in other cities 
and there is the absence of slums… these spaces place them outside of 
norms.  
The state had utilised the vacated SERS flats that were pending demolition for Interim 
Rental Housing (IRH) programme. This can be seen to be at odds with SERS’ aims of 
revitalising the area. The reason for upgrading the area was based on the fear that it 
will deteriorate further. As observed by Zee, these flats are deemed uninhabitable not 
only because they lack basic working facilities such as toilets but also due to the 
absence of 	 ‘comfort,	 privacy	 and	 control	 over	 their	 lives’	 (Teo	 2016:	 574).	 This	 is	
because	the	scheme	that	aims	to	make	housing	affordable	requires	families	to	co-share	
the	flat	with	another	unrelated	household	to	reduce	the	rental	costs.	Families	on	the	IRHS	
were	made	‘to	be	worse	off	than	families	on	the Public Rental Scheme who do not have 




precarious nature and sense of instability, in that a family would be required to move 
to another flat at another IRH site once the blocks are to be demolished.  
There have been families however that have stayed in IRH for close to five years. The 
average stay at different IRH sites ranged from 16 to 21 months. This is reflected in 
the contracted rental period of the IRHS flats, which began with six months and has 
since been amended to two years66. Finally, the precarity isn’t only temporal, but 
material: these ‘Malay ghettos’ have been described as ‘ghost towns’ where an absence 
of neighbourhood facilities has rendered it an unsafe environment (Goh and Chang 
2018: 87). I recall how Hans experienced the same when they were the last to relocate 
from Semakau. The only difference was that they were waiting to leave their old homes 
for new ones, whereas IRH presented temporary homes that may become permanent. 
As a result, IRH are considered unhomely, or not homes in the traditional sense (Goh 
and Chang 2018: 88): 
The roots of their unhomeliness can be traced to the fundamental 
perception of home as a unit of a cohesive community, derived from the 
traditional HDB environment in which most of them previously resided.  
If SERS seems to encourage homeowners to become property-minded, the arguably 
un-homing effect of IRH pushes IRH residents to not only become homeowners but 
also property-minded. Their passion for real estate begins with navigating the existing 
policies, such as the recently introduced Fresh Start Housing Scheme67, and subsidies 
available to them. In other words, property-mindedness springs from plans of how to 
afford a mortgage with their low income in the future. Despite concerns over 
concentrations of racial communities, a housing scheme designed to provide 
temporary accommodation to those in need had resulted in a concentration of Malays 
 
66 “Getting IRH to work better,” Khaw Boon Wan, accessed September 16, 
2020, https://mndsingapore.wordpress.com/2011/12/30/getting-irh-to-work-better/. 
67 The scheme aims to help second-timer families with young children residing in public rental flats to 
own flats through financial assistance and social support. “Fresh start housing scheme,” Housing and 







in deprived housing areas. Nevertheless, this suggests that the property state-housing 
nation is free from neither homeless families nor ‘ghettos’. Racial disparities remain 
entrenched, in spite of its upgrading initiatives and social mobility discourse.  
Although she liked SERS and the way it was implemented, Zee refused to move into 
Dawson, the designated replacement area, as she felt that it did not suit her lifestyle. 
She associated Dawson, due to its physical proximity, with Holland’s expatriate 
community and the Orchard shopping district’s line of luxurious shopping malls. Not 
only were these areas expensive, but Zee would not be able to find the type of clothing, 
food and most importantly, the community she identifies with. Being property-minded 
thus means knowing the area of relocation well in terms of the community and 
lifestyle, which is tied to affordability. As a Malay, she did not feel at home in Dawson 
and this is reflected in the distribution of Malays in Singapore. In order to facilitate 
urban planning, Singapore is divided into planning regions, planning areas and 
subzones. There are 5 planning regions which include central, west, north, north-east 
and east – each spanning a mix of residential, commercial, business and recreational 
areas as well as containing a population of more than 500,000. These planning regions 
in turn are divided into 55 planning areas, where each planning area has a population 
of about 150,000, served by a town centre and several neighbourhood commercial or 
shopping centres. Dawson is located in the planning area of Queenstown, within the 
central region. Figure 17 shows the planning areas wherein most of the population 
resides. A comparison with Figure 18, which shows the distribution of Malays in 
Singapore, will highlight that there are very few Malays residing in Queenstown. 
However, Figure 19, which shows the distribution of Malays according to subzones, 
would suggest that Malays are generally absent from the central region of Singapore.68  
Figure 17: Population distribution in Singapore by planning areas (OneMap.sg) 
 
 





Figure 17: Population distribution in Singapore by planning areas (OneMap.sg) 
 





Figure 19: Distribution of Malays in Singapore by subzones (OneMap.sg) 
 
 
Referring back to Figure 18, there are only two planning areas in the Central region 
which report a significant number of Malays residing in the area. The first is Bukit 
Merah which is a mature area at the city centre’s fringe, with the highest number of 
rental housing (Table 369). This means that these are the only working-class residents 
left in the city centre, where the upper classes dominate. I acknowledge that these are 
absolute counts, not percentages or proportions, with limitations that this implies, these 










Table 3: Number of rental flats according to area (HDB) 
 
 
Second is the Southern Islands planning area, comprised of Kusu Island, Lazarus 
Island, Pulau Seringat, Pulau Tekukor, Saint John's Island, Sentosa and the two Sisters’ 
Islands. Here there are 10 Malay men and 20 women. This is not to be confused with 
the Southern Islands constituency discussed in Chapter 5, which is now referred to as 
the Western Islands planning area and includes Bukom and Semakau (Figure 20).  
In summary, Malays seem to be absent from the central region. They are only present 
in areas in the central region that can be said to be less developed such as the offshore 
Southern Islands and in the old neighbourhood of Bukit Merah that has the highest 
number of renters. Zee herself has opted to move out of the central region based on 
her sense of elective belonging. Therefore, we can see how SERS and the surrounding 
developments in the central region contribute to processes of un-homing Malays such 
as Zee. And this is reflected in the spatial distribution of Malays across the housing 
nation. Though subtle in its mechanisms, the distribution of Malay homes thus reflects 
the other side of property-mindedness, the maintenance of the social and racial 




Figure 20: Western Islands and Southern Islands planning areas (OneMap.sg) 
 
 
Housing (as) social mobility, or, becoming the property-minded migrant-citizen  
Despite downgrading, Adi had regarded himself more fortunate than being a Malay 
living in Singapore, compared to other Malay majority countries. Zee, on the other 
hand, was prepared to live in another country in order to afford a bigger house. Yet, 
she conceded to living in Singapore and considered herself privileged in comparison 
to the interim rental dwellers who were mostly Malays. Both Zee and Adi employ a 
racialised understanding in accepting the lack of affordability in housing. This was 
consistent throughout their narrations of their housing lives. For instance, Zee justified 
selecting a less expensive floor as being a ‘Malay’ preference of living on the ground. 
Due to the high-rise flats, it is hard to get the ground floors. The only people with 
gardens are private housing residents, a group including very few Malays. Adi 
accepted the prevalent state relocation as indirectly contributing to the economy in 
order to prevent increased unemployment for his fellow citizens. It was important for 




justifying his downgrade, he regarded his self-reliance as a Chinese trait that 
contributed to the success of Singapore. These Malay versions of property-
mindedness, together with their justifications of revitalisation, differ from those 
discussed by Haila (2016), such as investing in multiple homes to get passive income. 
For both Adi and Zee these forms of property-mindedness are born out of necessity.  
Both, however welcome SERS because of the subjectivating logic of (re)housing 
which lies in its social mobility discourse. Relocation is framed as universal social 
mobility, advancement for everyone. In other words, they view SERS through what is 
in effect a subjectivating logic of social mobility. This is the logic that they internalise 
and, in any case, have to live by since they experience social mobility, development 
and self-reliance through housing. With housing policy as text, social mobility, 
development and self-reliance become subtext. This is appealing for those in the lower 
socioeconomic strata. (Re)housing allows them to feel better about their lives and this 
in turn is experienced as a form of agency.  
Property-mindedness becomes a powerful tool; it speaks of agency, it is the residents’ 
own choice to live in the flat. It means that the state did not force them, instead as in 
the case of SERS, state evictions are seen as helping, as offering them more choices. 
And these are not just choices of affordability but also of aspiration, because while 
poverty impacts affordability, it sustains and sometimes even encourages 
aspirations.  While they might not be able to choose to stay for instance, they can 
choose where to be relocated. It perhaps speaks of ‘shared’ power, where they can at 
least partially control their housing destiny. The idea here is that when people choose, 
they are able to choose better in terms of what works for them. Therefore, property-
mindedness complete the imagery of homes of choice. Still, Zee’s turning to fate 
shows how these choices are always structured and constrained.  
Under the neutral policy language of revitalisation and housing, however, lies a 
disparate, racialised impact. This is evident in the different ways in which the language 
and policy thrust of SERS universalist policy was experienced by the Malays. In other 
words, the SERS policy has been in effect a form of capitalist nation-building, 




accounts presenting SERS flats as highly sought after in the wider context of 
Singapore’s upgrading culture, sellers outnumber buyers, as the former prefer 5-room 
replacement flats70. The general trend among flat owners in Tanglin Halt is to move 
into the designated replacement flats: Only 1.8% of 3480 units have been successfully 
sold71. In addition, these units did not necessarily fetch high prices because according 
to real estate agents, owners sold their flats only if they needed to. These owners 
included elderly residents who already had plans to move in with their children or 
downgrade to smaller units, owners who were getting divorced and those who already 
had BTO flats waiting for them.   
Through reinvigorating the housing estate, HDB houses residents according to class, 
and with rehousing policies, sharpens the distinction between the housing classes. 
From housing people onto mainland Singapore and creating a class of homeowners, 
housing policies subsequently began to create classes of homes and homeowners, with 
rehousing policies reaffirming and sharpening the distinction between classes of 
housing. The redevelopment aims together with the culture of property-mindedness 
continue to deflect the disparate, racialised effects of relocation in the urban centres. 
Although the neutral discourse of revitalisation frames SERS as universalist in its 
application i.e. SERS applies to everyone who has flats in the area, it nevertheless has 
a disparate impact in the way SERS is experienced. I argue that there is an unintended 
racializing effect because it impacts certain communities more than others. It has a 
disproportionate impact on the elderly community and low-income residents, with 
Malays disproportionately represented in both these groups. It is not only that the 
(re)organization of housing in Singapore is effectuated through the current relocation 
policy of SERS; but it also sustains the housing hierarchy which is in turn coterminous 
with the ethnic hierarchy. SERS had inadvertently created Malay ghettos when the 
government used these unoccupied SERS flats for the IRH (Interim Rental Housing) 
policy, in complete apparent contrast with the SERS aim of revitalising the area. 
However, in a context of naturalisation of racial inequalities, such gap did not appear 
 
70 Or so said the real estate agents specialising in the SERS market whom I interviewed, anyway. 
71 Janice Heng, “Resale market for Tanglin Halt hotting up,” The Straits Times, August 26, 





as a limitation or failure of the programme. Nor does the ideology of the housing ladder 
allow for any notice to be taken of the highly unequal social and personal cost of 
property-mindedness for interim rental residents aspiring to become homeowners, 
eager to take on mortgage loans for perhaps the rest of their lives. Thus, SERS has 
been shown to be a core mechanism of the property state, stridently advertising 
homeownership as a stake in the Singaporean success story, open to all, whilst quietly 
maintaining the social and racial housing hierarchy, without which the meritocratic 









Chapter 7 | Unknowing my world-class home 
My thesis has offered an account of the Malays’ lived housing experience in world-
class Singapore. We saw in Chapter 4 how they were confronted by resettlement and 
relocation and what these experiences meant to them. I tried to show the multifaceted 
ways of experiencing (re)housing through the different embodied housing 
subjectivities. These subject positions in turn illustrated how Malays traverse the 
housing landscape lined with difficulties and options. At the same time, I also showed 
how these subjectivities highlighted the different ways Malays experienced un-
homing. Together, their stories showed the lasting effects of state housing policies and 
how Malays respond with constrained agency. I argued that Malays experienced 
longitudinal displacement as seen in their housing lives, beginning with Separation in 
1965. The experience of displacement continued even when they were no longer 
resettled or relocated as symbolic and phenomenological displacement set in. Not 
being able to identify with their present home and the wider nation-state would bring 
about a sense of dislocation, as would the fact that they are unable to return to their 
former homes where they lived most of their lives or during their growing years, some 
of which had disappeared under infrastructure, all in the name of economic 
development.  
Chapter 5 then described the early resettlement policies in the Southern Islands and 
the kinds of relationships and values that were enacted there to shape the majority 
Malays’ housing decisions and lives. I argued that the resettlement of the Southern 
Islanders resulted in them becoming indigenous migrant-citizens on the mainland and 
I highlighted three key mechanisms for this. First, I showed how gotong royong or 
communal spirit was used by the multiracial PAP in developing the Southern Islands 
to gain the residents’ trust. These constituted the beginnings of the subjectivating 
logics of social mobility and development, which were experienced in connection with 
housing policies in the Southern Islands. I then showed how the state ownership of 
land turned the residents’ island home into a temporary dwelling place. Finally, the 
resettlement of the Southern Islanders hinged upon the close relationship between 




of Singapore’s property state were developed. I argued that more than just 
disintegrating the Malay stronghold, which was experienced as pecahan or 
fragmentation, the resettlement of the Malays from the Southern Islands contributed 
to un-homing processes that were key to constructing them as the indigenous migrant-
citizens.  
Chapter 6 explored how the Malay homeowners make their ways as property-minded 
migrant-citizens in their relocated spaces – homes and neighbourhoods. I argued that 
these upgrading exercises become a means of social engineering. I showed how the 
property state sustains itself by shuffling its core, namely its central planning region, 
in terms of diversifying the social classes. The property state cultivates property-
mindedness among homeowners in Tanglin Halt by firstly, normalising the language 
of property development. Secondly, the real estate agents play a crucial role in 
fostering property-mindedness, through recruitment and a form of coaching of 
residents aspiring to participate in the programme. Overall, I found that SERS is 
upholding a universalist version of homeownership and generalised property-
mindedness by masking structural and class-based inequalities. Similar to the early 
resettlement policies in the Southern Islands, SERS in Tanglin Halt resulted in 
ambivalence among the Malays in their outcomes and experience of the un-homing 
process. The culture of property-mindedness, located in the bigger discourse of 
housing as social mobility, however conceals the disparate impact caused by SERS, 
including the continuous concentration of Malays in uninhabitable rental housing and 
the likelihood of lifelong indebtedness for poor Malays aspiring to be part of the 
homeowners’ nation. I show how the Malays understand their housing predicament 
through racialised versions of property-mindedness that naturalise various racialised 
disparities.  
Overall, I hope to have made three contributions with this dissertation. My main 
contribution is retrieving a more inclusive story about the housing nation that has been 
underacknowledged. There is an added urgency in retrieving this invisible history as 
the generation who had lived the housing nation from the beginning will gradually no 
longer be present. For instance, Sazali and several important informants passed on in 




but also introduce parts of it that have never been articulated before. Specifically, how 
its housing achievement has come at a price. In bringing out these absent and silenced 
parts, these protagonists were aware of claiming stories that made clear the sensitivity 
between nation-building, race, and (re)housing in Singapore. The thesis is thus a 
voicing of an absent history – retrieving a history that is not even erased: non-existent 
and never spoken. And the thesis’ second contribution lies in this wider silence.  
Housing biography, as a novel methodological tool in this context, becomes powerful 
as it seeks to unsilence. That is, it allows a silent history to speak. Housing biography 
helps us understand the lived experiences that embody both structural constraints and 
individual agency. It also allows Malays’ emotions, memories, and sense of home to 
be captured as closely as possible and they feature the structural relationships that 
shape them the most. Different from a general biography, a housing biography is a 
specific story of individuals who lived (through) the housing nation but never spoke 
about it. Housing biography becomes a methodological instrument, in that it allows 
these individuals’ voices to be added to specific conversations. I thus add these 
narratives to relevant bodies of knowledge on multiracial nation-building, capitalist 
state-building, housing, and social mobility. The chapter now turns to the thesis’ third 




My third contribution is deepening an understanding of the entwined relationship 
between capitalist state-building and multiracial nation-building. One cannot be 
understood without the other and I show how this is especially important to understand 
in contexts of diversity through three concepts: the indigenous migrant-citizen, 
racialised property-mindedness, and the housing nation.  
Indigenous migrant-citizens  
The first concept, indigenous migrant-citizens, illustrates how indigenous 




Such language captures how citizenship paradoxically enabled an indigenous 
community to become migrant. Malays can thus be considered as ‘racialised outsiders’ 
(Virdee 2014) in the property state of Singapore. I further develop the account of 
Singapore as the property state by contextualising it within processes of multiracial 
nation-building. My housing biographies show how race was essential in the making 
and remaking of the property state in Singapore across five decades. The founding co-
constitution of race and nation (Marx 1998; Goh 2008) similarly took place in property 
state Singapore. To be clear, (re)moving the Southern Islanders who resided at the 
margins of the new nation – in the process of creating the property state – did not make 
them less indigenous. It was the erasure of the Nusantara home through redevelopment 
that had wiped out their only recently acknowledged history.  
The importance of rendering Malays into migrants has to be seen in the context of the 
Singapore’s multiracial meritocracy (Moore 2000). Turning Malays into migrants 
meant forgetting that the Malays are constitutionally recognised as the ‘indigenous 
people of the state’ whom the government had promised comprehensive protection in 
multiple aspects. This promise was made in view of the socio-ethnic stratification 
present at Singapore’s founding. With multiracial meritocracy, each community is 
valued according to their role in national development. Malays feel a lack of 
‘indigenous’ entitlement due to their apparent lack of contribution to progress. But this 
seeming deficiency emerged as a result of the founding narrative omitting vital periods 
in Malay history together with the property state hushing up the Malay casualties 
inherent in its making. This is further reinforced by their sustained low socioeconomic 
position.   
Indigenous entitlement becomes a form of unearned entitlement in postcolonial 
citizenship. The historical baggage of the Malays however is less to do with their 
indigeneity. Even if pre-1819 was a sleepy fishing village, the Malays can still claim 
indigeneity. The issue is to do with the presentation of immigration Singapore society, 
where there is a need to have a subject (the Malays) that is backward in order to present 
the Singapore Story. The government can then claim their part in making the Malays 
successful, through its multiracial meritocracy. The construction of the indigenous 




the notion of a multiracial meritocracy. This highlights why capitalist development 
including urban redevelopment has to be examined within Singapore’s multiracial 
meritocracy. How does this then relate to the second concept, racialised property-
mindedness?  
Racialised property-mindedness  
If the indigenous migrant-citizen concept shows the different forms of citizenship in 
‘racial states’ (Goldberg 2002), including the property state of Singapore, the concept 
of racialised property-mindedness highlights the social mechanisms that maintain its 
racialised hierarchies. In particular, I extend Haila’s concept of property-mindedness 
(2017) to include class and racial dimensions by showing how Malays conceive of and 
experience different kinds of property-mindedness. Instead of property-mindedness 
for the purposes of investment or as a retirement asset, their property-mindedness was 
far from profitmaking – it focussed, rather, on how to afford a mortgage with their 
modest income, most likely for the rest of their lives.  
While it is obvious how the culture of property-mindedness is the necessary disposition 
for Singapore as a property state to encourage endless redevelopment and relocation, 
its other function deflected the highly uneven personal and social cost of property-
mindedness. I show how Malays themselves cope with their housing situation through 
racialised property-mindedness that naturalises these racialised inequalities. The way 
to understand the attractiveness of property-mindedness is to situate it in the wider 
discourse of housing as social mobility. Property-mindedness seem to suggest agency, 
albeit constrained, for them. If they fail, they are not property-minded enough. Yet, 
when their property-mindedness fails, it is relegated to fate or they compare 
themselves to those within their own community who are below themselves on the 
housing ladder. A closer examination of the property state, through the housing 
biographies of the Malays, however, paints a picture of structural inequality in relation 
to these various facades of property-mindedness and reveals a racialised pattern of 
homeownership and rental. In other words, the anti-liberal property state (Haila 2016; 
Chua 2017) needs to be understood alongside the multiracial housing nation - where 




Un-homing has been defined as the process that disrupts links between individuals and 
communities, people and place, and results in displacement in various forms (Elliott-
Cooper et al. 2020). I expand the notion of un-homing by not only identifying the 
different un-homing processes but also its different levels, scales, and periodicities. 
These multiple processes of un-homing had occurred simultaneously or unfolded over 
a longer period of time. First, conceiving displacement longitudinally (see Shin 2019) 
allowed me to identify its point of occurrence as well as the duration of its impact. It 
highlighted how forms of displacement evolved over time. Second, I was able to derive 
a deeper conceptualisation of un-homing through the lens of multiracial nation-
building as well as capitalist state-building. Separation, which changed Malays into an 
indigenous minority, marked the beginning of their un-homing experiences. Un-
homing the Malays, in building the property state, had laid the foundations of the 
multiracial nation by ensuring perpetual diversity and ethnocultural mixing in state 
housing.  
Connections, or the severing of, is central to un-homing. Malays in the housing nation 
of Singapore were un-homed on multiple levels and scales. Firstly, there was a break 
in community ties with the Nusantara through Separation, and consequently their 
island community, family and communal culture through resettlement. 
Redevelopment led not only to the removal of homes, but an entire community and 
history of the place and its people. They were not just displaced but erased. 
Homeownership and racialised property-mindedness in the property state ironically 
had contributed to the Malay’s second level of un-homing. More than just a loss of 
majority status in their nation-state, it resulted in economic hardship.  This can be seen 
in how economic inequalities continue to mirror the ethnic inequalities. Malays in 
Singapore continue to be over-represented in domestic violence cases, marital 
dissolution, crime rates, drug abuse and prison population. 
Housing nation  
I had earlier referred to Singapore as ‘the housing nation,’ as it prided itself on its 
ability to house an entire nation within one generation. However, despite its emphasis 




citizens and racialised property-mindedness – had shown how the housing nation had 
cumulatively un-homed the Malays individually and as a community. Housing the 
Malays can be seen as un-homing an indigenous community and creating a highly 
unequal multiracial housing nation. And I show how the housing nation is ultimately 
about continual rehousing. It is not only sustained by but also emerged from rehousing 
citizens after Separation from a wider regional home.  
I link together processes of capitalist state-building with multiracial nation-building 
with these three concepts. And for each concept, while there was a dominant side of 
the argument, I also show how the other side of the argument was present. This third 
concept, the housing nation, builds on the two earlier concepts to unpack the housing 
nation as an urban redevelopment project. From the start, Singapore had been an urban 
redevelopment project, redeveloping from the Nusantara. It brings together two facets 
of redevelopment – capitalist resettlement and a notion of regional home or more 
accurately the break with it which highlights the racial aspects of the resettlement. It 
is critical to unpack the notion of housing nation that Singapore prides itself on due to 
the different levels of un-homing it is based on. Homes had preceded before the nation 
and the thesis has highlighted the foundational role housing has played in the 
production and reproduction of nation-state in Singapore. But what use are theories if 
they have no impact on reality? We turn now to these implications. 
 
Substantive implications 
Based on the empirical data, the Singaporean state can be characterised as a housing 
nation. However, can this concept be applied to other states? As with most nation-
states, housing plays a crucial role in the (re)production of the nation-state. This is 
especially so for countries in the global South, especially in the East, where the 
experiences of industrialisation and urbanisation are highly condensed (see Chen and 
Shin 2019). Late-industrialized Asian economies such as mainland China, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan took 25 years or less to attain the level of 
economic development that developed countries such as Germany, United Kingdom, 




instance, Singapore was not just able to house the entire nation but achieved the status 
of First World in a single generation.  
My analysis of housing nation could be extended to Hong Kong in particular. As a 
fellow former British colony and city-state, Hong Kong share many commonalities 
with Singapore in terms of high density and high-rise residential housing estates due 
to limited land resources. Redevelopment became inevitable with population growth, 
where Hong Kong has been referred to as an ‘urban (re)development regime’ (Tang 
2008, 2017). Importantly, Hong Kong has also been identified as a property state 
(Haila 2000, 2016, 2017). This means that Hong Kong possesses similar key aspects 
such as substantial state ownership of land, buoyant real estate market and the 
disposition needed to sustain a property state. Ley and Teo (2014) discusses Hong 
Kong’s prevalent ‘culture of property’, which mirrors the culture of 
propertymindedness in Singapore. It functions to ‘obscure the working of a familiar 
set of class relations in the housing market’ (ibid.: 1301) and create an environment 
where ‘demolition and eviction seem to be naturalized as an inevitable part of urban 
life’ (ibid.: 1299).  
While both Singapore and Hong Kong share similar property state characteristics, 
important differences prevail. The population makeup and history of Hong Kong 
differs from the Chinese-majority Singapore that is geographically located in a Malay 
region – dubbed ‘Israel in Southeast Asia’ (see Kausikan 2019). Just like the 
uniqueness and non-transferability of the ‘Singapore model’ (see Chua 2011; Shatkin 
2014), the housing nation concept might perhaps apply to Singapore alone. It is one 
created from and maintained through un-homing an indigenous group into a highly 
unequal (multiracial) society.  
 
Policy implications  
Despite the universalist rhetoric of the Singaporean state, the implications of its 
housing policies have been uneven, adversely impacting the Malay community. In 




across different levels. The first has to be acknowledgement. Fostering Malay 
homeownership is a component of the property state (Haila 2016: 111), which had 
detrimental effects on the Malays. The loss of Malay homes laid the foundation for the 
property state - yet for the Malays, it resulted in cultural and economic losses. As my 
empirical data has shown, the model of property state did not consider the ‘indigenous’ 
question of a people to displace. Retrieving more housing biographies would 
supplement the present aracial narrative of property state. Without these housing 
biographies, the Malay ‘contribution’ to the Singapore Story remains absent. And this 
would further entrench the Malay dislocation, which centres on the agony of losing a 
place that held one’s story. 
Another policy intervention must address the scarcity of information regarding its 
housing policies, in particular public rental housing and SERS. There needs to be more 
transparency on the racial representation of public rental residents. This candidness 
constitutes a first step toward assessing the effectiveness of multiracial meritocracy. 
With regards to SERS, the government’s long-term plan is to ‘allow more 
Singaporeans a chance to experience large-scale redevelopment - something 
previously restricted to those part of the SERS’ by introducing a scheme called 
Voluntary Early Redevelopment Scheme or VERS (ST 22 November 2018). Unlike 
SERS, VERS is a voluntary scheme offered to residents of selected precincts aged 70 
years and older. This means more residents will be involved in urban redevelopment 
and there needs to be more in-depth studies, on urban redevelopment’s effect on 
residents, going beyond the regular SERS satisfaction surveys by HDB. More 
information on the existing SERS needs to be accessible for research, if not discussion. 
Chang (1999: 26)  warns of a possible outcome in over-emphasis on the ‘meritorious 
and “wise-man” mode of governance in Singapore’: 
In the long run, pluralistic ignorance or the spiral of silence among the 
public may permeate the society, weakening the foundation and process 
for any public policy discussion to emerge openly and rationally in a way 
that serves the best interest of most people. 
Transparency-enhancing mechanisms that involve numerous stakeholders in the 




the day, it is not the claims of ‘being’ a model multiracial city but initiatives that 
contribute to ‘making’ an inclusive home rich in gotong royong.   
--- 
The more stories I wrote about my protagonists, the more I listened to their stories in 
order to do justice to them, the more I began to unknow my home. And in re-telling 
my world-class home, it became clearer to me how my home and its underlying 
structures had allowed un-homing practices to exist unchallenged and, in this 
unchallenged silence, become more entrenched. It felt like a form of violence, of a 
potent kind – unseen but felt, unheard but shared. Their stories resonated with me as 
Malay. It was as much their story that it was mine. Singapore is my home. I can identify 
another Singaporean in any international airports by their accent and, of course, their 
use of Singlish terms – a colloquial form of English in Singapore. And yet I am not so 
identifiable. In my university building in Edinburgh, more often than not, I am asked 
if I am from Malaysia. My standard response would be lined with many buts: ‘I am 
Malay, but I am from Singapore; but you are close, Malaysia is our neighbour’. Such 
a response is typically greeted with a mixture of confusion, polite nods and awkward 
smiles. That would be my cue to just leave the subject, usually at the lift door. 
Constrained places are not the best places to talk about how Malays are a minority in 
a Chinese-majority city, in a wider Malay Archipelago. There is just no escape. 
Like other major cities, Singapore is also characterized by contradictions. I still cannot 
get used to feeling surprised when people tell me they have heard of Singapore – in 
the best way. Singapore is clean, green, corruption-free, organised, ‘first-world’, 
developed, a food paradise, efficient. The stream of superlatives is endless. I did not 
know how to respond when the world was fed a story about my home in the midst of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The hidden contradictions of this world-class city were put 
in a global spotlight as a result of the pandemic. Who would have thought that 
pandemics make space for lost stories and hidden narratives? The headline of a BBC 
news article summarised it all: ‘COVID-19 Singapore: A pandemic of inequality 
exposed’ (BBC News 18 September 2020). Another identified the Malay community 
as especially affected by the pandemic since they are located at the bottom of the 




much of the Malay community had already been vulnerable - and had been so for many 
years (Li 1989; Rahim 1998).  
Still, the pandemic’s hardest hit community in Singapore is the migrant workers. By 6 
May 2020, 87.9% of the 20,198 cases of confirmed COVID-19 in Singapore were low-
skilled migrant workers. They tend to be Indian and Bangladeshi nationals (The New 
York Times 28 April 2020). This was due to the extremely poor and cramped living 
conditions in dormitories, which became flash-points for the spread of any and all 
infections. All of a sudden they became visible, and migrant housing became visible. 
Will the pandemic hold the Singapore government accountable in keeping this city – 
shared among migrant workers, residents, and everyone else – as a place fit to call 
home? Perhaps, the minimum requirement for homes is a safe place to eat, sleep at 
night, and go to the bathroom. During the lockdown in Singapore, migrant workers 
even developed a fear of visiting the toilet in the dormitories (ST 6 April 2020)  In one 
of first media accounts noting how ‘a sudden Coronavirus surge [had] brought out 
Singapore’s dark side’, the writer unravelled the ‘hardest truths of the city [that] have 
been exposed’, but which had of course always shaped Singapore life: ‘the unflinching 
approach to importing people for hard, cheap labour and the willingness to diminish 
individual rights in a flood of collective good’. The chief individual right in Singapore 
is a right to housing. It is not that Singapore is a city without a conscience, but its 
conscience is only reserved for the majority, the privileged majority. The pandemic hit 
hardest migrant workers in public dormitories, while other Singaporean residents had 
the benefits of better public housing. Thus, whilst the Malay community has also been 
particularly vulnerable given their economic placement and housing situation, even 
more precarious and dangerous has been the housing situation of the housing nation’s 
migrant workers. This pandemic has brought into sharper focus Singapore’s racialised 
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